JB_129_010.xml

Title: [12 Aug 1809 Parl Reform Qualification]

Description: 12 Aug 1809

Parl Reform Qualification of Electors

Case in which all Electors by pursuing each his own interest (in respect of the

choice of Representative) might yet counteract the interest of the whole candidate is

a rule powerful – each Elector so poor that he is forced to give up his lasting to

his […?] interests, the Candidate bribes him with his own money.

Remedy – Check the duration of Representatives situation so short that viz[?] that it

shall not be worth his while to employ bribery

No one permanent class of men whose interests are

constantly and habitually sacrificed. No Helots[?] – No slaves &c

But the less opulent a variable description of men are habitually sacrificed to more

opulence

Remedies against Corruption from[?] the course[?] – in addition to d o against bribery at large

1. Keeping the matter of bribery in excess out of the hands of the Commons this is

now[?] become impossible

2. Keeping it from being applied to the Judges over […?] in such manner as to

influence their judicial conduct: this the only recourse.

Remedies against bribery at large

1. Electors numerous – bribery the[?] expence

2. Duration of Parliament short – bribery not worth while

3. Voting epistolary: thence occasion of expence over portion for bribery

/corruptive/ expence lessened

4. Voting by ballot: the /each man’s/ right being previously established

5. Annuality: the seat not worth bribing for.

On the supposition of universal suffrage each Elector could not do wrong if

independently of any sinister interest that might be employed to influence his vote

he pursued his own interest and that his permanent interest – his having a a compleat

and correct conception of that interest.

Wealth comes under consideration

1. as being possessed or receivable by an Elector.

2. as being possessed by a person possessing an influence either over the will or the

understanding of an Elector.

When an Elector feels himself incapable of forming any judgment on the merits of a

Candidate any the slightest neat[?] packet of personal advantage will be sufficient

to determine him: and if he sees no such advantage he will not give himself the

trouble of going to vote.

He sees no mischief that can ensue from his acceptance of a bribe: I[?]

And it does not follow that because a man will accept a bribe on ordinary occasions,

he will on every occasion ... where he feels himself capable of forming a judgment.

{ Corruption from /by/ individuals much less mischievous than d o

by the Crown.

{Bribery} /Corruption/ of Electors by the Crown is no further of mischievous than as

it determines them to choose a Representative who would be corrupted by the Crown,

but this result may be considered as certain

Corruption of Electors by individuals is no further mischievous than as it

determines them to choose a representative who would be comparatively unfit either by

want of probity or intelligence

A representative can never of himself produce in parliament any mischievous result,

to do so he must have on the question in question a majority on his side.

But by selling himself to the Crown he may not on each question /proposition/

supposed by the crown contribute to the success of that measure but he may moreover

get a measure in which he has a sinister interest carried for him by the Crown. }

{The only corruption therefore which is seriously formidable is that in which

mediately or immediately the Crown is the corrupter.}

{Duration short loses.

1. Making bribery not worth a lot (viz. occasional but the Crown is a permanent

briber)

2. Preservation of Members probity Not worth while to plan

the […?] of a Member, when the fellow[?] may be ousted from it the next year

3. Promoting intelligence on the part of Members, by making them ashamed of […?]

& silent votes.

4. In case of frequent change producing competition, emulating[?] intent[?]

5. Securing Members attendance.}

In the hands of an electors advisor, wealth considered as an index of superior

probity and intelligence may serve to guard him against wealth administered to him by

means of corruption.

In the case of Electors probity is no otherwise of use viz. to himself as to that of

fellow subjects – than in so far as it is accompanied by intelligence in so far as he

acts under the guidance of intelligence

The intelligence under the guidance of which he acts may be his own or borrowed.

In so far as he is free and pure

an Elector, if conscious of inability to judge for himself will borrow a judgment of

the person or persons whom he looks upon as best qualified to give it

Instruction is of no […?] where men are steeled against it by sinister interest

If Elenboro’ and Percival had their will there would be no

more liberty in England than in France. Their power to this

purpose is but suspended.

Voting Epistolary

Advantages

1. Electors in many districts may vote in all without trouble or expence.

125_058.xml

Title: [11[?] May 1811 - C Influence]

Description: 11[?] May 1811 - C

Influence

Part I

Ch.3. J.B.’s Proposition

13

Influence, supposing it to be undue, sinister, and as such pernicious is so only in proportion as it is effective /efficient/.

In the House of Commons there exists no source of sinister influence, the influence from which it, at least in comparison of that of the Crown, supposing that of the Crown to admitt of the epithet sinister, in any case, effective: scarcely any that can in any case /instance/ be looked to as being positively and absolutely in any degree effective. By that influence which operates by fear, or at least by fear and hope and gratitude at the same time, it can in all ordinary cases secure an absolute majority. At no time /On no occasion/ does there exist a person or set of persons having in his or their hands the means of securing any such result.

Coercion Coercive influence, wishing by fear, by fear of losing /the loss of/ necessaries as well as by hope and gratitude is stronger than corruptive influence working by nothing but hope or gratitude hope of superfluity receivable, or gratitude for superfluity received.

Corruptive influence which having at its disposal the matter of wealth in the largest masses, and things capable of being received without countervailing[?] /danger or apprehension of[?]/ evil or disadvantage in the shape of loss of character will be more effective than corruptive influence which can not operate but in masses comparatively much smaller, nor that without danger and apprehension of such loss.

JB_126_307.xml

Title: [20 Aug 1809 + Parl y Reform]

Description: 20 Aug 1809 +

Parl y Reform

Influence V.

Corruption

'. Office corrupts more than Bribe.

1

1

A contrivance (flimsy) for defending and [...?] or the cases in which it is most efficient and impressive.

'. Office is more corruptive than any /a/ bribe.

But a distinction is /has been/ taken, & owed[?] there are certain shapes forsooth[?], in which the application of a matter of good, though applied under the same conditions, and to produce the same line of conduct as it is applied to produce in the case where the application of it would be corruptive and bribery beyond dispute, is neither the one nor the other. And which are these cases? precisely those in which its influence is most feasible and irresistible.

For a Member to receive of a Member a bribe - say in the shape of a Banknote of ,10 or ,500 or ,1000, is dishonest wicked scandalous, shameful, in a word whatsoever in your indignation you may be pleased to call it. And why dishonest? - because by the conditions in which it is given the member by whom it is received engages himself to the Minister by whom it is administered, to give his vote and support to some one[?] measure which perhaps he thinks a bad one and to which perhaps he would not have given his vote or his support otherwise {- Now in this case where is the dependence of the Member? where is the dependence of the person corrupted on his corruptor? - None.}

For a /the same or any other/ Member to receive of the same or any other Minister not merely the ,500 or the ,1000 once paid, the ,5000 or the ,1,000 by which no dependence is created, but a place with or without duty, with or without dignity and power attached to it bringing in to him each and every year while he continues in possession of it a repetition of this same ,500 or ,1,000 - in all this there is nothing but what is fair and honourable. But why honourable the acceptance this so much greater portion of the matter of good while in the other case the acceptance of a so much lesser portion is so base and scandalous. By the base compact, the Trustee was barred /stood engaged[?]/ to nothing more than the committing a breach of trust on some one occasion at some one single instance. By the honourable compact he stands engaged to committ during his continuance in the receipt of this permanent bribe