125_040.xml

Title: [6 June 1810 §.3 Influence Ch]

Description: 6 June 1810 §.3

Influence

Ch. Influence undue & not

§.3. Influence where proper

4

But in the case in which it is by understanding as well as upon understanding that the influence is exercised, are there not (it may be asked) cases in which the influence is with propriety termed undue? In arguments[?] - the reasons that are employed - suppose it to be to the imagination merely, to the passions merely that they are addressed: or if to the judgment - suppose them to be all of them of a fallacious or deceptitious nature and tendency - of the class of reasonings /arguments/ called sophisms or fallacies? among /of/ all these is there any one which exercised or endeavoured to be exercised upon the understanding by the understanding is not undue?

My answer is - that in these cases to say that the influence exercised is undue is an expression to which the imputation of impropriety could hardly be attributed /affixed/. But in this case to avoid ambiguity, the better way seems to be, in speaking of the influence - not to say that it is undue, but that it is proper influence - influence of a proper species, unduly exercised, exercised in an undue manner.  Add matter influential matter, not undue being matter operating not immediately on the will.

Be this as it may, the practical use of the distinction is this. Influence of understanding over understanding, even when unduly exercised as above, can only to a theoretical purpose be termed undue: it is only the influence of will over will that to a practical purpose can generally speaking at least, be termed undue. Influence of will over will is, when unduly exerted, capable of being repressed by legal prohibition, enforced by penal inflictions: nor is there any body that in such a case would be inclined to object to the use of these.

JB_126_174.xml

Title: [10 June 1810 Influence Ch.]

Description: 10 June 1810

Influence

Ch.

' Influence convenient

2

This /The/ ambiguity, and along with it the advantage it affords to the defenders of abuse, shews itself in two forms /shapes/ -

1. In the first place comes the property which the word has of bringing to view /presenting to the mind/ along with the object which is really noxious another, and to at least an equal extent which is really innoxious. The good being thus confounded with the bad in /under/ the same appellation, the person with the {remedy} /useful medicament/ /aliment/, it is not without diffidence and hesitation /faultering/ that a man can bring himself to pass condemnation on both together, on the compound and unanalysed mass.

2. Another circumstance which contributes, how imperceptibly soever contributes to blunt the edge of resentment and censure when directed against this object /influence/, is the uncertainly in which /the cloud of uncertainty which hovers over/ the efficiency of the thing /influence/ /power in question/ is involved.

As there may be influence which is not /not being/ exercised over the will is on that account innoxious, so there may be influence which though exercised over the will, over a will over which it ought not be exercised, at least by the person by or on the part of whom it is exercised, is till not noxious /innoxious/. For on any given occasion to be noxious i.e. to be productive of a noxious effect it must be productive of some effect, but without producing any noxious effect, without producing any effect at all, it may happen to influence to have been exercised. It will have been thus inefficiently exercised, if when exercised on one part, it is not followed by correspondent obsequiousness on the other.

JB_126_176.xml

Title: [May 1810 Defence of Economy]

Description: May 1810

Defence of Economy

Ch.

'. Influence convenient

4

Where in compliance with custom the word influence is employed, and tokens of reprobation attached at the same time to the thing it is employed to express, explanations or restrictions ought then all along to be kept constantly attached to it.

1. First that it is over the will of some person that it is exercised, and that by the will of some one else

2. That the person by whom it is exercised is a person on whose conduct the person over whose will it is exercised is designed and supposed to operate as a check

3. Thirdly, that in the instances in question its operation has been effectual /effective/ - i.e. that on the part of the person on whose will the influence has been exercised, obsequiousness as towards the influences will have been produced: and that no doubt may remain, that such conduct has been produced, as but for the exercise of the influence would not on the part of the person in question, have had place.

If of the person on /to/ whose will the influence has applied itself the conduct is exactly the same as it would have been had no such influence applied itself the influence is to every practical purpose no influence at all. Not having been productive on any effect at all it can not have been productive of any bad effect.