date

Dec 1809 Parl y. Reform Ch
Dec 1809

Parl y. Reform

Ch.1. Explanations

'.5. Matter its modifications

2

7

1. Trusts[?] so important

2. Quantity of corrupt matter so great

{ 4 As to the first point, there are two circumstance in the view /under the aspect/ of which, although there be / were?/ not a particle of the matter of good that is not in the character of matter an efficient cause of corruption - in a word of criminality /delinquency/ and vice in all their shapes, susceptible /capable/ of being applied in and by other hands than the King's, and thence to other evil[?] purposes than the King under the influence of his separate and sinister interest is liable to propose to /set before/ himself, yet when compared with the mischief to the influx of which the community is exposed from this most copious and highest source, the utmost possible quantity of mischief producible in this way by any such private hands shrinks into nothing: these are}

{ 4. That in comparison of the species of trust, the breach of which is liable in this instance to be brought to pass the mischief producible by the breach of any other trust, not to say of all other trusts put together, is inconsiderable.}

{ 2. That whereas /while/ in the case of individual corruptors the aggregate mass of sinister interest by which taken together they are excited on the one hand to be /become/ corruptors on the other hand to become corrupted is in an indefinite degree divided: and that in such sort and degrees the mischievous effect of the corruption administered by one hand is capable of being lessened or done away by the effect of corruption, administered by another.

Take for example the case of the trust attached to the situation of parliamentary electors[?]. One elector is bribed by a candidate on one side, another elector by a candidate on the other. If so it be that the candidate who suceeds is probity intelligence and active qualifications taken together so it be that the successful candidate is equally fit with the unsuccessful one in ultimate mischief at least in the individual instance in question, [...?]: if more fit, instead of mischief the result of the corruption is in the individual instance in question, an actual ballance of good.}
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    In both stations /In each of these situations/ the quantity of mischief producible by the corruption was considered in respect of three distinguishable parts: 1. that part by which the interest /welfare/ of the of the public at large is assisted, /prejudiced,/ exclusive /independently/ of any damage which may be considered as done to /sustained by/ the moral part of the mental frame /mind/ of the individuals concerned in the transaction. 2. that part which consists[?] in the damage done to /moral damage sustained by/ the mind of the individual to whom the matter of corruption is administered: 3. that part which consists in the damage done to /sustained by/ the mind of the individual, when there is one, by whom the matter of corruption is administered.

    As to the mental damage or moral part of the mischief, in both stations viz. that of Member and that of Elector - and in each station in the instance of both parties (when there are two[)] by whom a part is borne in the corruption process, it has been shewn that either its very existence is precarious /indeterminable/ or at the utmost its amount is inconsiderable: so inconsiderable, that in comparison of the more public part of the mischief and for the purpose of the construction of the scale here in question, it may without considerable error be neglected.
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    But in the case of parliamentary corruption the seat of the disorder comprizes /disorder affects /applies itself to// two situations /stations/: viz. that of Member {of Parliament} and that of Elector: and in each of those situations corruption considered as the effect supposes and requires two different persons to be concerned in the production of it, viz the person to /by/ whom it /the matter of corruption/ is administered: and in the instance of each of these persons the disorder may require to be considered, forasmuch as it has been customary to consider it /customarily considered/, with respect to its influence on two distinguishable objects, a general and a particular one viz. the welfare /health/ of the country, and the health of the corrupted persons mind.

    Moreover in each situation the part of corruptor may be performed on the one hand by the King or an agent of the Kings: or on the other hand by some individual not[?] dependent on either the one or the other.

    In regard to the treatment of this disorder /offence[?]/ /species of delinquency/ or supposed disorder, if such it be to be stiled two dispositions seem to have been hitherto very generally prevalent: 1. in the first place a disposition and that a determinate one to foster it, and preserve it /to give encouragement /protection/ and encrease to it/ not only from cure /suppression/ but even from all abatement /check/; and a disposition /coupled with /all the time with/ disposition towards the offence[?] a disposition/ to apply punishment to it: always understood and provided, that by the application of the punishment no such effect will or shall or will be produced as the /any/ abatement, or much less the extirpation but rather the aggravation /the exacerbation/ of offence, in a word, for form's and reputation's sake to apply punishment to it, but so as, by confining the punishment to the cases in which the offence[?] is productive of least mischief or of no mischief at all, so to manage as that by the very punishment the mischief of offence so far from extirpated or so much as checked shall be encreased: things being so managed that by confining the punishment to the cases in which the offence if productive of little or no mischief, the offence /delinquency/ shall be confined to those channels[?] in which the mischief producible by it, is at its highest pitch.
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    '.1. Leading principles.

    Of influence exercised on the one part, be it influence of understanding on understanding, be it influence of will on will - be it of the coercive kind, be it of the alluring /inviting/ kind - be it legitimate, be it sinister and illegitimate - in so far as it is efficient, the result, on the other part, is obsequiousness.

    Every thing - as hath above been so fully explained - every thing depends upon obsequiousness: upon the existence or non-existence of undue obsequiousness, as towards the corruptor general or any casual corruptor, on behalf of the trustee and agent or rather him who should be /being in fact the trustee of right ought to be/ the agent of the people.

    A breach of trust of this sort does it never take place? None except what /such/ difference as may happen to be produced in respect of the talents and intellectual endowments and talents of the representative by a competent or incompetent set of Electors, no matter who the Electors are nor wheth[?] corrupted or in any and what degree corrupted.

    If in any instance a representative who is either absolutely unfit for the trust or less fit than some other that might have been obtained for it happens to be placed in it, and the substitution has not on the part of the Electors any error or judgment for the cause, what it must have had for its cause is resolvable into a manifestation of undue[?] obsequiousness on the part of the number requisite to produce the/ this/ undesirable effect /result/.