date

18 Nov r 1809 Parl. Reform Plan
18 Nov r 1809

Parl. Reform Plan

'.2. No moral binding

11

6

2. Here is an occasion for a man[?] in the situation this[?] dependent to display the independence of his mind. Rebels[?] in this case [...?] as necessary the will of his constituent or in other cases as necessary d o of King.

Neither From any manifestation thus made of independence of mind in an office which in a degree proportioned to the amount of the value of it in the eyes of him that holds it renders him dependent in point of situation - neither from any such manifestation in this or that particular instance nor from a general observance of the rule /any such general rule as that/ which requires it to be made can any ultimate and preponderant prejudice [...?] to the interest of the whole. I mean always under a system under which the recurrence of the process election should be frequent in any such degree viz. annual as that here proposed. For no sooner does the next election day arrive, than the Electors in question, taking into consideration the whole line of the conduct of their representative since the last preceding Election day, have then an opinion of pronouncing their judgment upon it, and in pursuance of such judgement to re-elect him or dismiss him as they think fit. If in going counter to their opinion: to their will and their instructions, he presents himself to their votes as having gone counter to his own opinion of what is right, their opinion reprobating his conduct on the score[?] of want of probity will have been pronounced, his dismission at their hands will follow as of course. And even in their eyes should even his probity remain unimpeached, still /even in that way/ it may happen to him to present himself to their view as being to such a degree wanting /deficient/ in power[?] of intelligence, that some other candidate /person/ may present himself to their view as being likely to be more fit in respect of both qualifications taken together than their former representative.
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