date

18 Nov r 1809 Parl. Reform Plan
18 Nov r 1809

Parl. Reform Plan

Ch.3. Dependence on Constituents

'.2. No moral binding

12

7

It is a mark of want of intelligence or probity to profess[?] a determination blindly to follow instructions

The same man who would do this for a suit would do this for an office.

In the situation of a Candidate, or of a Member looking to become a Candidate, shall a man then declare to his constituents actual or expected to be or actually such, a determination on his part to pay obedience to whatsoever instructions shall on any subject whatsoever, or on this or that particular subject be delivered to him? Of a deficiency in one or other or both of two /the two primary qualifications/ endowments, intelligence or probity or intelligence, a declaration to any such effect seems to afford us[?] but two conclusive marks /evidence/ of intelligence, in not being able /in respect of /through/ his inability/ to form in relation to the subject in question an opinion of his own - insomuch that, for want of such ability, he, notwithstanding the superiority of his means of judging, so far, to wit, as concerns /depends/ upon information from without, he who is so much better equipped for judging is ready on all occasions, or at least on this or that occasion ready to give up the task of forming an opinion to those whose external means of judging, as above, are to such a degree inferior to his own: - of probity, inasmuch as expecting to be able to form in his own mind in relation to all such subjects whatsoever as are liable to come before him for his vote, or at least in relation to all such as appear to him likely to engage the attention of his constituents an opinion juster than theirs is likely to be, he is content to sacrifice his own more trustworthy to their less trustworthy opinion, or in other words to sacrifice the interest of the public to some private and sinister interest of his own by which such sacrifice has been commanded at his hands.
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  • Title: [18 Nov r 1809 Parl. Reform Plan]
    Description: 18 Nov r 1809

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    '.2. No moral binding

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    2. Here is an occasion for a man[?] in the situation this[?] dependent to display the independence of his mind. Rebels[?] in this case [...?] as necessary the will of his constituent or in other cases as necessary d o of King.

    Neither From any manifestation thus made of independence of mind in an office which in a degree proportioned to the amount of the value of it in the eyes of him that holds it renders him dependent in point of situation - neither from any such manifestation in this or that particular instance nor from a general observance of the rule /any such general rule as that/ which requires it to be made can any ultimate and preponderant prejudice [...?] to the interest of the whole. I mean always under a system under which the recurrence of the process election should be frequent in any such degree viz. annual as that here proposed. For no sooner does the next election day arrive, than the Electors in question, taking into consideration the whole line of the conduct of their representative since the last preceding Election day, have then an opinion of pronouncing their judgment upon it, and in pursuance of such judgement to re-elect him or dismiss him as they think fit. If in going counter to their opinion: to their will and their instructions, he presents himself to their votes as having gone counter to his own opinion of what is right, their opinion reprobating his conduct on the score[?] of want of probity will have been pronounced, his dismission at their hands will follow as of course. And even in their eyes should even his probity remain unimpeached, still /even in that way/ it may happen to him to present himself to their view as being to such a degree wanting /deficient/ in power[?] of intelligence, that some other candidate /person/ may present himself to their view as being likely to be more fit in respect of both qualifications taken together than their former representative.
  • Title: [18 Nov r 1809 + Ch.3. '.2 Parl. Reform]
    Description: 18 Nov r 1809 + Ch.3. '.2

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    Ch.3. dependence on Constituent

    '.2. No moral binding

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    '.2. Instructions ought not to be considered as morally binding.

    6 or 1. As to an obligation of the moral kind: an obligation of this cast /nature/ it is not in the nature of any such arrangement to [...?].

    1. As to his speeches - not to the delivery of his opinions with the arguments /considerations/ on which they are grounded and by which they have been produced, if any such arguments /considerations/ present themselves as to have appear likely to throw useful light on the subject, and to be conducive to the engaging the majority of his colleagues to pursue on the occasion the course most subservient to the interest of the whole community, such considerations not having been nor being likely to be exhibited with equal advantage from any other quarter, if he suppresses them he violates his duty /the duty by which he bound/ to the whole community and that even by such reticence, and in whatsoever degree opposite /contrary/ to those opinions the /any/ instructions of his particular constituents may happen to have been.

    But if it be not in the nature of power of any such instructions to impose on him in relation to any discourse of the above description so much as the negative obligation of reticence, of preserving silence, still /much/ less can they have any such effect as that of imposing on him the positive obligation of employing /using/ falshood or deceit: - of falshood in misrepresenting facts; of deceit in giving /exhibiting/ as correct and conclusive arguments which to his own eyes present themselves as incorrect /deceptitious/ or inconclusive.
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    Description: 18 Nov r 1809

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    Ch.3. Dependence on Constituent

    '.1. No legal binding

    3

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    2. If /Supposing the instructions/ framed by any proportion less than that of a majority of a man's constituents, removing or otherwise punishing a man for non-compliance with any such instructions would have /involve/ this inconsistency and incongruity, viz. the giving to a minority the power of over-ruling and over throwing the act of the majority. By the act of the majority he has been pronounced trustworthy on all occasions, and as one who ought so to be deemed until the stated time for the review of his whole conduct comes to pass. But here is an occasion in which by the act of the minority he is treated as one in whom it is not fit that sort and degree of confidence should be reposed.

    3. If framed by a proportion amounting to a majority, the greater this majority, the less the probability that they will all of them, or to the amount of a bare majority have had in relation to any such conception of the evidence and the arguments bearing upon the question any such conception as in point of correctness and compleatness taken together shall be equal to that which had been possessed or were about to be possessed by the /their trustee and/ representative /delegate/.