158_337.xml

Title: [[clviii. 337] 1822 July 27.]

Description: [clviii. 337]

1822 July 27.

Constitut. Code Expositive or Rationale?

1. Misrule what - it has place in so far as greatest happiness end is departed from.

2. Necessary cause of such misrule, inaptitude in rulers.

3. Cause of moral inaptitude self preference.

4. Effect of self-preference in a ruler to the extent of competition, real or supposed, sacrifice of all other's happiness to his own.

5. Right and proper interest that which prompts him to pursue greatest happiness of all.

6. Sinister interest that which prompts him to pursue his own to the sacrifice of other interests.

7. Power in so far as given to the end, its exercise being directed to the encrease of another's happiness, a trust: in so far as directed to the encrease of any other person's happiness to the sacrifice of do. of such principal or │   │ trust, such sinister direction is a breach or violation of trust.

8. In proportion as breach of trust has place to trustees benefit, so has corruption: trust-breaker is corrupt: acts a corrupt part.

9. Benefit in this case is matter of corruption.

10. Matter of corruption - its modifications. See elswhere.

11. Commonly to corruption two parties - Corruptor and Corruptee.

12. But the effect may be produced by a single individual: he is then self corruptor: left hand corrupts right

13. Party, to the dtriment of whose interest corruption in a trustee has place, the principal: lawyers say [...?]-que-trust.

14. Cases of corruption particularized.

Case 1. Self-corruption: more common appellatives are Embezzlement and Peculation

Mr. Steward, having in his hands property of his principal, Mr Bull, embezzles it.

15. Case 2. Trustee, one Mr. Steward. Principal, Mr. Bull. Stranger Mr Frank, by benefit to Steward, engages him to allow Frank to purloin it.

16. Case 3. Trustees two. Mr. Foreman, Mr. Steward. Foreman and Steward having property of Bulls at their disposal, Foreman and Steward by confederacy give each of them a part to the other.

17. Case 1. Absolute Monarchy

Case 3. Limited Monarchy. Foreman and Steward being parties break the cob-web-chains, cast off the limitation.

Case 2 is mentioned for explanation: occurrs on occasion under absolute Monarchy: under limited the need of it is superseded by │   │ and impunity.

18. In Monarchy, whether in Monarch's situation corruption can have place, depends on the theory on which the Monarchy is justified: │   │ as a relation between Monarch and subjects.

JB_127_064.xml

Title: [30 Aug 1809 Parl y. Reform]

Description: 30 Aug 1809

Parl y. Reform

Ch Curwen's Act

3

3

The persons to whom the mischief and guilt of bribery & corruption ought to be imputed are - not the bribed or bribers - but those who rival[?] a state of things in which such corruption is unpreventable. So of Perjury &c of Jurors &c Bribery of an Examiner &c two [...?] made necessary.

The act has two professed objects.

One is to prevent places from being given for seats by Ministers.

The other is to prevent money or money's worth from being given for seats by persons at large.

Of these the effect (and can it be too much to say the design?) the effect at any rate is to facilitate and protect what it professes to prevent.

What it forbids to be done - it forbids to be done - how? - answer "by any express Contract or Agreement." - What then is the inference? that it may be done "by any" implied "contract or agreement": by any contract or agreement that is not " express". Now as to any thing that could never be called an express contract or agreement, in what instance was such a business ever done? In none whatever. What then is it that is done by the pretended prohibition? It prohibits, though even that in a manner that as will be seen presently would never be effectual, the doing the thing in a manner in which it never was done, nor ever would be attempted: and in and by the very terms of the pretended /this sham/ prohibition, it tips the wink to the intended transgressor, and points out to him that he is still at perfect liberty to do it in the only way in which it would ever have entered into head to attempt doing it.

JB_129_010.xml

Title: [12 Aug 1809 Parl Reform Qualification]

Description: 12 Aug 1809

Parl Reform Qualification of Electors

Case in which all Electors by pursuing each his own interest (in respect of the

choice of Representative) might yet counteract the interest of the whole candidate is

a rule powerful – each Elector so poor that he is forced to give up his lasting to

his […?] interests, the Candidate bribes him with his own money.

Remedy – Check the duration of Representatives situation so short that viz[?] that it

shall not be worth his while to employ bribery

No one permanent class of men whose interests are

constantly and habitually sacrificed. No Helots[?] – No slaves &c

But the less opulent a variable description of men are habitually sacrificed to more

opulence

Remedies against Corruption from[?] the course[?] – in addition to d o against bribery at large

1. Keeping the matter of bribery in excess out of the hands of the Commons this is

now[?] become impossible

2. Keeping it from being applied to the Judges over […?] in such manner as to

influence their judicial conduct: this the only recourse.

Remedies against bribery at large

1. Electors numerous – bribery the[?] expence

2. Duration of Parliament short – bribery not worth while

3. Voting epistolary: thence occasion of expence over portion for bribery

/corruptive/ expence lessened

4. Voting by ballot: the /each man’s/ right being previously established

5. Annuality: the seat not worth bribing for.

On the supposition of universal suffrage each Elector could not do wrong if

independently of any sinister interest that might be employed to influence his vote

he pursued his own interest and that his permanent interest – his having a a compleat

and correct conception of that interest.

Wealth comes under consideration

1. as being possessed or receivable by an Elector.

2. as being possessed by a person possessing an influence either over the will or the

understanding of an Elector.

When an Elector feels himself incapable of forming any judgment on the merits of a

Candidate any the slightest neat[?] packet of personal advantage will be sufficient

to determine him: and if he sees no such advantage he will not give himself the

trouble of going to vote.

He sees no mischief that can ensue from his acceptance of a bribe: I[?]

And it does not follow that because a man will accept a bribe on ordinary occasions,

he will on every occasion ... where he feels himself capable of forming a judgment.

{ Corruption from /by/ individuals much less mischievous than d o

by the Crown.

{Bribery} /Corruption/ of Electors by the Crown is no further of mischievous than as

it determines them to choose a Representative who would be corrupted by the Crown,

but this result may be considered as certain

Corruption of Electors by individuals is no further mischievous than as it

determines them to choose a representative who would be comparatively unfit either by

want of probity or intelligence

A representative can never of himself produce in parliament any mischievous result,

to do so he must have on the question in question a majority on his side.

But by selling himself to the Crown he may not on each question /proposition/

supposed by the crown contribute to the success of that measure but he may moreover

get a measure in which he has a sinister interest carried for him by the Crown. }

{The only corruption therefore which is seriously formidable is that in which

mediately or immediately the Crown is the corrupter.}

{Duration short loses.

1. Making bribery not worth a lot (viz. occasional but the Crown is a permanent

briber)

2. Preservation of Members probity Not worth while to plan

the […?] of a Member, when the fellow[?] may be ousted from it the next year

3. Promoting intelligence on the part of Members, by making them ashamed of […?]

& silent votes.

4. In case of frequent change producing competition, emulating[?] intent[?]

5. Securing Members attendance.}

In the hands of an electors advisor, wealth considered as an index of superior

probity and intelligence may serve to guard him against wealth administered to him by

means of corruption.

In the case of Electors probity is no otherwise of use viz. to himself as to that of

fellow subjects – than in so far as it is accompanied by intelligence in so far as he

acts under the guidance of intelligence

The intelligence under the guidance of which he acts may be his own or borrowed.

In so far as he is free and pure

an Elector, if conscious of inability to judge for himself will borrow a judgment of

the person or persons whom he looks upon as best qualified to give it

Instruction is of no […?] where men are steeled against it by sinister interest

If Elenboro’ and Percival had their will there would be no

more liberty in England than in France. Their power to this

purpose is but suspended.

Voting Epistolary

Advantages

1. Electors in many districts may vote in all without trouble or expence.