JB_126_351.xml

Title: [21 Aug 1809 + Parl y Reform]

Description: 21 Aug 1809 +

Parl y Reform

B.III. Influence

Corruption

Electors

1

The Lords are in for themselves: Why may not Electors be?

'. Bribery be on the part of the Elector?  Not till after Corruption on the part of the Member.

The parliamentary Elector in his situation does he not do mischief, by accepting of money or what is equivalent, for his vote?

I answer, as before /above/ - that depends upon the character and disposition of the Member whom his vote contributes to place in the House: in which is included the this /these two/ proposition, viz. that, if without his vote the candidate would equally have been placed there, or is not placed there at all, no mischief is produced.

The Member /Candidate/, who being a man of an independent mind, means to act upon independent principles gains his election by bribery, and acts upon those principles to the last. The Candidate who had he succeeded on his election would have been from first to last a tool of the Minister, gives no bribes and loses it. Now where is the mischief in this? - just none: the case /event/ in which the mischief, whatever mischief the case is susceptible of, would have taken place, is the opposite case /event/.

JB_126_300.xml

Title: [20 Aug 1809 + Parl y Reform]

Description: 20 Aug 1809 +

Parl y Reform

Corruption

'.2. Members

3

1

Add. Sole mischief of corruption, dependence: and dependence is strengthened by notices of honour and gratitude.

'.2. Corruption passive on the part of the {Parliamentary} Representative

The parliamentary representative /A Member of Parliament/ has for his possible corruptor as well /either/ an individual or the Minister /principal /chief/ adviser of the Crown, in general the person distinguished by the name of the Minister/: but of the two by far the most natural corruptor in this case is the Minister. Of any single vote or even any such number of votes as any single member without the aid of party considerations can command, the effect is so compleatly inadequate to every parliamentary purpose, that the /a/ Member of Parliament howsoever well inclined thus to dispose of himself could scarce hope, in these times at least, /in times such as these, at any rate/ to find a customer.

(a) In the history of parliament here and there in a very few cases you may find an instance of a member of parliament bribed by a party or parties other than ministers. But in this case the corrupted Member has been a person of great influence and the corrupting party some opulent company.

Thus in the case of the South Sea Company's bubble we find Stanhope then secretary of state receiving from the South Sea Company /authors of that swindling scheme/ a bribe in the shape of South Sea Stock i.e. annuities payable by that Company.

 Look out for other instances. See[?], The Old East India Companies?

JB_128_005.xml

Title: [3 Jan y 1810 Parl. Reform.]

Description: 3 Jan y 1810

Parl. Reform.

B.II. Influence. Titles of Chapters and Sections.

Part I.

Exequent[?] /Excreatory[?]/ mass[?]

Ch. 1. Of Influence, Dependence, Independence, Obsequiousness

and Corruption. and Bribery

{§.1. Influence, due and undue }

§.2. Dependence and obsequiousness.

§.3. Dependence, the only considerably mischievous fount of undue influence.

§.4. Of Corruption.

3 or 2

Ch. 2. Of the Matter and efficient cause of Corruption – and material cause of undue

influence.

§.1. Matter of Corruption – its general nature.

§.2. Modifications of the matter of corruption – their respective corruptive powers.

§.3. Distinction between King-created article and ordinary d o –

its uses.

§ Different articles suited to different purposes.

2 or 3

Ch. 3. Dependence, its mode and degrees

§.1. Where the possessor of the benefit is the dependent

himself.

§.2. Where the possessor of the benefit is a friend of the

dependents.

8

Ch. 8. Of the influence of Property.

7

Part 2[?] continued[?]

Ch. 7. Of dependence on a party in partiones[?] +

Ch. 8. Of the consequence of corrupt Boroughs and other Electoral Districts on party

dependence.

Part I

4

Ch. 4. Gratitude, considered as a bond of dependence /an efficient[?] bond[?] of

corruption/.

§. 1: Bond, the affection[?] or the duty

§.2. To afford ground for the affection, the benefit must

be irrevocable.

§.3. The affection rare in this case.

§.4. Immorality of the affection in this case.

If private[?] interest[?] is the shape[?] no other[?] interest[?]

[…?] or that[?] See Spencers virtua[?] & Graves[?] motives[?]

§.5. Sinister interest by which the duty has been imposed.

§.6. or Ch. Bonds of dependence, their invisibility Consequence – Frequent Elections

&c necessary.

Ch. 5. Dependence, in what cases undue, and in what manner mischievous –

/{ Ch. 5. Mischief of conduct[?] […?]}/

or

{ 6

Independence in what sense desirable.

§.1

§.2. Objection answered. }

5

Ch.6. Of the Dependence of Members on their Constituents.

§.1. Instructions ought not to be made legally binding.

§.2. Instructions ought not to be considered as morally binding.

Ch. 7.* Of Corruption &c considered as applicable /accident[?]/ to the

situations of Member and Elector indiscriminately. See Ch. 19 How to combat

&c.

§.1. Radical error in the mode of treatment.

§.2. Cause of the error, sinister interest

§.3. Leading principle. Sole immediate seat of the mischief parliament itself.

Part II Corrupt Memb.

Ch. 2. Corruption &c its mischief in the case of a Member –

I. The corruption habitual – Corruptor, the Crown.

§.1.1. Mischief to the state.

§.2.2. Mischief to the mind of the individual corrupted, habitual insincerity.

§.3. On the Opposition side, the insincerity has /had/ necessity for an excuse.

§.4. After parli y reform, no such necessity would have place.

§.5.3. Mischief to the mind of the subordinate corruptor.

§.6.4. Mischief to the King’s mind.

Ch. 9. Continuation as

II. The Corruption habitual; corruptor an individual – patron of the seat.

§.1. Mischief to the state +

§.2. Mischief to the mind of the corrupted incumbent. +

§.3. Mischief to the mind of the patron. +

Ch. 10. Continuation

III. Benefit gained or sought by the Corruption, possession of a seat.

§.1. Mischief to the state.

§.2. Mischief to the mind of the incumbent /purchaser/ or proposed incumbent

/purchaser/

§.3. Mischief to the mind of the patron or supposed patron /seller or proposed

seller/.

Ch. 11. Continuation.

Doctrines of the Speaker of the H. of Commons A o 1809 concerning

this case examined.

§.1. The doctrine examined

§.2. Anecdote for illustration

Part II Corrupt Membs

Ch. 12. Continuation.

IV. The corruption occasional: benefit gained or sought, a particular vote – matter

of corruption liquidated.

§ 1. Mischief to the state

§ 2. Mischief to the mind of the individual corrupt ed.

§ 3. Mischief to the mind of the corrupt or.

Ch. 13. Continuation.

V. {The corruption occasional: benefit gained or sought, a particular vote:} matter

of corruption, unliquidated.

§.1. Mischief to the state.

§.2. Mischief to the corrup ted mind.

§.3. Mischief to the corrupting mind. In case of bribery, briber or bribee must

put[?] confidence: this confidence in […?] violated: no real[?] disparity[?] than is

produced by it.

Part III. Corrupt. in Electors.

Ch. 14. Corruption – its mischief in the case of an Elector.

§.1. Leading[?] principles

§.2. Boroughs open, close, and pocket -

§.3. Scales of mischievousness as between the three species according to the

Speaker’s doctrines and the above.

§.4. Anecdote for illustration Dialogue between a great character and a little one.

Ch. 15. Continuation.

§.1.