date

7 Aug 1809 Parl. Ref Ch. Necessity
7 Aug 1809

Parl. Ref

Ch. Necessity Hume

2

2

His argument lies within a small compass. It is necessary that a part, and that a considerable one of the Members of the House of Commons should be in a state of dependence on the crown. Why? - Because if they were not - if every one were at liberty to follow his own judgment in other words at his own will - i.e. that which would be his own will, but for such dependence, the House of Commons would of course conquer the other powers of the state, viz. King and Lords, and become absolute. This theorem is his antecedent: and his consequent conclusion his practical inference is of course - therefore there ought to be always a portion of the House of Commons in a dependent state. (a)

For my own part I can not agree with him in any one part of this argument: neither in the /his/ antecedent nor in his conclusion.

His conclusion I speak to first: but only for the purpose of laying it out of the case.

If it were ever so clear that but for this dependence with the corruption by which it is produced the House of Commons would conquer the King and the House of Lords and so convert the government into a Commonwealth I had rather it were so, than that matters should continue in their present train. Why? because in my view of the matter, supposing things to continue in their present train, the government would sooner or later /ere long/ be converted into a sort of mixt despotism composed of Monarchy and Aristocracy, with the same /the still more effectual/ irresponsibility I mean impunity for malpractice as in the case of a pure monarchy, and with a heavier train of ill-bestowed and otherwise unnecessary expence, and thence with a heavier pressure in all shapes and in particular in a pecuniary shape, upon the body of the people.

(a)  Quote the passage at the bottom of the margin.
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  • Title: [7 Aug. 1809 Parl. Ref. Ch.]
    Description: 7 Aug. 1809

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    Ch. Necessity Hume

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    But to insist any further on this topic {not to speak of the invidiousness of it -} would be to take too wide a range. His antecedent - the position, that, but for the dependence, and its efficient cause the corrupt influence, the House of Commons would conquer the King and the Lords appears to me altogether untenable, having no grounds that approach to the character of sufficient ones, either in particular history, or general reason operating on general experience. That it is altogether without grounds would be too much to say. Grounds he may be said to have had, though extremely slight ones: slight even in his own time, and rendered still more so by the experience of succeeding times.

    The House of Commons could, and therefore would, (and thus far he must be admitted to be right - viz that it would if it could) the House of Commons if not kept in a state of dependence on /under/ the Crown by withdrawable bribes would conquer the Crown and the Lords along with it. Why so? Because it has done so already. And how often? Once and once only, viz in the time of Charles the 1 st. And what enabled it so to do? Its perpetuity, so weakly and improvidently conferred on it by the Crown: its perpetuity, by which it was converted into a pure aristocracy, taken altogether out of its dependence on the people.

    This dependence of the House upon the people, of the elected upon the electors - this dependence which constitutes the essential character of the House of commons - and this not only in point of utility and right but in point of fact and experience - this dependence is the very circumstance which he overlooks, for /and/ his argument turns upon the non-existence of it.
  • Title: [7 Aug. 1809 Parl. Ref. Ch.]
    Description: 7 Aug. 1809

    Parl. Ref.

    Ch. Necessity Hume

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    In this case what we should have under the name of a Parliament would be a sort of Roman Senate under the Tiberius Cæsars, or a sort of French Corps Legislatif under Bonaparte.

    In one of the two Houses {the House} the House of Lords we have somewhat of that sort already and thus far, so long as /if/ the House of Commons were what it ought to be, all would be well: and sooner or later were things to continue in their present train the House of Commons would /might/ become like unto it: the House of Commons Elections falling into the track of the Election of Scotch Peers and the Election of Irish Peers.

    In the other case we should have a Commonwealth. And what sort of a Commonwealth? Such an one as we see already established /exemplified/ in the effect of /from/ the british Constitution that has been transplanted into America?

    And do you wish then to see such a Commonwealth in the British Isles? - No indeed do I not. But what I have now to compare is not an evil with a good but what I look upon as two evils: viz an absolute monarchico-aristocratical government disguised under the forms /guise/ of a limited one, and an undisguised Commonwealth: and under the argumentative necessity I choose the Commonwealth as being that one of the two evils, which to me appears the least.

    Note to say that the British government would by this time have been converted into such disguised despotism but for the Grenville Act the admission of auditors into the two Houses, and the license we still have by sufferance of what remains undestroyed of the liberty of the press.
  • Title: [26 Sep 1809 Parl y Reform B]
    Description: 26 Sep 1809

    Parl y Reform

    B. I. Necessity

    Ch. 18 Despotism near

    §.1. Commons dependent

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    N.B. In pocket boroughs a slight too[?] capitation[?] appropriate dependence.

    If of the 658 members of which since the Union with Ireland it is composed a clear

    majority, containing /consisting of/ 330 or more were in relation to the King

    constantly and at all times in any such state as should be universally acknowledged

    to be a state of compleat and absolute dependence, the inefficacy of the House in the

    character of a check would it is supposed be universally acknowledged, or at any rate

    not explicitly maintained.

    If the House were exactly in that state, it would be manifest beyond dispute that

    the monarchy so pretended to be limited would be worse than an absolute one, viz in

    every particular but the discussion of public measures in the House in circumstances

    under which some particulars of the debates were liable to transpire; which publicity

    would however in that case have been but of short continuance. If it were exactly in

    that state, for in that case every discussion would be mere matter of form, and the

    King’s will, howsoever opposite to the interest of the people would in every case

    without exception, be prevalent of course: and the House of Commons would as well as

    the House of Lords oppose to the will of a King of Great Britain and Ireland no other

    check than is opposed to the will of an Emperor of the Franks by the {Bonaparte’s}

    legislative body of Bonaparte.