date

7 Aug. 1809 + Parl. Reform
7 Aug. 1809 +

Parl. Reform

Ch. Necessity Hume

8

8

The more clearly his train[?] of reasoning is looked into, the weaker and weaker it will be found to be.

/Once more/ Why then is it once more that the House of Commons has never since the days of Charles the first made this imaginary conquest, never produced this imaginary change? Because says Hume "the interest of the body is here restrained by (the interest) /that/ of the individuals: and that the House of Commons stretches not its power, because such an usurpation would be contrary to the interest of the majority of its members." Thus for Hume, and still the people with all their power constitutional /factitious reward[?]/ as well as original and natural are forgotten as compleatly as if they were so many sheep.

Such a power i.e. the supposed absolute power contrary to the interest of the majority i.e. the habitually attending and acting majority of the Members? What? Did he suppose - yes for the moment he must have supposed that all the emolument they could have seized on if possessed /sole possessors/ of absolute power would not have exceeded that which under the system of that corruption which under the name of influence is in his view of the matter so necessary possess already. What a picture of the government drawn by [...?] by so able a hand, in the very act of defending it! the quantity of the people's money lavished upon the deputies of the people - and for no other purpose than to pay them for not conquering the King and Lords and so overthrowing the government this quantity of the people's money thus lavished so enormous that not even absolute power could give them more! these /The/ people more pressed to save the government from being thus destroyed than they could be pressed if it were destroyed. This too given as a reason for supporting /preventing/ the government from being destroyed & were in the way mentioned. Would it not be a [...?] better for suffering the government to be so destroyed, or even for destroying it?
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  • Title: [7 Aug. 1809 Parl. Reform Ch]
    Description: 7 Aug. 1809

    Parl. Reform

    Ch. Necessity Hume

    6

    6

    To the people indeed it would be "easy" (in /to use/ the words of Hume) "to wrest from the Crown all those powers". To the people ever since the Revolution it always has been easy. Yet have they ever done so, attempted so to do, or even thought of it viz. by persevering in the practice of electing Members foreknown to be determined upon that course? Not they indeed. And why not? Only because they all along have been and still are, and so long as the constitution either remains undestroyed or appears to them so to do, in all human probability ever will be. /for any thing that appears to the contrary./

    If then for want of the supposed necessary quantity of the matter of corruption and the habit of applying it - if from this or any other cause the constitution /government/ be destroyed by the destruction of the /that/ monarchy and aristocracy which are two out of the three component parts of it it can never be by the House of Commons alone it must be by the body of the people themselves, viz. either of themselves or through the medium of the House of Commons.

    At present the people have no such inclination. No not even under the provocation offered viz by the dependence of the House of Commons and by the corruption and sham elections by which this dependence is produced. No such inclination have they; though from their birth accustomed as they have been to see Members pretended deputies of theirs, in the choice of whom they have no part, Members when[?] in such number by whomsoever chosen they see mere tools and puppets of /in the hands of/ the Minister - as ready to vote for one thing as for another - Members put into this state by vast masses of emolument capable of being taken away from them by the same advisers of the Crown at pleasure, and by that danger perpetually hanging over their heads, not to mention ill applied notions of gratitude and honour kept perpetually in that same abject and dependent state.
  • Title: [7 Aug 1809 + Parl Reform Ch]
    Description: 7 Aug 1809 +

    Parl Reform

    Ch. Necessity Hume

    Humes Concession

    1

    23

    What is curious is that if Hume were taken for judge the matter would be decided and that not exclusively in favour of parliamentary reform, i.e. a government without corruption that being what he himself has expressly declared against but in favour of a commonwealth, viz. in the estimation of every person in whose eyes that form of government were preferable to absolute monarchy.

    But that in such a case Humes authority any more than any body elses authority ought to weigh for any thing, much less be regarded as decisive - or will be so in the judgment of any one who holds himself capable of weighing reason and forming a judgment for himself - but that those persons whose sole look out is for a shove to gain their faith again, and who in their adherence to such their opinions, begged or borrowed those opinions are, are not among the least tenacious, /tenacious - that in persons of this description it may be visible/ may on that the authority of Hume which they might /may/ have supposed to be in their favour, is in fact against them.

    "Did the House of Commons" (says he) ["]depend in the same maxims on the King" (viz as the King is made dependent on the House of Commons by the power of the purse) "and had none of the members any property but from his gift, would not he command their resolutions, and be from that moment, absolute."

    Thus far, David Hume: from which taking into the account, on the footing on which they have since some out, the facts relative to and probative of that dependence, it will be sufficiently clear that in his opinion, at least supposing his view of the matter confined to those facts, the King would at the moment at which I am writing be pronounced to be already absolute.

    + Essays &c [...?] p.107[?].
  • Title: [7 Aug. 1809 Parl. Reform Ch]
    Description: 7 Aug. 1809

    Parl. Reform

    Ch. Necessity Hume

    5

    5

    " How easy" {(says he)} "therefore" (viz. by means of the power he has just been speaking of, that is the power of the purse) "would it be" (says he) ["]for that House to wrest from the Crown all these powers" (no matter what powers it comes to the same thing and he might as well have said all its powers) "one after another; by making every grant conditional, and choosing their time so well, that their refusal of supply should only distress the government, without giving foreign powers any advantage over us."

    Easy enough, certainly, viz. in a case that may be imagined: viz if the Members were in for life: for in this case viz. under Charles the firsts Long Parliament it actually did take place.

    But in the present state of things or any thing /state/ in any degree resembling it? under a House of Commons which at the utmost can last but seven years and at the will of the King may be dissolved at any time? Not it indeed.

    Withhold the supplier they indeed may: and in case of a struggle thus it is which is always either put in practice, or looked to and intended to be practiced as the ultimate resort.

    But supplies withheld what is the consequence. The King's Ministers must /can/ not suffer the government to perish for want of supplies - for want of its daily bread: the government perishing they would perish along with it. Of course they dissolve the Parliament: i.e. they make their appeal to the people: and this done it rests with the people whether, as towards the King, the House of Commons i.e. the acting majority of its members acting on the occasion in question shall be conquerors or conquered.