date

7 Aug. 1809 Parl. Reform Ch
7 Aug. 1809

Parl. Reform

Ch. Necessity Hume

13

13

 Formulary[?] - 1 I see - 2 d. I see (tracing out from Scott, Ellenboro' &c the money produced by corruption & others vice)

"Instead then[?] of asserting absolutely" (continues he) " that the Dependence of parliament, in every degree, is an infringement of British liberty, the Country-party should have made some concessions to their adversaries, and have examined what was the proper degree of that dependence, beyond which it became dangerous to liberty."

Very curious concessions indeed! profound policy to make /have made/ them! sapient advice to have advised them. On the part of one of his favourites a dishonest or interested man, an insincere man yes: a very /perfectly/ consistent and suitable line to pursue to place the question on the footing of one that never could be determined, and on /in regard to/ which it would be at all times open to every man upon every occasion to take that side and that course which for the moment might seem to him most conducive to his own personal interest, leaving that of the country to be promoted or denied by the decision, as it might happen.

{With all his ingenuity, There was something about this man that rendered him never so happy, as when he had involved a question in what seemed to him interminable doubts: and all the most strenuous exertions of his mind seem to have been those which were directed to this end.}

A more idle enquiry /errand/ than this about which he was for setting all men about, and of both /all/ parties, seems to me not capable of being imagined /imaginable/.
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     Add false moral sanction be [...?] to be in a state of the most abject indigence[?] is sad[?] to be ousted, bound in the chains of absolute dependence.

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    Much more really afflictive than this may be the lot of the man who has placed himself in that state of dependence which is created by the acceptance of a lucrative office. The cloaths on his back and in his chest of drawers excepted, The furniture of his house {and those other little articles of property which are as so many necessary appendages to every man's person excepted,} /excepted or not excepted/ it is no rare case /by no means an uncommon situation/ even in the instance of a Member of Parliament for a man to have no other source of livelyhood /means of living/ than that which is attached to such his office.

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