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8 Aug t 1809
Parl y Reform
Humes Note
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After a passage /sentence/ about spies which contains no argument, and neither is not so much as appears to be nothing /in reality not so much as in shew is any thing/ to the purpose, he returns to the subject of influence, and strengthens his ground by the authority of Polybius, which is as little /in reality / whatever it may be in shew is as little to the purpose.
"Polybius" (says he) "justly esteems the pecuniary influence of the Senate and Censors to be one of the regular and constitutional weights which preserved the balance of the Roman government."
Thus far Hume: as to Polybius' history it is not at present within my reach: nor /on the present occasion/ if it were, on the present occasion, if it were valuable as it is should I think it worth the looking at. Balance of the Roman government? what trifling[?]! Balance of the Roman government? how widely distant how [...?] the analogy! the Roman government in which the principle of popular deputation was unknown compared with the English of which when coupled with the extent of the powers given to the deputies it constitutes the characteristic excellence.
Pecuniary influence of the senate and censors? influence, whose, and on and over whom exercised? over what deputies of and trustees for the people? In the Roman Constitution there were no such deputies, no such trustees for the body of the people, except in so far as the Tribunes might be considered as such: but these were /composed/ no assembly, for there were but two of them /for at one time there was but one, and at the most but three/.
These tribunes did it ever happen to them to have either or each of them during their tribuneship an annuity paid to them by the Senate or what would be more convenient by the Censor and withdrawable at his pleasure? If so then according to Humes principle the case would /was/ so far be parallel to that of a British House of Commons, and according to this principle of David Hume's, every thing as it should be. But such policy I should not expect to find there in practice since[?] /because/ if the two Tribunes composed /were/ in this respect a Parliament /Parliamentary House of Commons/ the Parliaments were unusual ones, and to Parliament thus shortlived and thus frequently renewed the application of this sort of policy would have been at the same time too laborious and too precarious.
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Title: [1823 Feb. 16 Observations Observations]Description: 1823 Feb. 16 Observations Observations Judiciary Art. 85 Delivered in the form /Expressed in the words/ in which it is here expressed this is neither /not/ an arrangement nor a principle It has no determinate application No body of men can be assigned to which it has decidedly any application. By the legislative power does it mean the power of the body stiled the legislative Senate? It should have kept to that expression then, and not have changed it By the executive power does it mean the body stiled the Executive Council? Here too it should have kept to that expression then and not have changed it. Yet to these must it apply /have application/ or to nothing. This being the case, now observe even one effect. The body called the Executive Council having as above an equal share of legislative power with the body called the Legislative Senate, the two bodies concurr suppose and by their joint power enact a law. Giving execution and effect to this law does not suit the wishes[?] of the persons whosoever they are who are invested with Judicial power in the supreme grade. What is the consequence the law remains of necessity unexecuted. Here then is another disguised Veto on the power of the appointed Deputies of those of whom the supreme Constitutive power is composed. Here is a set of functionaries in whose power it is to dissolve the government, and put anarchy in the place of it: a set of functionaries who thus have it in their power to unite their own power with all those whose wish it is that the Constitution should have place /continue or exercise/ /be carried into effect/.
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