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7 Aug 1809 +
Parl Reform
Ch. Necessity Hume
Humes Concession
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23
What is curious is that if Hume were taken for judge the matter would be decided and that not exclusively in favour of parliamentary reform, i.e. a government without corruption that being what he himself has expressly declared against but in favour of a commonwealth, viz. in the estimation of every person in whose eyes that form of government were preferable to absolute monarchy.
But that in such a case Humes authority any more than any body elses authority ought to weigh for any thing, much less be regarded as decisive - or will be so in the judgment of any one who holds himself capable of weighing reason and forming a judgment for himself - but that those persons whose sole look out is for a shove to gain their faith again, and who in their adherence to such their opinions, begged or borrowed those opinions are, are not among the least tenacious, /tenacious - that in persons of this description it may be visible/ may on that the authority of Hume which they might /may/ have supposed to be in their favour, is in fact against them.
"Did the House of Commons" (says he) ["]depend in the same maxims on the King" (viz as the King is made dependent on the House of Commons by the power of the purse) "and had none of the members any property but from his gift, would not he command their resolutions, and be from that moment, absolute."
Thus far, David Hume: from which taking into the account, on the footing on which they have since some out, the facts relative to and probative of that dependence, it will be sufficiently clear that in his opinion, at least supposing his view of the matter confined to those facts, the King would at the moment at which I am writing be pronounced to be already absolute.
+ Essays &c [...?] p.107[?].
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Title: [7 Aug 1809. Parl. Reform Ch]Description: 7 Aug 1809. Parl. Reform Ch. Necessity Hume Humes concession 2 24 To bring the propositions /ideas in question each of them/ to a precise point. To give correctness to the expressions, and perhaps to the ideas, some alteration /change/ will require to be made in some of the expressions: for David Hume, though a man of genius was seldom a close reasoner /had not the faculty of close reasoning/: a deficiency of which his general habit of scepticism was a consequence and a proof. 1. Amendment 1. After the word gift, add with the power of taking it away at pleasure. By power of reward howsoever arbitrary power of reward for example by appointment to lucrative offices neither absolute power nor any thing approaching to absolute power, unless power of punishment, for example by power of inaction[?] in relation to those same offices, be conjoined with it. Witness the Kings of Poland who had always good things to give and in plenty, but without power of taking them away: not to speak of patent places here with us. 2. Amendment the 2 d. Add more, or if any, yet not so much, but that the taking away of the quantity of property attached to the office / their respective offices/ would produce in their respective bosoms /respectively/ a sense of privation operating in the occasion in question in the character of a motive with a force too great to experience on that same occasion from the motives acting on the other side any effectual resistance. Without an amendment to this effect the supposition he makes would be a nugatory and useless one, not being altogether incapable of finding its exemplification any where. For in what possible state of things would /could/ the House of Commons now a days be composed any part of it of a set of men, each of whom on being dismissed from Office would feel his coat stripped off his back. Yes, if you go a few centuries back, viz. to the times when /back to the reign of Henry the 7 th, when/ under the name of liveries the retainers of the King or of a Baron wore uniforms and when the subsistence of many a brave gentleman depended on the overplus grass of a common for his cattle, or of the overplus meat in his Majesty's or his Lordship's kitchens, for the more immediate source of his sustenance.
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Title: [15 Feb y 1814 Euthanasia 1]Description: 15 Feb y 1814 Euthanasia 1 1 Essay on the British Constitution, and on the probable conclusion and termination of it. Being a Supplement to the Essays to be found on that subject in the works /among the Essays /works// of David Hume. Speaking of the British Constitution, David Hume, in one of his Essays, speaks of absolute monarchy as the expected termination of it, and introduces /[…?]/ Euthanasia, a Greek word of his own imparting /impartation/, as expression of the termination /conclusion/ /character/ of that result. In the original, by the syllable eu goodness and desirableness as well as easiness is expressed: by thanasia death. Death being the proverbial exemplification of entire certainty, none could serve more aptly /effectually/ for impressing the persuasion that certainty was /is/ among the attributes of that result was that of certainty. This alone was no small recommendation /would if admitted be no slight /weak/ argument/ if not in favour of the thing /result/ itself, at any rate in proof of the inutility, folly and even mischievousness of all endeavours to prevent it: and /but/ lest that should not be sufficient, it /the argument/ is topped and crowned by the little word eu, by which the easiness, the pleasantness and in every point of view the desirableness in one word the happiness of such a result, is so neatly and so happily expressed.
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Title: [8 Aug t 1809 Parl y Reform]Description: 8 Aug t 1809 Parl y Reform Humes Note 2 17 17 After a passage /sentence/ about spies which contains no argument, and neither is not so much as appears to be nothing /in reality not so much as in shew is any thing/ to the purpose, he returns to the subject of influence, and strengthens his ground by the authority of Polybius, which is as little /in reality / whatever it may be in shew is as little to the purpose. "Polybius" (says he) "justly esteems the pecuniary influence of the Senate and Censors to be one of the regular and constitutional weights which preserved the balance of the Roman government." Thus far Hume: as to Polybius' history it is not at present within my reach: nor /on the present occasion/ if it were, on the present occasion, if it were valuable as it is should I think it worth the looking at. Balance of the Roman government? what trifling[?]! Balance of the Roman government? how widely distant how [...?] the analogy! the Roman government in which the principle of popular deputation was unknown compared with the English of which when coupled with the extent of the powers given to the deputies it constitutes the characteristic excellence. Pecuniary influence of the senate and censors? influence, whose, and on and over whom exercised? over what deputies of and trustees for the people? In the Roman Constitution there were no such deputies, no such trustees for the body of the people, except in so far as the Tribunes might be considered as such: but these were /composed/ no assembly, for there were but two of them /for at one time there was but one, and at the most but three/. These tribunes did it ever happen to them to have either or each of them during their tribuneship an annuity paid to them by the Senate or what would be more convenient by the Censor and withdrawable at his pleasure? If so then according to Humes principle the case would /was/ so far be parallel to that of a British House of Commons, and according to this principle of David Hume's, every thing as it should be. But such policy I should not expect to find there in practice since[?] /because/ if the two Tribunes composed /were/ in this respect a Parliament /Parliamentary House of Commons/ the Parliaments were unusual ones, and to Parliament thus shortlived and thus frequently renewed the application of this sort of policy would have been at the same time too laborious and too precarious.
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