date

11 Aug 1809 + Parl y Reform
11 Aug 1809 +

Parl y Reform

B[?].III Duration

Ch. 2. Objections

2

1

To this duration of duration /a length of duration thus short/ heads of objection have been or might be opposed.

1. By the inordinately frequent narrowness of the process of election, the nation /country/ would be kept in a state of perpetual ferment.

2. The government would thus be thrown altogether into the hands of the great body of the people: who, howsoever they may be desirous of [...?] on every occasion their own interest, are incapable of possessing a right comprehension of it.

3. By reason of the instability and precariousness of its duration the administrative body, or the Minister (no matter what term be employed) would be incapable of obtaining from any foreign power /foreign powers/ the degree of confidence necessary to their engaging in treaties with us. /our own./

4. The arrangement there proposed does not go far enough to be conformable to the principle on which it is grounded: for if the running counter to the opinion and will of his constituents is a sufficient reason for the dismissal of them /discharge of this their trustee/, the arrangements established ought to be such as would put it in their power to discharge him immediately, as soon as the supposed breach of trust on his part has been committed.

5. The dissolution of Parliament being upon this plan an event which with such regular frequency would be taking place of itself, the prerogative under the King now is and would still remain /be/ nominally in possession of in relation to that point, would be so much curtailed, as to be in effect nearly abolished.
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    6. By means of this and the other proposed arrangements, and in particular those for the exclusion of placemen the power of the Crown taken in the aggregate would be to such a degree curtailed that the supposed [...?] Monarchy would in the first instance be but a Monarchy in name, and might at any time cease to be so even in name, converted as it might at any time be into an avowed Commonwealth.

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    As to the Member, in this case he will have the satisfaction of taking his choice. If in his estimation, his own pecuniary circumstances taken into the account, money be the preferable object, he will accept of the official situation: if power, superordinate power, he will declare it.

    But though in this respect /article/ the value of a seat in the House will not be taken /done/ away, it will at any rate be diminished /upon the whole be curtailed/ nor will the diminution be inconsiderable. It will be no longer, as at present a situation held during what is called /during/ /in the technical/ good behaviour that is during any sort of behaviour good or bad so it be not punishable as a crime, but during the pleasure of his constituents that is during good behaviour in the natural /familiar/ and unsophisticated sense.

    At present, under the system of Septennial Parliaments, each Member /Candidate if successful/ being in, bating accidents, for seven years, each Candidate if unsuccessful, sees his hope deferred for that long term. His exertions are proportionably strenuous, and in case of opposition violent.

    But when every year by renewing his chance keeps alive his hope, a gentle and moderate though constant emulation will take place of that turbulent passion in the composition of which a space[?] of eventual despair is necessarily involved.