date

20 Sep 1809 Parl y Reform 2
20 Sep 1809

Parl y Reform

2 o

Ch.1. Elections Voting

10

6

The voter's inclination (it may be said) might be having in favour of the unfit candidate: and at /yet by/ the same time the /by/ fear of public opinion, by the [...?] apprehended in the event of his being known to give his vote in favour of so unfit a man, he may under the system of publicity be engaged to resist this inclination and give his vote in favour of the fit candidate.

But by the supposition the number of Electors is very considerable /extream[?]/: say for example, and to fix conception, not less than two thousand. and unless under the /some/ expectation of success, which can not be unless the majority say at the least 1000 be on the side on which his inclination bade him to vote, he will not give his vote at all which ever of the two be the mode in use. But if under the open mode his expectation be that he shall have /of his having/ a thousand persons at least on his side, his situation can scarcely be said to be that /of that sort/, in which the public opinion will according to his conception pass condemnation on the part he takes in the giving of his vote; of his co-electors he expects by the supposition the /a/ majority to the amount of this large number to give him support and countenance not only /merely/ by their secret opinions, but by the opinions publicly[?] declared by their votes. With this number on his side /to give him /for his/ support and countenance/, it will not be easy /very natural/ for him to expect to find the least to take [...?] by the community at large: and even if he does /should he even/ entertain any such expectation /apprehension/, assured of such support and /sympathy and/ countenance from those that are near him, the apprehension of the disapprobation of those that are at a distance will scarcely give him much trouble.
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  • Title: [Sep 1809 Parl y Reform 2 o]
    Description: Sep 1809

    Parl y Reform

    2 o

    Ch.1. Electors Voting

    '.2

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    What he thinks the least[?] shown[?] he will think the public most The large public instead[?] [...?] him from a [...?] [...?] he is joined by a sufficient number[?]

    Remains the influence of public opinion - in other words of the moral or popular sanction.+

    But in the present instance, great and salutary as its influence is in most /almost all/ others, it is not in the nature of this principle to be of any effect or use.

    What is desired is that he should make that choice which in his eyes is the most proper one: in other words that choice which to his conception is most likely to be conducive to his own interests for in the absence of all sinister influence as above described nothing more or better is expected or desired at his hands.

    But this is exactly the sort of choice which he is disposed to make independently of this moral sanction made[?] without his being /standing/ exposed to the force of it: his standing exposed to the force of it is therefore what to this purpose can not be of any use.

    For the seat in question Two candidates present themselves. Under the system of secrecy he will vote for that one of them whose conduct promises in his eyes /expectation of it/ to be most conducive to his /the Electors/ interest, that is to what he regards as the interest of the whole community: for by the supposition he is not /does not stand/ exposed to the action of any other interest.

    Now what can the force of the moral or popular sanction. What can the eye of the public do more for him towards securing[?] the aptitude of his choice?

    Of the two candidates suppose one eminently[?] /decidedly/ fit to be a member, the other as eminently[?] /decidedly/ unfit. What even in this case can the public eye do more than secrecy would do towards securing the vote in favour of the fit candidate. Happen /Let/ his choice to fall /have fallen/ in favour of the unfit one; but since /forasmuch as/ it has, the probability is that in looking upon him as the fittest in his own opinion, he looked upon him as fittest likewise in the opinion of the public: for what to himself seems right what should lead him to consider as being in the opinion of the public other than right?

    + Introd.

    Dum[?]
  • Title: [17 Jan y 1810 Parl y Ref m]
    Description: 17 Jan y 1810

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    '.2. Friendship

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    An Elector who through fear of what one of the candidates in whatsoever degree in comparison of a rival candidate less fit might {otherwise} do to him, or hope of what he might /may/ do for him would in /under/ the open mode of vote for that candidate howsoever unfit and howsoever to the Elector in question /himself/ personally odious /obnoxious/, would /might/ then if he thought fit talk of his friendship and affection, but would give his vote to some one else.

    That the affection borne on whatsoever private account towards a candidate by the Elector is no fit ground for a vote to be given in his favour, is a proposition contended for as above: and assuredly /as it must be admitted, in so far as/ where it is by this private consideration that the ground of preference constituted by public consideration is overborne, in so far the secret mode would fall of producing the effect here stated as a salutary one. But under the open mode how apt self-regarding interest is to conceal itself under the mask of the social one is a consideration already brought to view: + and in so far as under the open mode {the imposture would be practiced with success and by means of it} the vote would thus be given in favour of the less fit candidate, in so far {would the imposture be} under the secret mode {prevented, and} would the vote be given in favour of him who in the judgment of the voter at least would be {of[?]} the fitter candidate.

    + Ch. Gratitude
  • Title: [29 Oct 1809 Parl y Reform Part]
    Description: 29 Oct 1809

    Parl y Reform

    Part II. Influence

    Ch.1. Explanations

    '.5 Matter of Corruption

    Causes of its efficiency

    8

    The truth is that on these points the force of public opinion - of the moral or popular sanction - is divided against itself: and under favour of this [...?] it is that a Member of Parliament who without regard to his public duty means on each occasion to pursue that course which presents itself to him as most conducive to his personal interest finds himself much at his ease: being sure of finding more or less support and countenance which so ever course he takes.

    In the first place suppose his situation that of a place for life. If it happens to suit him to vote or to speak or to vote against the side espoused by his patron, his paramount regard is thus for the interests of the country in general, and all narrow considerations ought in his view of the matter to give way to this broad and public one. If the side which it suits him to espouse be that which is espoused by his /the/ patron, so high /exalted/ is his opinion of the wishes intellectual as well as moral of his patron, and such the sentiment of veneration as well as gratitude towards this patron with which he is inspired /impressed/, that he beholds in the opinion of his patron the surest guide which /that/ his own can have.

    Then there is a conflict between a sense of public duty on the one hand, and a sense of private gratitude on the other. Which of these two contending forms which shall gain the ascendant and prevail? The answer /result/ depends upon the permanence of the patron's power in the opinion of the incumbent. If the fall of the patron seems approaching, public spirit preponderates, and gratitude kicks the beam: if the patron appears /is thought/ to be firm in his seat, then gratitude preponderates, and public spirit kicks the beam.