date

Sep 1809 Parl y Reform 2 o
Sep 1809

Parl y Reform

2 o

Ch.1. Electors Voting

'.2

9

5

What he thinks the least[?] shown[?] he will think the public most The large public instead[?] [...?] him from a [...?] [...?] he is joined by a sufficient number[?]

Remains the influence of public opinion - in other words of the moral or popular sanction.+

But in the present instance, great and salutary as its influence is in most /almost all/ others, it is not in the nature of this principle to be of any effect or use.

What is desired is that he should make that choice which in his eyes is the most proper one: in other words that choice which to his conception is most likely to be conducive to his own interests for in the absence of all sinister influence as above described nothing more or better is expected or desired at his hands.

But this is exactly the sort of choice which he is disposed to make independently of this moral sanction made[?] without his being /standing/ exposed to the force of it: his standing exposed to the force of it is therefore what to this purpose can not be of any use.

For the seat in question Two candidates present themselves. Under the system of secrecy he will vote for that one of them whose conduct promises in his eyes /expectation of it/ to be most conducive to his /the Electors/ interest, that is to what he regards as the interest of the whole community: for by the supposition he is not /does not stand/ exposed to the action of any other interest.

Now what can the force of the moral or popular sanction. What can the eye of the public do more for him towards securing[?] the aptitude of his choice?

Of the two candidates suppose one eminently[?] /decidedly/ fit to be a member, the other as eminently[?] /decidedly/ unfit. What even in this case can the public eye do more than secrecy would do towards securing the vote in favour of the fit candidate. Happen /Let/ his choice to fall /have fallen/ in favour of the unfit one; but since /forasmuch as/ it has, the probability is that in looking upon him as the fittest in his own opinion, he looked upon him as fittest likewise in the opinion of the public: for what to himself seems right what should lead him to consider as being in the opinion of the public other than right?

+ Introd.

Dum[?]
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    Of /From/ publicity, if substituted to the supposed secrecy, two distinguishable effects would be produced. The Elector would be exposed to seductive influence - to influence acting either on his fears or his hopes or on both together - acting in the way of intimidation or of corruption /attainment[?]/ - to such seductive influence exercisable by /at the hands of/ this or that individual or particular kind[?] of individuals: this is one effect.

    He would be moreover exposed to the influence of public opinion: in other words to the good and ill opinion than[?] to the god or ill will and eventually to good and ill offices at the hands of the community at large, that is to individually unassignable members of it: - this is the other effect.

    In so far as the first of these effects has place, no imaginable advantage can be proposed from /as being likely to be produced by/ publicity; no imaginable[?] disadvantage as being likely to be produced by secrecy. For who are these particular individuals by whom it is better that the choice should be made than by himself. This brings us to what was said before over the objection wrong applied being applied to the act[?] of voting instead of to the description of the voters, and inconsistent /inadequate/ with itself, /and inadequate to its own purpose/ viz by producing no more than a chance instead of a certainty of what is looked upon as a right choice.
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    No says somebody: in the case of great public trust, such as is that in question, the direction given to a man’s vote should not be determined by his private wishes: it should be the direction would pointed out to him by the best and wisest men of the state. For avoidance of miselection therefore, the surest course to take /mode to pursue/ is not the secret mode, but the open mode: for only in the open mode can the course he takes be open to the view of those by whose opinions he /it/ ought to be guided: only in so far as the course he takes /has taken/ is known to them can he be the object of their approbation and esteem where it is right, of their disapprobation and desertion[?] where it is wrong.

    Generally speaking, the controul afforded by public opinion – by the force of the popular or moral sanction as you call it, you acknowledge to be a useful one: if in the present instance it fails of being so, it rests with you to shew how this happens to be the case, and to what cause the difference is to be ascribed.
  • Title: [10 Sep 1809 Parl y Reform 2]
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    If, nothing more being known of a man than that he is a parliamentary elector it were to be assumed that in the case in question his choice would be more likely to be a fit one if some one else were to have the forming of it than if it were left to himself to form it, allowing this to be true the consequence would indeed be true, viz. that publicity and not secrecy would /is/ most conducive to its aptitude of choice. For in the case of secrecy it is matter of [...?] that the choice good or bad will be compleatly and exclusively /decidedly and absolutely/ is own: whereas in th case of publicity, the choice declared by him may have been made for him by some one else /other person or persons else/.

    But to render his assumption rational it would be necessary to fix upon that person or persons by whom it were better that the choice declared by the voter should be made than that it should be made by himself.

    But to do this would be as much as to say the description of persons who on this occasion have been proposed for election, are not fit to /for the/ exercise that office. Give us for Electors - not these persons, but such or such others.

    That the choice which it were designed should be formed by one set of persons should be declared by a different /not by them, but by another/ set, would be an arrangement which, to say nothing of the inutility, its complication /complexness/ and its tortuosity and fraudulency, would be inconsistent with the very design itself: for though you should succeed in exposing a man to the action of the external influences, you could not be sure that in every instance he would be determined and governed by it: you could never be so sure of this as you could be that the proposed ruler and real author of the choice would make it and conform /give effect/ to it himself, if left to give effect to it in the secret mode.