date

1818 Oct. 26 Parl. Reform Bill
1818 Oct. 26

Parl. Reform Bill

Reasons

'.2 Electors Who

Univ

III. Taxedness

6

2. According to this theory it is fit that the faculty of contributing to the choice of those functionaries whose office it is to apply a check and controul to the exercise of the powers of /exercised by/ another functionary, the Monarch should not be absolute fixt and secured to those electors themselves but dependent for its existence partly on the set of persons annually[?] chosen by them partly upon the functionaries to the exercise of whose powers it thus belongs to them to apply a check: and on[?] whom[?] will it will in some way or other depend when the exercise of the elective function shall be possessed. With the concurrence of the Lords House and of the Commons House both of them so notoriously subject to and their conduct determined by his influence, he may tax when he pleases he may forbear to tax /avoid taxing/ when he pleases.

3. On each occasion whether the person in question shall be admitted to give a vote depends not immediately upon the law which has undertaken to determine who shall and who shall not vote, but upon the interpretation given to that law, and thence upon the evidence which shall or shall not be required and admitted to give effect to that right. But by the influence of will on will exercised over the wills of those by whom it is determined what evidence shall and what shall not be received /accepted/ as sufficient - acceptance or rejection /non-acceptance/ of - vote may there be, and but too often has been /as but too often it has been/, determined by his pleasure, as that has been determined by his separate and sinister interests.
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  • Title: [1822 June 26 Economy The modes of]
    Description: 1822 June 26 Economy

    The modes of limitation being thus distinguished, apply them to the several

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  • Title: [26 June 1819 Disfranchisements proposed]
    Description: 26 June 1819

    Disfranchisements proposed.

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    Landholders sinister interest

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    Proofs of […?] & other waste Trusts –

    1 Clergy’s dilapidating Leases.

    2. Scotch Burghs dilapidation.

    3. Charitable institutions dilapidation

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    1. They have /act un/ /stand exposed to/ a particular interest opposite to and more

    powerful than their share in the universal interest.

    2. This particular interest will always be predominant, unless and until a radical

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    III. They want that sympathy of conception with the exigencies of the lower

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    I. As to that particular and sinister interest the circumstances by which it is

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    titles constituted by these same efficient causes partly by intimidating influence

    /terrorism/ partly vote-compelling partly of the competition-excluding kind they are

    actually in possession of a number of seats sufficient to constitute a majority in

    the House of Commons, and by that means determine on every occasion the conduct of

    government without or notwithstanding any check capable of being opposed to the

    misrule[?] on their part by the body of the people in the character of Electors

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    sinister influence of will on will, by operation of the matter of wealth in the /its/

    character of matter of corruption operating on those minds in all its several shapes

    according to these several situations: money, power, factitious dignity, peerages

    advancement in the peerage: all these good things looked for, not only for themselves

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