date

1818 Oct. 7 Parl. Reform Bill
1818 Oct. 7

Parl. Reform Bill

+ XI

Reasons 3 o or 4 o

'.2. Electors Who

'. Universality

XI Objection, this is democracy

1

3

XI. Objection - On this plan the Constitution would be democratised. Answer.

* By virtually universal suffrage in the hands of the people the force of the Government would not be altered.

* It may be said, {and not without truth} that the whole power of the government is virtually in the hands of the Commons House: and that therefore if the power of choosing the Members of that House were in the hands of the whole body of the people or of a body having no other than the same interests the whole power of the government would thus be virtually in the hand of the whole body of the people: and the government instead of a limited Monarchy would be a Representative Democracy.

In this case, the antecedent does not seem capable of being denied. For by annexing conditions to their determination, those on whose determination it at all times depends, whether money is sufficient quantity for keeping the powers of government alive and in action shall come into the hands by which it will be applied to that purpose, are potentially virtually in possession of that power: since at any time by the refusal of the supplies necessary for that purpose, it rests with them to dissolve the government, and supposing the people to concurr with them, to set up another in its stead: and under the existing system in the hands of the House of Commons the /their/ power of thus dissolving the government has by recent provisions /statutes/ been preserved: and the power they thus possess they possess will by the consent, and thence by the virtual acknowledgement of the two other branches of the Government - the Monarch and the House of Lords. +

+ See Stat. < > Irish Union Act and Land Tax and Malt Tax Redemption Acts.
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    Thus[?], so would it be: but the effect, instead of being right, would be clear[?] of the new existing[?] abuses to great [...?] use it & have [...?]

    But though potentially and hypothetically and even potentially as above, under the proposed system of universal suffrage, the whole power of the government would then be in the hands of {the whole body of the people say} the virtually universal suffrage even[?] yet actually it would not be so. Potentially the whole power is in the hands of the House of Commons: thence in the hands of those by whose will the conduct of the House of Commons is at present habitually directed: Potentially yes: but /yet/ actually no.

    Potentially in the King of France and the existing system is a despotism as poor[?] as in Turkey: But not actually. So in other European Monarchies.

    In /Under/ the existing state of things, this power of changing the form of Government is not exercised by those who possess it. exercised. More is it likely to be: means and interests both are wanting. In any attempt to exercise it, by the existing so called Representatives, being but sham representatives, no assistance would be afforded by the body of the people their pretended Constituents - the body of the people. Why /Nothi/ /How should they/? because by the people nothing would be gained by such a change. From the existing howsoever inadequately checked yet in a small degree checked Monarchy, the change would be as under the Rump parliament into an aristocracy without any check to it. For: for want of /not possessing/ the power either of choosing or of changing or of choosing the majority of these pretended Representatives, no regular check on the conduct of these same Representatives would they have.
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    { Employed in 4 b

    14. In the hands of the Commons House resides /is placed/ actually no more than a part of the aggregate power of the whole Government. But in this same body, and even {by the acknowledgement, and} with the consent, and thence by the virtual acknowledgement, of the two other branches of the government + {to wit the Monarch and the House of Lords the concurrence and cooperation of the people being supposed, resides potentially the whole of that same power.

    Employed in 4 o c[?]

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    Correspondent and proportionate to this power in /the power of/ the aggregate body of those Representatives is and will under every system be the aggregate power of these Electors.}

    VII /16/. By Electors must on this occasion, and to this purpose be understood - not those who are such only in form and name, but those who without either the form or the name are so in effect: to wit under the existing system, the proprietors of seats /seat-owners/ and all those by whose influence, of that sort which is /understand that influence/ exercised by will on will, the votes of those persons who are Electors in form and name, are in respect of the several seats determined.

    Draughtsman's Note

    + See Stat. 40 G.3. c. Irish Union Act.? or Land Tax Redemption Act.
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    The persons by whom, that is to say on each occasion by the majority of whom, this virtually /potentially/ supreme power is exercised, are then the Members of the House of Commons. The exercise given to this power will on each occasion be conducive to the above indicated only proper end as object according to the degree of aptitude in which they respectively possess relation being had to the accomplishment of that end: according to their respective degrees of aptitude with relation to the execution of such their trust.

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    + See these elements explained and application made of them to the purpose here in question in the Catechism of Parliamentary Reform by the author of this Draught.