date

1818 Sept. 1. Parl. Reform Bill
1818 Sept. 1.

Parl. Reform Bill

Reasons ult o

'.2. Electors Who

Universality

4

4

reserved. By refusing certain supplies altogether, they may dissolve the whole frame of government:

by not granting such supplies but in conditions of their own imposing /annexing/ they may draw to themselves successively all the several other powers of government:

neither by the Monarch nor by the House of Lords nor by both together could any such condition be imposed, any new powers acquired.

Draughtsmans Note

In the existing state of things, the representative this power of conquest though possessed is not exercised by the House of Commons. In the proposed state of the Representation neither would it be exercise. In the proposed state of things the constitution would in power of force be the same as it is in the existing state. The sole differences would be in the effect. In the existing state the effect is that the interest of the ruling few is consulted in preference to that of the subject many: in the proposed state the interest of the subject many would be consulted in preference to that of the ruling few. {See further reason - where this is shewn [...?] at large.} In the existing state of things, the majority of the House of commons habitually sell their power to the monarch and his subordinates and adherents, by whom it is employed in the advancement of their separate interests at the expence of the universal interests: the House of Lords pursues[?] habitually the same course. In the proposed state of things the House of Commons would not have it in their power thus to sell themselves. As to the House of Lords their power would hardly be worth the buying; and if it were, the Monarch would not have it in his power to make the purchase.
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    " How easy" {(says he)} "therefore" (viz. by means of the power he has just been speaking of, that is the power of the purse) "would it be" (says he) ["]for that House to wrest from the Crown all these powers" (no matter what powers it comes to the same thing and he might as well have said all its powers) "one after another; by making every grant conditional, and choosing their time so well, that their refusal of supply should only distress the government, without giving foreign powers any advantage over us."

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