date

3 Jan y 1810 Parl. Reform.
3 Jan y 1810

Parl. Reform.

B.II. Influence. Titles of Chapters and Sections.

Part I.

Exequent[?] /Excreatory[?]/ mass[?]

Ch. 1. Of Influence, Dependence, Independence, Obsequiousness

and Corruption. and Bribery

{§.1. Influence, due and undue }

§.2. Dependence and obsequiousness.

§.3. Dependence, the only considerably mischievous fount of undue influence.

§.4. Of Corruption.

3 or 2

Ch. 2. Of the Matter and efficient cause of Corruption – and material cause of undue

influence.

§.1. Matter of Corruption – its general nature.

§.2. Modifications of the matter of corruption – their respective corruptive powers.

§.3. Distinction between King-created article and ordinary d o –

its uses.

§ Different articles suited to different purposes.

2 or 3

Ch. 3. Dependence, its mode and degrees

§.1. Where the possessor of the benefit is the dependent

himself.

§.2. Where the possessor of the benefit is a friend of the

dependents.

8

Ch. 8. Of the influence of Property.

7

Part 2[?] continued[?]

Ch. 7. Of dependence on a party in partiones[?] +

Ch. 8. Of the consequence of corrupt Boroughs and other Electoral Districts on party

dependence.

Part I

4

Ch. 4. Gratitude, considered as a bond of dependence /an efficient[?] bond[?] of

corruption/.

§. 1: Bond, the affection[?] or the duty

§.2. To afford ground for the affection, the benefit must

be irrevocable.

§.3. The affection rare in this case.

§.4. Immorality of the affection in this case.

If private[?] interest[?] is the shape[?] no other[?] interest[?]

[…?] or that[?] See Spencers virtua[?] & Graves[?] motives[?]

§.5. Sinister interest by which the duty has been imposed.

§.6. or Ch. Bonds of dependence, their invisibility Consequence – Frequent Elections

&c necessary.

Ch. 5. Dependence, in what cases undue, and in what manner mischievous –

/{ Ch. 5. Mischief of conduct[?] […?]}/

or

{ 6

Independence in what sense desirable.

§.1

§.2. Objection answered. }

5

Ch.6. Of the Dependence of Members on their Constituents.

§.1. Instructions ought not to be made legally binding.

§.2. Instructions ought not to be considered as morally binding.

Ch. 7.* Of Corruption &c considered as applicable /accident[?]/ to the

situations of Member and Elector indiscriminately. See Ch. 19 How to combat

&c.

§.1. Radical error in the mode of treatment.

§.2. Cause of the error, sinister interest

§.3. Leading principle. Sole immediate seat of the mischief parliament itself.

Part II Corrupt Memb.

Ch. 2. Corruption &c its mischief in the case of a Member –

I. The corruption habitual – Corruptor, the Crown.

§.1.1. Mischief to the state.

§.2.2. Mischief to the mind of the individual corrupted, habitual insincerity.

§.3. On the Opposition side, the insincerity has /had/ necessity for an excuse.

§.4. After parli y reform, no such necessity would have place.

§.5.3. Mischief to the mind of the subordinate corruptor.

§.6.4. Mischief to the King’s mind.

Ch. 9. Continuation as

II. The Corruption habitual; corruptor an individual – patron of the seat.

§.1. Mischief to the state +

§.2. Mischief to the mind of the corrupted incumbent. +

§.3. Mischief to the mind of the patron. +

Ch. 10. Continuation

III. Benefit gained or sought by the Corruption, possession of a seat.

§.1. Mischief to the state.

§.2. Mischief to the mind of the incumbent /purchaser/ or proposed incumbent

/purchaser/

§.3. Mischief to the mind of the patron or supposed patron /seller or proposed

seller/.

Ch. 11. Continuation.

Doctrines of the Speaker of the H. of Commons A o 1809 concerning

this case examined.

§.1. The doctrine examined

§.2. Anecdote for illustration

Part II Corrupt Membs

Ch. 12. Continuation.

IV. The corruption occasional: benefit gained or sought, a particular vote – matter

of corruption liquidated.

§ 1. Mischief to the state

§ 2. Mischief to the mind of the individual corrupt ed.

§ 3. Mischief to the mind of the corrupt or.

Ch. 13. Continuation.

V. {The corruption occasional: benefit gained or sought, a particular vote:} matter

of corruption, unliquidated.

§.1. Mischief to the state.

§.2. Mischief to the corrup ted mind.

§.3. Mischief to the corrupting mind. In case of bribery, briber or bribee must

put[?] confidence: this confidence in […?] violated: no real[?] disparity[?] than is

produced by it.

Part III. Corrupt. in Electors.

Ch. 14. Corruption – its mischief in the case of an Elector.

§.1. Leading[?] principles

§.2. Boroughs open, close, and pocket -

§.3. Scales of mischievousness as between the three species according to the

Speaker’s doctrines and the above.

§.4. Anecdote for illustration Dialogue between a great character and a little one.

Ch. 15. Continuation.

§.1.
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    In regard to the situation of Member, of the several different modifications of parliamentary corruption which it seemed of use to distinguish and bring to view, the order in the scale of mischievousness seemed to be as follows: viz. Case is[?] Modification the first, occupying the highest place: corruption having for its effect, on the part of the Member an habitual state of Court or ministerial dependence. The corruption or corrupt state of the Member's mind habitual, the influence of the mater of corruption applied to it having for its effect /fruit/ the placing and keeping him /his mind/ in a state of undue and corrupt dependence on the Corrupter General, the King, his agents and subordinates and agents: thence his conduct in a correspondently habitual state of undue obsequiousness.

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    { In the former case the dependence with the consequent obsequiousness is assured and long continued, lasting as long as the parliament lasts, and the undueness of both being it rendered equally certain and lasting by the necessary predominance of sinister interest on the part of the King and his dependent subordinates and agents, coupled with power sufficient /adequate/ to the purpose of pursuing that sinister interest with constantly considerable effect.}
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    §.7. – 2. Corruptor d o continual mischief to corrupted Member’s

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    §.9 III Corruption: by sale and purchase of seat Mischief to date (none)

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    IV.

    §.12. 13. 14. Corruption occasional, efficient cause a fee[?] money, a fixt sum

    Mischief 1 to Stable[?] 2. to corruptee’s[?] mind, to corruptor’s mind

    §.15. 16. 17. 18. Corruption occasional efficient cause a sum unliquidated – or a

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    Ch.6. Parl Corrupt Members

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    1

    '.6. II. Corruption continued - Corruptor an individual, patron of the seat - 6. Mischief to the public

    When from a hand which (no matter how) has a seat in the house of Commons at command, that hand not being in a state of dependence under the Crown a man is placed /finds himself seated/ in that seat, in this case is there any thing of corrupt dependence or corruption? and if so /either/ (mischief being supposed a necessary consequence /concomitant/ of parliamentary corruption) is the quantity of mischief then[?] produced to the public greater or less than the quantity of mischief attached to the corrupt dependence of a Member on the King or a Minister /through a Ministry/ in possession or expectancy, as above?

    To these questions before any answer can be returned some further distinctions will be requisite.

    The Member thus seated, does he pay a price for the appointment /this benefit/, or does he receive it without price?

    If without price, is the connection between this incumbent and his patron such as to place him /his conduct in this his office/ in a state of strict dependence on the patron, or in only that loose kind of dependence which as above may happen to be considered as constituted by the sense or obligation of Gratitude? (a)

    Note ( )

    ( ) If paying a price that price be such as is understood to be to a certain amount inferior to the market price, this is a compound case, and in so far as gratitude operates /is considered/ as a bond of dependence, he continues in a sort of dependence under the patron in a sort of dependence, the degree of which is determined by the amount of the abatement on the correct price.

    This sort of arrangement is a very common one. The parties between whom it takes place are usually parties who understand one another to stand /be stationed/ in the war of politics on the same side.