125_001.xml

Title: [8 June 1810 Influence analyzed - Ordo]

Description: 8 June 1810

Influence analyzed - Ordo novus propositus

Prob. I

Ch.1.

§.1. Objects of this work

1. What influence proper what undue

2. Where undue, why & in what proportion

§.2. Influence if understood over understanding, in no case undue?

§.3. Use of the word influence in protecting it where undue

§.4. Where mischievous, influence of will on will why mischievous.

Ch.2 King, influence on Members - whether and why undue /mischievous/

§.1. Existence[?] of a sinister interest on the part of the King supposed by the Constitution.

§.2. the existence real and indisputable.

§.3. Share possessed in it by his servants.

Ch.3. Systems in regard to the influence of the Crown stated and compared.

§.1. The two systems explained

§.2. Provisional preference /adoption/ necessary to be given to the more popular.

§.3. More popular - reason for the preference given to it.

In the open mode of voting the influence of will is exercised on the same person by the same person as d o on understandi g d o on understanding being beneficial as well as unavoidable, protects the sinister[?] from […?]

Sole method of decomposing[?] them, secret voting.

H. of Commons (suppose surrounded[?] with a […?] army[?], subject /devote/ to the King & hostile to the House. This not more mischievous than its existing influence.

 7 May 1811

Give the results in the first chapters.

Effective mischievousness of undue influence circumstances on which it depends viz on the ratio, occasional and habitual of the influenced band to the non-influenced: thence in the proportion between attendant and absentee.

For the effective influence of the undue influence of the Crown no actual declaration of will on the part of the King or of any Minister is necessary.

Therefore no degree of probity on the part of the King is (as parliament is now composed) sufficient to prevent the mischiefs of undue influence.

8 May 1811

Part I

Practical results

Part II

Of influence due and undue.

Part III

Mischief of undue Influence undue dependence.

Part IV

Efficient cause of undue dependence - matter of corruption Gratitude &c (including liberty[?] of Non-Attendance.)

Part I Of Influence proper and undue

Part .II. Of Parliamentary Dependence Independence and Corruption.

Part .III. /II/ Of Corruption in the situation /case/ of Members of Parliament

Part .IV. /III/ Of Corruption in the case of a Parliamentary Elector.

{Part .V. Parliamentary Corruption considered in various points of view.}

N.B. A large portion of Necessity in an abridged form be now engrafted into Influence.

Part V. Systems of corruption and incorruption compared.

Part VI. How to combat

JB_128_025.xml

Title: [3 April 1818 Proposed Parliamentary]

Description: 3 April 1818

Proposed Parliamentary Reform Resolutions

Draught – Marginals

1

1

II. Interest

1.

Sole adequate security for good government community of interest between governor and

governed.

2.

Recognition have been made of them from the throne

# 1

3

# 1 Recognition quoted: viz

1. James 1. 1605 Nov. 9

2. Charles 2. 1670 Feb 14

3. d o 1678 June 18.

4. d o 1680 March 21

5 Will. 3. 1692 Nov. 4

6. d o 1695 Nov 22. # 2

3

* # 2 Such community failing, governed’s interest ought to be

preferably pursued

4

Recognition from the throne

1. James 1. 1603 March 19.

2. Will. 3 1679 Dec r. 3.

3. George 1. 1717. Nov. 21

4. G. 2. 1730. Jan y 13

5. d o 1744 April 3

6 d o 1758 June 25

7. G. 3. 1763. Nov. 15

8. d o 1770 Nov. 13.

9 d o 1771 May 8.

People electors

5

Though no such security compleat, but in so far as the administrators of public

affairs are approved, and thence chosen or at least removable by those whose affairs

are administered, yet the case of

People Electors

the King, affords an exception, prescribed by evil of change &c, considering

that no act of his is valid without signature of a responsible servant.

4

* { See Act of Settlement 12 & 13 Will. 3. as to Resolution of the Privy

Council: The clause was repealed 4 An c.8. v 24. }

People Electors

7

2. Lords, another: Reasons 1 Evil of change &c 2 – Use of a temporary bar to

precipitation: 3. presumption of ultimate yielding to people’s wishes.

People Electors

8

Only in so far as they are really / Fina[?]/ representative of

the Univ / whole/ people, are functions of

Common’s House Members legitimately exercised. Add Recognitions

I III

IV Annuality

9

* Only in so far as really[?] chosen, and at short and stated periods removable, is

people’s assurance adequate, that Representatives’ Acts are conformable to people’s

sense and wishes, and they true Representatives.

I Universality

10

People’s Representatives if really so, are d o of the whole body,

or at least the majority; such excepted (whose interests are inseparably interwoven

with those who choose and such) who, on a manifest ground, are incapable of having

quoadhoc an adequate conception of their own interests.

III Equality

11

In choice of Representatives peoples sense not conformable to, but in so far as each

voters suffrage has the same force as every other’s: nor therefore unless in so far

as in the choice of each Representative, the numbers of the Voters are the same.

III Equality

12

Numbers being ever and every where changing, such absolute equality impossible, and

by no such change immediate sensible mischief producible – application of this

principle must give way to local exigencies: and without inconvenience may, if not

caused by partiality, personal or local.

II. Freedom

13

On no Election is suffrage free, unless voter be unexposed to hope or fear for self

or connection from every individual, by reason of such suffrage –

15

# 2 Recognition of the necessity of this universality, freedom,

and equality, from the throne.

1. James 1 1614 April 8.

2 d o 1620 Mar. 26

3. d o 1623 Feb. 12.

4. Charles 1 1640 April 13

5 George 3 1761 March 19

19

# 3 Recognition from the throne of the necessity of shortness of

duration in the trust, coupled with frequency of meeting: viz.

1. In divers Statutes of Ed. 3. &c: enforced by 16 C.1. c.1: that Statute

unhappily repealed under Charles 2 whose endeavour was to reign without Parliaments.

20

Yet has the principle been recognized by succeeding Monarchs: viz.

1. by G. 2. 1741. April 21.

2. d o 1747 Nov. 12

3. by G. 3 1761 Nov. 6

4. d o 1768 Nov. 8

5. d o 1780 Nov. 1.

JB_128_325.xml

Title: [nd [wm 1816] C + 17]

Description: nd [wm 1816]

C +

17

{as compleatly exempt as possible from every such external influence.}

27. That, forasmuch as, according to the originally and immemorially established,

and still existing, forms and practice of the Constitution of this realm, the

disposal of public offices and Commissions is, and all along has been, without any

considerable exception, lodged in the hands of the Crown, to which Offices and

Commissions, pecuniary emolument has all along, for the most part, been, - and to a

greater or less amount can not but continue to be, - attached – and not only Offices

and Commissions, but objects of general desire, in various other shapes, such as

those of power, rank, and dignity, in a variety of forms, all which advantages

constitute so many instruments of temptation, by the hope of obtaining which, for

themselves or their connections in the way of personal interest or sympathy, or in so

far as obtained by the fear of being deprived thereof, the representatives of the

people can not but continue to be exposed, as at all times they have been exposed, to

be seduced from their duty, and induced to sacrifice the universal interest, of the

people their constituents, to the particular interest or supposed interest of the

Crown, its servants and their adherents, possessors, many of them, by one means or

other, of seats in Parliament, - hence arises a necessity – not only for the giving,

to the continuance of their respective terms in such their trust, the shortest

practicable duration, as above, but moreover, in the event of any such transgression,

to the profit whereof it may happen, to be greater in value, than the utmost loss, to

which they can ever be subjected by simple removal from such their {trust, - the

further necessity, of rendering them eventually subject to adequate ?quere what? punishment, +[1] at the hands, or at the

instance, of their successors in such their trust.}

28. That, forasmuch as, in proportion as it has place, this influence of the Crown

can not be exercised and made productive of its natural effect, without counteracting

and /outweighing and/ overpowering, in the breasts of their Representatives, the influence of the

people, - and that, in such sort as to engage them to make

continual sacrifice of the interest of such their dependents, and adherents, - such

influence may, with but too incontrovertible propriety, be termed a Sinister influence.

29. That, so long ago as the year 1780, in consequence of the experience then

already had, and the strong sense accordingly entertained, not only of the existence,

but of the mischievous effects of this same sinister influence, it was, in and by a

Resolution passed on the 6 th day of April in that year by this

House, declared, of and concerning the influence of the Crown, that the same “has

encreased, is encreasing, and ought to be diminished.”

30. That, since that time, this same sinister influence hath been encreased, viz on

the one hand, by the difference between the public Debt and consequent Taxes of that

time (viz. between £ | | and £ | |) and the public Debt and Taxes of the present time

(between £ | | and £ | |); on the other hand by the amount of the standing army at

that time, between ( ) and ( ) men /(viz Army 35,003 +[2] men)/,

and the amount of the standing Army (viz between ( ) and ( ) men at this present

time: the debt, - in respect of the taxes, necessary for payment of the interest

thereof, and the profitable patronage and power, exercised in relation to the several

offices and Commissions, necessary for the collection of those same taxes: - the

army, “in respect of the patronage and power exercised in relation to the Offices and

Commissions thereunto belonging, as well as of the faculty of applying that same

power to the stifling the voice, and destroying the liberties, of the people.”

+[1] Answer – No use in saying what: it would only afford a handle for objections

against a proposition the truth of which as it stands is out of the reach of dispute.

J.B.

But I have no objection to the omission of this clause about punishment on this

occasion, indispensable as I can not but regard the measure thus proposed. J.B.

+[2] Annual Register A o 1780, p.308 Supplies granted by

Parliament for the Year 1780.