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7 Oct. 1809
Parl y. Reform. P t. 1. Necessity –
Chapters and Sections
Ch. 1. Plan of this work
§.1. Objects of this work
§.2. Radical grievance Dependence of the House of Commons on the King. Nov. 1816 This
is not the evil itself but its cause.
§.3. Pleas in belief of the Dependence stated.
Ch. 2. Kings separate interest – general view of it.
§.1. K. gs separate interest why held up
to view
§.2. K. gs separate interest – shapes in which it acts.
Ch.3. King’s interest as to to Power – what power he ought to have.
§.1. Power as to 1 measures – 2. – men.
§.2. What power the King ought to have as to each.
Ch. 4. King’s interest as to power continued – What power he ought not to have. (See Ch 13.)
§.1. Powers not properly exercisable by the King
§.2. Pitt y r[?] – his notions accorded with the above.
Here or further on?
§.3. No medium between the Kings absolute power and the above limitations.
Note on continuing[?] Kings here or elsewhere?
Ch.4. continued.
§.4. King’s inviolability and indismissibility depend upon his impotence.
Ch. 5. Kings interest as to power continued – his sinister interest.
as to d o.
§. 1 King’s sinister interest as to 1. Measures
§. 2. King’s sinister interest as to 2. patronage
Marginals have only §.6
Ch. 6. King’s interest as to power continued.
his sinister interest as to sources of power.
§.1. King’s sinister interest as to war.
§.2. – as to Colonies and dependencies in general
§.3. – as to Penal Colonies
§.4. – as to ill-governed home-possessions.
§.5. Limits to Kings power of patronage
Ch. 7. King’s interest as to 2. Money
§.1. Money how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister interest.
§.2. Admiralty Droits.
§.3. Greenwax.
§.4. Exemption from War-Taxes.
Ch. 8. King’s interest as to 3. Ease.
§.1. Ease, how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister, interest.
§.2.
Ch. 9. King’s interest as to 4. Reputation.
§.1. King’s reputation, what publicly useful, what sinister.
§.2. Mischief of undue reputation in the Kings case
§.3. Kings interest in the means of reputation
Ch. 10.
Kings interest as to 5. Vengeance.
§.1 Sinister how much, i.e What fit, what unfit.
§.2.
Ch. 11. Kings sinister interests – their mutual subservience.
Ch. 12. Sinister interest of the King’s subordinates.
§.1. Shapes in which the sinister interests of the Kings
subordinates act.
§.2. Natural confederacy among the several subordinate possessors of sinister
interest.
§.3. Sinister interests as to war exemplified.
{{ Topics of the Chapters Stated.
I. Radical grievance dependence of Commons on King
N.B. This dependence /The mischief/ depends on the existence of a separate interest
on King’s part. Insert here from Plan – Explanations – Mischief of Commons dependence
Ch. 1.
II. Kings sep. interest, its different branches –
Ch. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9 10. 11. thence unfitness as to probity
III. D o of this subordinate. Ch.12.
IV. King’s unfitness as to intelligence. Ch. 13.
V. Necessity of an adequate check to King’s power, governed
by his separate interest. Only such check, his dependence
on the people, thro’ their representatives. Ch. 14.
VI. Burke’s opinion assuring Kings unfitness, and thence the necessity of his
constant dependence on the people. Ch. 15
VII. Unless the king be thus constantly dependent, his power will encrease to
despotism and his sinister interest govern without controul. Ch. 16
VIII. Inadequacy of other checks upon the King’s absolute power. Ch. 17. }
IX. Particular necessity of King’s constant dependence to the prevention of
unnecessary wars. Ch. 19.
{ King can not be dependent on people but in so far as their representatives are Ch.
Taking representatives out of dependence on King and rendering them in part[?] dependent as formerly on their property in part independent of every body the main object of
Parliam. Reform. }}
{ X. King would naturally[?] be in a state of adequate dependence on people, of
representatives, instead of being either independent or dependent on people, were not
dependent on King.
XI. Necessity of taking them out of the improper dependence and placing them under
the proper one.
XII. For this purpose intelligendum how /by what means[?]/
the dependence is established. }
{ XIII. Corruption and bribery by and to whomsoever applied
are no otherwise productive of considerable mischief, than in as far as they are
contributory to this anticonstitutional dependence. }
XIV. By the means necessary to do away the greatly mischievous corruption, the other
modes will be done away.
XV. The arrangements necessary to place the dependence of Members on the proper
footing as above may be so ordered as to be productive of divers collateral and
subordinate and collateral good effects.
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Title: [31 Aug 1809 Parl y Ref m Ch. Necessity]Description: 31 Aug 1809 Parl y Ref m Ch. Necessity Original Beginning. 1 §.5. K gs sep. interest. 1. Money 23. 24. 25. §.8. King’s separate interest 3. ease. §.9. King’s separate interest 4. vengeance §.10. Kings separate interest. 5. reputation. {Part 1 Ch. 1 Objects of this work […?] and Means of Reform Necessity & mode of reform[?] replacing the House of Commons in a state of dependence on the people Ch.2. The King’s separate interest – shapes in which it acts Ch.3. The Necessary prevalence[?] of which the conduct of the K.[?] is dependent on his will Ch.4. Sole remedy replacing the House in its dependence on the people } B.I. Necessity. Sect. s continued { 6 §.19. Elogiums on the Kings mischievous.} B.III. Influence 1 2 §.20. Tests, an instrument of corrupt dependence. III. Influence 2 1 §.21. Ireland – its abuses of use to despotism. Ch. 5 { B.I. Necessity Sections 12 Sept 1809 § 1 Objects of this work 1 (2. 3. 4. notes:) 5. 6 §.2. General grievance. Dependence of the H. of Commons. 7. 8. 9: 10. 11. 12. §.3 Pleasure[?] forms[?] of the dependence. 13. 14. 15. Duplicative[?] 15. Influence ambiguous, Reference inwards. II §.4. Kings sinister /separate/ interest – its 5 shapes 16. 17 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. {23 24. 25.} (dup. 8. 9.) §.6. Kings sinister /separate/ interest 2. Power. as to 1. Measure §.7.* King’s separate interest 2. power. as to 2. patronage III §.7./10/ Mutual subservience of King’s separate interests. §.8./11 Ministers’ separate interests. IV 1 §.9./12/ King’s and Ministers separate interests prevalent – unless controuled. 2 §.10. People’s controul Britannice[?] – its peculiar excellence. 3 §.11. Sole effectual controul, People’s power thro’ Representatives. 4 §.12. People’s controul mollified by House’s dependence. 5 §.13. House, in dependence compleat. 6 §.14. Sole remedy. House’s dependence 15 V § 15. King’s dependence necessary 17 §.16. Future prospects. 18 §.17. Despotism chained & loosed – Historical Sketch 19 §.18. King’s dependence necessary – Objection – Ballance destroyed.
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Title: [7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. I]Description: 7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. I. Necessity. Chapters and Sections Ch. 13. King’s unfitness or Evil consequences of the Kings being his own Minister See Ch. 4. §.1. Evil consequences enumerated. §.2: Consequence 1. Misrule, viz. by the King §.3.2. Preference given to unfit subordinates. §.4-3. Encroachment continually encreasing. §.5.-4. Habits of insincerity produced in Ministers. { §.6. King’s unfitness for power maintained by Burke. Here, or in Ch. 4? or in Ch. 14? } Ch. 14. King’s dependence on the people how far necessary § 1. Propriety of the King’s dependence in point of theory. § 2. Objection answered inconsistency of such dependence with the ballance of power. (Reference to a dissertation in the Appendix.) §.3. Actual dependence of the King antecedently to the present reign. Historical sketch §.4. Hanover and Hampshire The dependence broken through in the case of Hanover. §.5. The propriety of the King’s dependence maintained by Burke Post[?] off to Ch. 15. §.6. Future prospects necessity of this dependence indicated by the state of the Royal Family. Ch. 15 poste[?] 16[?] Marginals Ch. 16. The King will be despotic, unless the House of Commons be thus dependent on the people. §.1. The King’s sinister interest will prevail unless controuled §.2. Sole adequate controul the power of the people §.3. Peculiar excellence of the mode in which this controul is exercised according to the English constitution. §.4. The controul of the people is nullified, in so far as their delegates are dependent on the King. §.5. The dependence of the House of Commons on the King is compleat on all ordinary occasions. §.6. Its dependence on the people is the sole true remedy. §.7. Inefficacy of all other remedies – spirit of the people – press - &c. Ch. 17.* Occasional interposition on the part of the people is inadequate. §.1. §.2. §.3. Burke’s intimation of its adequacy examined. §.4. Tumultuous petitioning Act – check applied by it to such interposition. Ch. 19. Necessity of parl y reform to the promotion of unnecessary wars. §.1. In theory Polyarchy is more favourable than monarchy to peace. §.2. Facilities the King has for plunging the people into war. §.3. In practice polyarchy has been more pacific than monarchy. §.4. Wars produced or endeavoured at by sinister interest in this reign. Ch. 18 No marginals Recapitulatory conclusion – Despotism is at hand. §.1. Abject dependence of the House of Commons. §.2. Abject dependence of the Clergy and the Lawyers §.3. All interruptions to the despotism are precarious and inadequate. §.4. Recapitulation. Ch. 15. Unfitness of the King for exercising power in detail – and the necessity of his dependence on the people through the medium of their delegates, contended for by Burke §.1. Burke’s opinions to what purpose brought to view §.2. His opinions as to the power of the King §.3 – as to the powers of the people §.4 – as to the power of the Electors over their delegates. Ch. 20. Mischief of Idol-worship in the person of the King viz. as obstructing Parl Reform §.1. 29 Dec r 1809 Ch. 17 The occasional prevalence of Oppositions[?] is no efficient check to the King’s despotism. §.1. Dependence on a party, though in opposition, is dependence on the King. §.2. Changes in administration prevent not despotism, only cause it to change hands. §.3.
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Title: [21 Sep 1809 K[?] 17 Sep. 1809]Description: 21 Sep 1809 K[?] 17 Sep. 1809 Parl y Ref m B. 1. Necessity. Ch. 20 Elogiums mischievous 3 30 Sep. 1809. Ordo propositus. §.1. Interest how much dexter, how much sinister as to reputation §.2. Mischief of the effectual pursuit of his sinister interest in this article. §.3/4/. Modes by which his sinister inter t in this is pursuable §.4/3/. Modes by which his dexetr interest in this is pursuable §.5. Mischief of effectual pursuit of his sinister interest how avoible[?] – not by punishm t, but by parl y reform. False tokens of fitness, as[?] 1. Youth and old age 2 Nativity 3. Large family – Wife’s avarice 4. Conjugal fidelity. To know[?] so forbidding? 5 Solanne[?] & Cobbet convicted as for a libel for imputing […?] character to Hardwick in token of public unfitness. 6. Gossipping & Gratification to preach 7 Blindness[?] Tokens of unfitness. 1. Misrule – so many instances – nothing done since King’s commission Proof Catholic business 2. Slave Trade abolition – his opposition 3. Sacrificing Britain & Hanover to himself 4. Propensity to unjust war against Russia thro’ Sweden. 5 Liberty of the people Wilkes &c 6. Freedom of H. of Commons Middlesex election. 7. Fondness for arbitrary power. British America: Spanish America. 8. Hardness of character Keeping people standing &c. 9. Imbecillity – What? what? what? 10. Hatred of Talents. Paley – A. Smith – Archb p. Moore. 11. Exempting himself from War Taxes. 12 Inspectors make […?] in[?] dupes. It is to these alone[?] I address myself with any prospect of success – Henceforward any size[?] of […?] should bespeak a man an Ephraim[?] Justius[?]. In regard to each pretence of private goodness, ask is this a reason why he should govern?
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