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8 Oct r 1809 + §.2
Parl y Reform
B. I. Necessity
Ch. Occasional inadequate
§.2. Changes, inadequate
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§.2. Changes of administration are inadequate to the purpose
Thus it is that the habitual tide of despotism is subject to be stemmed for the
moment by occasional storms. But of this sort of security against misrule what is the
use or value?
For ten years together /the whole of these ten years/ the course of despotism and of
that misrule which is the consequence of despotism—of unchecked power—has gone on
without ceasing—all this time the business has been conducted /carried on/ by
unfit—by comparatively if not compleatly and absolutely unfit—hands Bad measures in
any numbers may have been carried into effect: good measures in any numbers remained
unthought of, or if thought of and brought upon the carpet, rejected or in some other
way frustrated.
Worn out or blunted /and become unfit for use/ the old set of instruments are now
discarded /thrown by/. But the people in what respect are they gainers? Then hand—the
invisible irresponsible, the uncontrouled and uncontroulable hand that worked with
the old instruments, the same hand and with the same power goes to work with the new.
To the old set of servants succeeds a new one: but the new servants are still in the
same set of dependence as the old ones were: what they succeed to is—not power—not
independence as against the King not dependence on the people but dependence on the
arbitrary will of the Monarch to the same yoke as that which kept pressing on the
necks of their predecessors. At so easy a price as that of dismissing an old set of
servants as soon as he is tired of them, the King rubs off his old scores: the tablet
washed clean, and now he is at full liberty to commence a new one. The people have
got that which is termed satisfaction: and which is all the satisfaction that in this
state of things they can have: the satisfaction of seeing the same sort of work going
on under /performed by/ a different set of hands. Hampshire can no longer be defended
in Hanover by M r Pitt or M r Addington: but it
may be, and is defended if not with equal success with at least equal energy by Lord
Grenville and M r Fox.
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Title: [7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. I]Description: 7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. I. Necessity. Chapters and Sections Ch. 13. King’s unfitness or Evil consequences of the Kings being his own Minister See Ch. 4. §.1. Evil consequences enumerated. §.2: Consequence 1. Misrule, viz. by the King §.3.2. Preference given to unfit subordinates. §.4-3. Encroachment continually encreasing. §.5.-4. Habits of insincerity produced in Ministers. { §.6. King’s unfitness for power maintained by Burke. Here, or in Ch. 4? or in Ch. 14? } Ch. 14. King’s dependence on the people how far necessary § 1. Propriety of the King’s dependence in point of theory. § 2. Objection answered inconsistency of such dependence with the ballance of power. (Reference to a dissertation in the Appendix.) §.3. Actual dependence of the King antecedently to the present reign. Historical sketch §.4. Hanover and Hampshire The dependence broken through in the case of Hanover. §.5. The propriety of the King’s dependence maintained by Burke Post[?] off to Ch. 15. §.6. Future prospects necessity of this dependence indicated by the state of the Royal Family. Ch. 15 poste[?] 16[?] Marginals Ch. 16. The King will be despotic, unless the House of Commons be thus dependent on the people. §.1. The King’s sinister interest will prevail unless controuled §.2. Sole adequate controul the power of the people §.3. Peculiar excellence of the mode in which this controul is exercised according to the English constitution. §.4. The controul of the people is nullified, in so far as their delegates are dependent on the King. §.5. The dependence of the House of Commons on the King is compleat on all ordinary occasions. §.6. Its dependence on the people is the sole true remedy. §.7. Inefficacy of all other remedies – spirit of the people – press - &c. Ch. 17.* Occasional interposition on the part of the people is inadequate. §.1. §.2. §.3. Burke’s intimation of its adequacy examined. §.4. Tumultuous petitioning Act – check applied by it to such interposition. Ch. 19. Necessity of parl y reform to the promotion of unnecessary wars. §.1. In theory Polyarchy is more favourable than monarchy to peace. §.2. Facilities the King has for plunging the people into war. §.3. In practice polyarchy has been more pacific than monarchy. §.4. Wars produced or endeavoured at by sinister interest in this reign. Ch. 18 No marginals Recapitulatory conclusion – Despotism is at hand. §.1. Abject dependence of the House of Commons. §.2. Abject dependence of the Clergy and the Lawyers §.3. All interruptions to the despotism are precarious and inadequate. §.4. Recapitulation. Ch. 15. Unfitness of the King for exercising power in detail – and the necessity of his dependence on the people through the medium of their delegates, contended for by Burke §.1. Burke’s opinions to what purpose brought to view §.2. His opinions as to the power of the King §.3 – as to the powers of the people §.4 – as to the power of the Electors over their delegates. Ch. 20. Mischief of Idol-worship in the person of the King viz. as obstructing Parl Reform §.1. 29 Dec r 1809 Ch. 17 The occasional prevalence of Oppositions[?] is no efficient check to the King’s despotism. §.1. Dependence on a party, though in opposition, is dependence on the King. §.2. Changes in administration prevent not despotism, only cause it to change hands. §.3.
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Title: [8 Oct r 1809 Parl y Reform]Description: 8 Oct r 1809 Parl y Reform B I Necessity Ch. Occasional inadequate §.1. Changes how produced 3 3 Such being by supposition the effect, the cause by which and mode in which it has been /was/ produced must have been near[?] about as follows— For the ten years all but a few days—say for the ten years all but a month the King having had in his dependence such a proportion of the members in ordinary attendance as shall on each individual occasion have constituted a sufficiently great /abundant/ majority, all the measures that have been carried into effect within that time have followed the determination /direction/ of his private /personal/ /single/ will. But now within a month of the conclusion of the ten years symptoms of dissatisfaction on the part of the people have grown to such an height that changes begin to take place in the ordinary composition of the House of Commons 1. One set of /Some of the/ Members who under the general notion of supporting government in whatsoever hands lodged had without having reaped /reaped or expected to reap/ from the services of the functionaries in office any considerable advantage been accustomed to take the opinion and will of the rulers for the time being for a /as and for the/ provisional standard of rectitude, viz. for the sake of saving to themselves respectively the trouble of applying their minds to each separate business, observing the /a/ general dissatisfaction encrease, now apply their minds to the subject, and regarding the members of the existing administration as unworthy of their confidence, withdraw it accordingly, and commence the habit of voting on the other side. Friends of government. John [...?]-men. Quietists. Bell-weather-followers.
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Title: [8 Oct r 1809 Parl y Reform]Description: 8 Oct r 1809 Parl y Reform B. I. Necessity Ch. Occasional inadequate §.2. Changes, inadequate 7 2 Thus it is that in respect of so much as a remission of the disease the remedy is in its operation altogether precarious and inadequate. Of any thing like a compleat intermission its efficacy /adequacy/ is still more compleatly inadequate. As to prevention to any such purpose the power of the remedy is still more problematical /questionable/ and feeble. For ten years has mischief been going on without controul unless in so far as the bare possibility that by mischief on this or that particular occasion mischief in this or that particular shape the sort of crisis in question may peradventure be accelerated. Against violent and unprecedented mischiefs acts each of them openly and avowedly subversive of the constitution even this check, feeble as it is may perhaps be not altogether without its effect: and to this may we perhaps be indebted for the having a jubilee to celebrate under a King not avowedly absolute instead of under a King as absolute as the Emperor Bonaparte. But against petty or customary /mischiefs and/ instances of misrule in any number that it affords no protection experience but too plainly testifies: the governing a vast majority of the inhabitants of one of the three kingdoms upon principles upon /by/ which their interests are avowedly set at nought and sacrificed: {sacrificed either to nothing at all or to the humour and that the ill humour of one man.} holding the liberty of the press in a state of avowed extinction by a species of spurious law /rules of pretended law/ which wants /want for/ nothing but opportunity to be carried into effect {as if it were genuine}.
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