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8 Oct r 1809
Parl y Reform
B. I. Necessity
Ch. Occasional inadequate
§.2. Changes, inadequate
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Thus it is that in respect of so much as a remission of the disease the remedy is in
its operation altogether precarious and inadequate.
Of any thing like a compleat intermission its efficacy /adequacy/ is still more
compleatly inadequate.
As to prevention to any such purpose the power of the remedy is still more
problematical /questionable/ and feeble. For ten years has mischief been going on
without controul unless in so far as the bare possibility that by mischief on this or
that particular occasion mischief in this or that particular shape the sort of crisis
in question may peradventure be accelerated.
Against violent and unprecedented mischiefs acts each of them openly and avowedly
subversive of the constitution even this check, feeble as it is may perhaps be not
altogether without its effect: and to this may we perhaps be indebted for the having
a jubilee to celebrate under a King not avowedly absolute instead of under a King as
absolute as the Emperor Bonaparte.
But against petty or customary /mischiefs and/ instances of misrule in any number
that it affords no protection experience but too plainly testifies: the governing a
vast majority of the inhabitants of one of the three kingdoms upon principles upon
/by/ which their interests are avowedly set at nought and sacrificed: {sacrificed
either to nothing at all or to the humour and that the ill humour of one man.}
holding the liberty of the press in a state of avowed extinction by a species of
spurious law /rules of pretended law/ which wants /want for/ nothing but opportunity
to be carried into effect {as if it were genuine}.
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Title: [[clxiv. 116] 1820 June 25 Emancipation]Description: [clxiv. 116] 1820 June 25 Emancipation Spanish ?.8. Corruptive influence 5. Mode of operation There are two arrangements, by each of which, restraint may be put upon the power of a functionary or set of functionaries - upon a power, which, but for such restraint would be absolute and despotic: the one is exposure to punishment in case of a misuse of the power appertaining to the situation; the other is - liability to be removed /exposure to removal/ out of it. Of these two arrangements, exposure to punishment may perhaps be necessary to compleat the security, but of itself it is altogether inadequate, and on the supposition that either can suffice without the other may with the least prejudice /inconvenience/ be dispensed with. Liability to be removed /exposure to removal/ is the most obvious, the most simple, the most immediately efficient, the most plainly /manifestly/ apposite remedy. One case however is not less manifest /obvious/ in which it would manifestly be imperfect and inadequate: this is where a functionary who by /according to/ law is exposed to removal refuses to submitt to it. According to this so compleatly /undeniably/ glorious, though so far from matchless Constitution of ours - functionaries or sets of functionaries of the three sections between /amongst/ which the supreme operative power of the government - the one the Monarch is exposed neither to punishment nor to removal: the Lords /Members of the Lords House/, so long as they /the majority of the body/ act together as little exposed to either: the Members of the Commons House, in that same case as compleatly exempt from punishment, and that not only in effect, but in form likewise, enjoying avowedly an equal impunity: to removal, at the hands of the people, whose removable Agents they profess themselves to be with one breath while they deny it with the next in effect as little exposed as the Lords.
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Title: [7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. I]Description: 7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. I. Necessity. Chapters and Sections Ch. 13. King’s unfitness or Evil consequences of the Kings being his own Minister See Ch. 4. §.1. Evil consequences enumerated. §.2: Consequence 1. Misrule, viz. by the King §.3.2. Preference given to unfit subordinates. §.4-3. Encroachment continually encreasing. §.5.-4. Habits of insincerity produced in Ministers. { §.6. King’s unfitness for power maintained by Burke. Here, or in Ch. 4? or in Ch. 14? } Ch. 14. King’s dependence on the people how far necessary § 1. Propriety of the King’s dependence in point of theory. § 2. Objection answered inconsistency of such dependence with the ballance of power. (Reference to a dissertation in the Appendix.) §.3. Actual dependence of the King antecedently to the present reign. Historical sketch §.4. Hanover and Hampshire The dependence broken through in the case of Hanover. §.5. The propriety of the King’s dependence maintained by Burke Post[?] off to Ch. 15. §.6. Future prospects necessity of this dependence indicated by the state of the Royal Family. Ch. 15 poste[?] 16[?] Marginals Ch. 16. The King will be despotic, unless the House of Commons be thus dependent on the people. §.1. The King’s sinister interest will prevail unless controuled §.2. Sole adequate controul the power of the people §.3. Peculiar excellence of the mode in which this controul is exercised according to the English constitution. §.4. The controul of the people is nullified, in so far as their delegates are dependent on the King. §.5. The dependence of the House of Commons on the King is compleat on all ordinary occasions. §.6. Its dependence on the people is the sole true remedy. §.7. Inefficacy of all other remedies – spirit of the people – press - &c. Ch. 17.* Occasional interposition on the part of the people is inadequate. §.1. §.2. §.3. Burke’s intimation of its adequacy examined. §.4. Tumultuous petitioning Act – check applied by it to such interposition. Ch. 19. Necessity of parl y reform to the promotion of unnecessary wars. §.1. In theory Polyarchy is more favourable than monarchy to peace. §.2. Facilities the King has for plunging the people into war. §.3. In practice polyarchy has been more pacific than monarchy. §.4. Wars produced or endeavoured at by sinister interest in this reign. Ch. 18 No marginals Recapitulatory conclusion – Despotism is at hand. §.1. Abject dependence of the House of Commons. §.2. Abject dependence of the Clergy and the Lawyers §.3. All interruptions to the despotism are precarious and inadequate. §.4. Recapitulation. Ch. 15. Unfitness of the King for exercising power in detail – and the necessity of his dependence on the people through the medium of their delegates, contended for by Burke §.1. Burke’s opinions to what purpose brought to view §.2. His opinions as to the power of the King §.3 – as to the powers of the people §.4 – as to the power of the Electors over their delegates. Ch. 20. Mischief of Idol-worship in the person of the King viz. as obstructing Parl Reform §.1. 29 Dec r 1809 Ch. 17 The occasional prevalence of Oppositions[?] is no efficient check to the King’s despotism. §.1. Dependence on a party, though in opposition, is dependence on the King. §.2. Changes in administration prevent not despotism, only cause it to change hands. §.3.
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