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8 Oct r 1809 + §.3
Parl y Reform
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B. I. Necessity
Ch. Occasional inadequate
§. Burke
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To be inserted either in P t I. Necessity, or in P t III. Plan?
Ch. 17. Occasional interposition on the part of the people inadequate
§.3. Burke—Occasional interposition alone advocated by him
Meantimes this occasional interposition, in how small a degree soever it answers the
purpose of the people answers in the best possible degree the purpose of party men of
that set of Court dependents whose interest in the good things /loaves and fishes/
for the time happens to be in the state not of possession but expectancy.
When the voice of the people has reached to a certain pitch of loudness, the strings
of administration will they know be crushed and a new set of performers /themselves/
be summoned upon the stage.
But when once mounted upon the stage and fairly seated, is it their interest—can it
be any desire of theirs to hear any thing more of the voice of the people? /So long
as they continue there/ That voice can never more make itself heard but to their
prejudice.
Such as is /hath been/ their interest, such of course hath /has/ been their
language. A grumbling, a disturbance, a riot, a tumult—a sedition—any thing of this
sort—any thing /expression of popular affection/ which in its nature can not but be
occasional they have no objection to: on the contrary it is what they wish for—and
which in so far as it can be promoted in a whole show[?]—by words which whether
spoken or written will be sufficiently guarded they use their endeavours /are used/
to promote.
Propose to them the only useful mode of interposition, constant, constantly
efficacious and therefore as constantly quiet—in that they behold unsurmountable
difficulties. Then comes a cloud /torrent/ of words, the object of which is to make
plain things seem mysterious, and easy things impracticable.
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Title: [9 Oct r 1809 + §.3 Parl y Reform]Description: 9 Oct r 1809 + §.3 Parl y Reform 2 o B. I. Necessity Ch. Occasional inadequate §.3. Burke advocates occasional 1 §.3. Occasional, to the exclusion of constant, interposition pleased for /advocated/ by Burke Occasional interposition—(it must be confessed)—‘ interposition’ indeed, but that not more nor other than occasional—was what was desired and pleaded for, on the part of the people by Edmund Burke. ‘Indeed’ (says he +) ‘in the situation in which we stand, with an immense revenue, an enormous debt, mighty establishments, Government itself a great banker and a great merchant, I see no other way for the preservation of a decent attention to public interest in the Representatives, but the interposition of the body of the people itself’ (the words italicized here are italicized in the original) ‘of the body of the people itself—Yes—but when? {Periodically and regularly and} at {stated and} pre-appointed and foreknown times?—No: but on some very particular occasion or occasions, when the purpose of a very particular and meritorious connection of Noble Lords and Gentlemen may be answered by it, things being at that pitch that for giving the country the benefit of their services, nothing less, nothing else will serve—‘whenever’ (continues he) ‘it shall appear, by some flagrant and notorious act, by some capital innovation, that these Representatives are going to over-leap the fences of the law, and to introduce an arbitrary power’;—a state /juncture/ of things the arrival and continued existence of which the ninety-nine preceding pages had been employed to prove. + Thoughts on the causes of the present discontents. p. 100.
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Title: [7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. I]Description: 7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. I. Necessity. Chapters and Sections Ch. 13. King’s unfitness or Evil consequences of the Kings being his own Minister See Ch. 4. §.1. Evil consequences enumerated. §.2: Consequence 1. Misrule, viz. by the King §.3.2. Preference given to unfit subordinates. §.4-3. Encroachment continually encreasing. §.5.-4. Habits of insincerity produced in Ministers. { §.6. King’s unfitness for power maintained by Burke. Here, or in Ch. 4? or in Ch. 14? } Ch. 14. King’s dependence on the people how far necessary § 1. Propriety of the King’s dependence in point of theory. § 2. Objection answered inconsistency of such dependence with the ballance of power. (Reference to a dissertation in the Appendix.) §.3. Actual dependence of the King antecedently to the present reign. Historical sketch §.4. Hanover and Hampshire The dependence broken through in the case of Hanover. §.5. The propriety of the King’s dependence maintained by Burke Post[?] off to Ch. 15. §.6. Future prospects necessity of this dependence indicated by the state of the Royal Family. Ch. 15 poste[?] 16[?] Marginals Ch. 16. The King will be despotic, unless the House of Commons be thus dependent on the people. §.1. The King’s sinister interest will prevail unless controuled §.2. Sole adequate controul the power of the people §.3. Peculiar excellence of the mode in which this controul is exercised according to the English constitution. §.4. The controul of the people is nullified, in so far as their delegates are dependent on the King. §.5. The dependence of the House of Commons on the King is compleat on all ordinary occasions. §.6. Its dependence on the people is the sole true remedy. §.7. Inefficacy of all other remedies – spirit of the people – press - &c. Ch. 17.* Occasional interposition on the part of the people is inadequate. §.1. §.2. §.3. Burke’s intimation of its adequacy examined. §.4. Tumultuous petitioning Act – check applied by it to such interposition. Ch. 19. Necessity of parl y reform to the promotion of unnecessary wars. §.1. In theory Polyarchy is more favourable than monarchy to peace. §.2. Facilities the King has for plunging the people into war. §.3. In practice polyarchy has been more pacific than monarchy. §.4. Wars produced or endeavoured at by sinister interest in this reign. Ch. 18 No marginals Recapitulatory conclusion – Despotism is at hand. §.1. Abject dependence of the House of Commons. §.2. Abject dependence of the Clergy and the Lawyers §.3. All interruptions to the despotism are precarious and inadequate. §.4. Recapitulation. Ch. 15. Unfitness of the King for exercising power in detail – and the necessity of his dependence on the people through the medium of their delegates, contended for by Burke §.1. Burke’s opinions to what purpose brought to view §.2. His opinions as to the power of the King §.3 – as to the powers of the people §.4 – as to the power of the Electors over their delegates. Ch. 20. Mischief of Idol-worship in the person of the King viz. as obstructing Parl Reform §.1. 29 Dec r 1809 Ch. 17 The occasional prevalence of Oppositions[?] is no efficient check to the King’s despotism. §.1. Dependence on a party, though in opposition, is dependence on the King. §.2. Changes in administration prevent not despotism, only cause it to change hands. §.3.
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Title: [8 Oct r 1809 + Parl y Reform]Description: 8 Oct r 1809 + Parl y Reform 1 […?] Ch. Occasional inadequate[?] Ch. 16. The casual interposition of the people is not sufficient. §. 1. Sole and rare effect—change of administration—how produced. On the part of the people at large interposition in regard to the conduct of public affairs, may (it has been observed) and actually does, occasionally take place. This /In this faculty of occasional/ interposition some have seen or pretended to see at the same time a sufficient counterbalance to the influence of the King in and over the House of Commons, a sufficient security against arbitrary power, a conclusive evidence that the people possess /are in the actual possession and exercise an efficient/ influence over the conduct of public affairs: which influence it is contended is as much as they ought to have—in other words, as much as it is for their own advantage that they should have.
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