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2 Sep r 1809
Parl y Reform
B. I. Necessity
Ch. 18 Mischief of Idol worship
§.{3}. King’s interest. 2. power
Elogiums mischievous
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But these elogiums, not to speak of their bearing so frequently on the part of the
object not any determinate ground, nor on the part of the eulogist any generous
/really social/ and honest motive, such is the constant tendency – such is very
frequently their effect, that against their influence a man whose social affections
are capable of extending themselves beyond the garment which wraps up the individual
– a man in whose bosom the constitution and the people whose all[?] depends upon it
are in any degree the objects of regard /affection/ can not be too much upon his
guard against its sinister influence.
Under an absolute monarchy such exercises may be not only innocent but beneficial:
be he what he may /ever so mischievous/ their tendency is in some measure to sooth
and soften the character of the Monarch, at any rate to reconcile the people to their
fate.
But under the British Constitution /English government/, the very existence of the
constitution depends upon jealousy, and upon the unceasing alertness of that
jealousy: the unfitness the radiant and irremediable unfitness of the King, as King,
to govern to govern in any thing the few exceptions as above alone exempted[?] is the
fundamental principle of it.
So good a King! can we do better than to be governed by him? to be governed by him
in every thing? So excellent a King, can any man be more fit – can any man be so fit
as he for the so difficult task of government? for a task for which the purest[?]
probity is not more than necessary
The King so good, and the country therefore to be governed by him? No: if he /the
King/ have but so much as the wish to govern, this wish, to the extent in which he
suffers himself to indulge in it, is itself a proof of his not being, of his not
being to the only purpose here in question to the most material of all purposes, a
good one.
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Title: [2 Sep r 1809 Parl y Reform : Necessity]Description: 2 Sep r 1809 Parl y Reform : Necessity B. I. Necessity Ch. 18 Mischief of Idol worship Ch. Elogiums mischievous 3 1 1 1 Ellenboro’ should he punish men for false eulogy? 2 Mischief of this eloquence when applied to probable successors. Most religious of gracious Kings 3 Particular praise good: general, evidence of sycophancy. To this topic belongs the consideration of the tendency and effect of those elogiums which have the personal virtues of the Monarch for their themes. The indulgence of social affection is at once so natural so amiable and so beneficial /and so amiable/, the Monarch of the country is at once so conspicuous and so natural an object of it /that amiable affection/, the figure of speech by which this exalted personage is placed /seated/ in the imagination of every man and more especially of every woman /imagination of the public/ in the character of a common father, the efficient cause and cement of a correspondently kind affection the affection of fraternity on the part of his subjects, one towards another, that it is not reluctance /a certain amount of uneasiness/ that a man in whose bosom the dissocial affections do not predominate can bring himself to bring to view any considerations, by the effect of which it may happen that to the warmth of so generous an affection to be /find itself/ diminished. /A cap/ It is indeed a cap, but a cap which on so serious /important/ an occasion must not be put away. If indeed the effect of those elogiums terminated with what is most commonly though not always their professed object – if in a word they never had either for their effect or for their tendency the disposing men to take the supposed personal will of the Monarch (for it is scarce ever other than the supposed one) for the rule of action and standard of propriety and rule of action, the error of these elogiums supposing it such would by the supposition be a harmless one, and so far as it were embraced with security, would even be preferable to the truth. Sure I am that in my own instance it is matter of uneasiness to me to find myself doing what depends on me towards opposing checks and objections to to what taken in itself is so innocent as well as harmless an exercise. Neither the /any/ qualification which it may be supposed capable of affording to the royal person who is the object, not any which it may be the lot of the performer to experience – most assuredly it is not in the contemplation of pleasure in those or any other shapes that I find /feel/ the inducement which has engaged me in so ungracious a task.
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Title: [21 Sep 1809 K[?] 17 Sep. 1809]Description: 21 Sep 1809 K[?] 17 Sep. 1809 Parl y Ref m B. 1. Necessity. Ch. 20 Elogiums mischievous 3 30 Sep. 1809. Ordo propositus. §.1. Interest how much dexter, how much sinister as to reputation §.2. Mischief of the effectual pursuit of his sinister interest in this article. §.3/4/. Modes by which his sinister inter t in this is pursuable §.4/3/. Modes by which his dexetr interest in this is pursuable §.5. Mischief of effectual pursuit of his sinister interest how avoible[?] – not by punishm t, but by parl y reform. False tokens of fitness, as[?] 1. Youth and old age 2 Nativity 3. Large family – Wife’s avarice 4. Conjugal fidelity. To know[?] so forbidding? 5 Solanne[?] & Cobbet convicted as for a libel for imputing […?] character to Hardwick in token of public unfitness. 6. Gossipping & Gratification to preach 7 Blindness[?] Tokens of unfitness. 1. Misrule – so many instances – nothing done since King’s commission Proof Catholic business 2. Slave Trade abolition – his opposition 3. Sacrificing Britain & Hanover to himself 4. Propensity to unjust war against Russia thro’ Sweden. 5 Liberty of the people Wilkes &c 6. Freedom of H. of Commons Middlesex election. 7. Fondness for arbitrary power. British America: Spanish America. 8. Hardness of character Keeping people standing &c. 9. Imbecillity – What? what? what? 10. Hatred of Talents. Paley – A. Smith – Archb p. Moore. 11. Exempting himself from War Taxes. 12 Inspectors make […?] in[?] dupes. It is to these alone[?] I address myself with any prospect of success – Henceforward any size[?] of […?] should bespeak a man an Ephraim[?] Justius[?]. In regard to each pretence of private goodness, ask is this a reason why he should govern?
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Title: [7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. 1]Description: 7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. 1. Necessity – Chapters and Sections Ch. 1. Plan of this work §.1. Objects of this work §.2. Radical grievance Dependence of the House of Commons on the King. Nov. 1816 This is not the evil itself but its cause. §.3. Pleas in belief of the Dependence stated. Ch. 2. Kings separate interest – general view of it. §.1. K. gs separate interest why held up to view §.2. K. gs separate interest – shapes in which it acts. Ch.3. King’s interest as to to Power – what power he ought to have. §.1. Power as to 1 measures – 2. – men. §.2. What power the King ought to have as to each. Ch. 4. King’s interest as to power continued – What power he ought not to have. (See Ch 13.) §.1. Powers not properly exercisable by the King §.2. Pitt y r[?] – his notions accorded with the above. Here or further on? §.3. No medium between the Kings absolute power and the above limitations. Note on continuing[?] Kings here or elsewhere? Ch.4. continued. §.4. King’s inviolability and indismissibility depend upon his impotence. Ch. 5. Kings interest as to power continued – his sinister interest. as to d o. §. 1 King’s sinister interest as to 1. Measures §. 2. King’s sinister interest as to 2. patronage Marginals have only §.6 Ch. 6. King’s interest as to power continued. his sinister interest as to sources of power. §.1. King’s sinister interest as to war. §.2. – as to Colonies and dependencies in general §.3. – as to Penal Colonies §.4. – as to ill-governed home-possessions. §.5. Limits to Kings power of patronage Ch. 7. King’s interest as to 2. Money §.1. Money how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister interest. §.2. Admiralty Droits. §.3. Greenwax. §.4. Exemption from War-Taxes. Ch. 8. King’s interest as to 3. Ease. §.1. Ease, how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister, interest. §.2. Ch. 9. King’s interest as to 4. Reputation. §.1. King’s reputation, what publicly useful, what sinister. §.2. Mischief of undue reputation in the Kings case §.3. Kings interest in the means of reputation Ch. 10. Kings interest as to 5. Vengeance. §.1 Sinister how much, i.e What fit, what unfit. §.2. Ch. 11. Kings sinister interests – their mutual subservience. Ch. 12. Sinister interest of the King’s subordinates. §.1. Shapes in which the sinister interests of the Kings subordinates act. §.2. Natural confederacy among the several subordinate possessors of sinister interest. §.3. Sinister interests as to war exemplified. {{ Topics of the Chapters Stated. I. Radical grievance dependence of Commons on King N.B. This dependence /The mischief/ depends on the existence of a separate interest on King’s part. Insert here from Plan – Explanations – Mischief of Commons dependence Ch. 1. II. Kings sep. interest, its different branches – Ch. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9 10. 11. thence unfitness as to probity III. D o of this subordinate. Ch.12. IV. King’s unfitness as to intelligence. Ch. 13. V. Necessity of an adequate check to King’s power, governed by his separate interest. Only such check, his dependence on the people, thro’ their representatives. Ch. 14. VI. Burke’s opinion assuring Kings unfitness, and thence the necessity of his constant dependence on the people. Ch. 15 VII. Unless the king be thus constantly dependent, his power will encrease to despotism and his sinister interest govern without controul. Ch. 16 VIII. Inadequacy of other checks upon the King’s absolute power. Ch. 17. } IX. Particular necessity of King’s constant dependence to the prevention of unnecessary wars. Ch. 19. { King can not be dependent on people but in so far as their representatives are Ch. Taking representatives out of dependence on King and rendering them in part[?] dependent as formerly on their property in part independent of every body the main object of Parliam. Reform. }} { X. King would naturally[?] be in a state of adequate dependence on people, of representatives, instead of being either independent or dependent on people, were not dependent on King. XI. Necessity of taking them out of the improper dependence and placing them under the proper one. XII. For this purpose intelligendum how /by what means[?]/ the dependence is established. } { XIII. Corruption and bribery by and to whomsoever applied are no otherwise productive of considerable mischief, than in as far as they are contributory to this anticonstitutional dependence. } XIV. By the means necessary to do away the greatly mischievous corruption, the other modes will be done away. XV. The arrangements necessary to place the dependence of Members on the proper footing as above may be so ordered as to be productive of divers collateral and subordinate and collateral good effects.
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