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2 Oct r 1809
Parl y Reform
B. I. Necessity
Ch.19. War prevented by Reform
§.1. Popular pacific. 1. Theory
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When the people have been instigated to war it has been by the King’s corrupt tools.
At present and at all times as we have seen it is the interest of the King to keep
the people in a state of war, necessary or unnecessary. War encreases his patronage,
itself an object of value[?] to encrease his patronage is to encrease his power: his
power of doing every thing: of corrupting the authority which ought to check
/superintend[?]/ his: of converting those, who ought to be his supervisors into his
instruments instruments by the use of which he scrapes into his coffers more money
and more power: power and money befit one another and so taking money out of the
pocket and liberty out of the breast of the subject so long as either of the one or
the other any thing is left.
But it is not the interest of the people to be kept /continue/ in a state of war at
/in/ any other time /occasion/ nor for any longer time than it is necessary. To p.4
From p.4
By their passions the people are liable to be plunged into a war. But the King is
prompted to keep the people plunged in war not only by his passions passions – by
casually arising /rising/ and temporally acting but by his interests: by his by his
constantly acting and most coolly considered interests. In this shape, as in every
other shape, what is the King’s interest. These same interests so long as he has
power, the King ought in reason to be supposed and expected to pursue. Take away this
part of his power, his interest will to the purpose of mischief in this shape be
without effect.
To p.5.
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Title: [7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. 1]Description: 7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. 1. Necessity – Chapters and Sections Ch. 1. Plan of this work §.1. Objects of this work §.2. Radical grievance Dependence of the House of Commons on the King. Nov. 1816 This is not the evil itself but its cause. §.3. Pleas in belief of the Dependence stated. Ch. 2. Kings separate interest – general view of it. §.1. K. gs separate interest why held up to view §.2. K. gs separate interest – shapes in which it acts. Ch.3. King’s interest as to to Power – what power he ought to have. §.1. Power as to 1 measures – 2. – men. §.2. What power the King ought to have as to each. Ch. 4. King’s interest as to power continued – What power he ought not to have. (See Ch 13.) §.1. Powers not properly exercisable by the King §.2. Pitt y r[?] – his notions accorded with the above. Here or further on? §.3. No medium between the Kings absolute power and the above limitations. Note on continuing[?] Kings here or elsewhere? Ch.4. continued. §.4. King’s inviolability and indismissibility depend upon his impotence. Ch. 5. Kings interest as to power continued – his sinister interest. as to d o. §. 1 King’s sinister interest as to 1. Measures §. 2. King’s sinister interest as to 2. patronage Marginals have only §.6 Ch. 6. King’s interest as to power continued. his sinister interest as to sources of power. §.1. King’s sinister interest as to war. §.2. – as to Colonies and dependencies in general §.3. – as to Penal Colonies §.4. – as to ill-governed home-possessions. §.5. Limits to Kings power of patronage Ch. 7. King’s interest as to 2. Money §.1. Money how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister interest. §.2. Admiralty Droits. §.3. Greenwax. §.4. Exemption from War-Taxes. Ch. 8. King’s interest as to 3. Ease. §.1. Ease, how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister, interest. §.2. Ch. 9. King’s interest as to 4. Reputation. §.1. King’s reputation, what publicly useful, what sinister. §.2. Mischief of undue reputation in the Kings case §.3. Kings interest in the means of reputation Ch. 10. Kings interest as to 5. Vengeance. §.1 Sinister how much, i.e What fit, what unfit. §.2. Ch. 11. Kings sinister interests – their mutual subservience. Ch. 12. Sinister interest of the King’s subordinates. §.1. Shapes in which the sinister interests of the Kings subordinates act. §.2. Natural confederacy among the several subordinate possessors of sinister interest. §.3. Sinister interests as to war exemplified. {{ Topics of the Chapters Stated. I. Radical grievance dependence of Commons on King N.B. This dependence /The mischief/ depends on the existence of a separate interest on King’s part. Insert here from Plan – Explanations – Mischief of Commons dependence Ch. 1. II. Kings sep. interest, its different branches – Ch. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9 10. 11. thence unfitness as to probity III. D o of this subordinate. Ch.12. IV. King’s unfitness as to intelligence. Ch. 13. V. Necessity of an adequate check to King’s power, governed by his separate interest. Only such check, his dependence on the people, thro’ their representatives. Ch. 14. VI. Burke’s opinion assuring Kings unfitness, and thence the necessity of his constant dependence on the people. Ch. 15 VII. Unless the king be thus constantly dependent, his power will encrease to despotism and his sinister interest govern without controul. Ch. 16 VIII. Inadequacy of other checks upon the King’s absolute power. Ch. 17. } IX. Particular necessity of King’s constant dependence to the prevention of unnecessary wars. Ch. 19. { King can not be dependent on people but in so far as their representatives are Ch. Taking representatives out of dependence on King and rendering them in part[?] dependent as formerly on their property in part independent of every body the main object of Parliam. Reform. }} { X. King would naturally[?] be in a state of adequate dependence on people, of representatives, instead of being either independent or dependent on people, were not dependent on King. XI. Necessity of taking them out of the improper dependence and placing them under the proper one. XII. For this purpose intelligendum how /by what means[?]/ the dependence is established. } { XIII. Corruption and bribery by and to whomsoever applied are no otherwise productive of considerable mischief, than in as far as they are contributory to this anticonstitutional dependence. } XIV. By the means necessary to do away the greatly mischievous corruption, the other modes will be done away. XV. The arrangements necessary to place the dependence of Members on the proper footing as above may be so ordered as to be productive of divers collateral and subordinate and collateral good effects.
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Title: [3 Oct r 1809 Parl y Reform]Description: 3 Oct r 1809 Parl y Reform B. I. Necessity Ch.19. War prevented by Reform §.1. Popular pacific. 1. Theory 4 4 Upon the King, power operates as a penalty. From p.3 The people have their passions, their occasional unruly /ungovernable/ and seductive passions, sources of so many occasionally prevalent sinister interests, acting upon them in such a direction as to be capable of plunging them into unjust and unnecessary wars. The people have their passions – their sinister interests: - but the King /Monarch/ has he not less? Yes: - to all the passions /affections/ and sinister interests to the sinister action of which the people are exposed he adds others which are peculiar to himself. To urge /drive/ them into war the people have their dissocial their angry passions – the passions of the irascible appetite. But to the same temptations which act upon the irascible appetite not only as the King /Monarch/ is not only exposed in common with the people – but in his bosom they find a degree of susceptibility, if perpetually pampered pride be in the case of the angry passions a source of proportionable susceptibility superior in constancy to any thing of the sort that is commonly /naturally/ to be found in the bosom of the people. But Added to that interest which applies itself to the irascible appetite, the King and the King alone, I speak of a King of England is constantly instigated to war by a mass of interest which acting upon /belonging to/ the concupiscible appetite is peculiar to himself in comparison with and in contradistinction to the people. The people derive no patronage from war as the King /a King of England/ does: the people have no plunder to pocket from wars commenced by piracy as a King of England has: the people are not excused from contribution /contributing/ to war-taxes by any exemption, such as the King that now is has been advised to give himself. Back to p.3
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Title: [31 Aug 1809 Parl y Ref m Ch. Necessity]Description: 31 Aug 1809 Parl y Ref m Ch. Necessity Original Beginning. 1 §.5. K gs sep. interest. 1. Money 23. 24. 25. §.8. King’s separate interest 3. ease. §.9. King’s separate interest 4. vengeance §.10. Kings separate interest. 5. reputation. {Part 1 Ch. 1 Objects of this work […?] and Means of Reform Necessity & mode of reform[?] replacing the House of Commons in a state of dependence on the people Ch.2. The King’s separate interest – shapes in which it acts Ch.3. The Necessary prevalence[?] of which the conduct of the K.[?] is dependent on his will Ch.4. Sole remedy replacing the House in its dependence on the people } B.I. Necessity. Sect. s continued { 6 §.19. Elogiums on the Kings mischievous.} B.III. Influence 1 2 §.20. Tests, an instrument of corrupt dependence. III. Influence 2 1 §.21. Ireland – its abuses of use to despotism. Ch. 5 { B.I. Necessity Sections 12 Sept 1809 § 1 Objects of this work 1 (2. 3. 4. notes:) 5. 6 §.2. General grievance. Dependence of the H. of Commons. 7. 8. 9: 10. 11. 12. §.3 Pleasure[?] forms[?] of the dependence. 13. 14. 15. Duplicative[?] 15. Influence ambiguous, Reference inwards. II §.4. Kings sinister /separate/ interest – its 5 shapes 16. 17 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. {23 24. 25.} (dup. 8. 9.) §.6. Kings sinister /separate/ interest 2. Power. as to 1. Measure §.7.* King’s separate interest 2. power. as to 2. patronage III §.7./10/ Mutual subservience of King’s separate interests. §.8./11 Ministers’ separate interests. IV 1 §.9./12/ King’s and Ministers separate interests prevalent – unless controuled. 2 §.10. People’s controul Britannice[?] – its peculiar excellence. 3 §.11. Sole effectual controul, People’s power thro’ Representatives. 4 §.12. People’s controul mollified by House’s dependence. 5 §.13. House, in dependence compleat. 6 §.14. Sole remedy. House’s dependence 15 V § 15. King’s dependence necessary 17 §.16. Future prospects. 18 §.17. Despotism chained & loosed – Historical Sketch 19 §.18. King’s dependence necessary – Objection – Ballance destroyed.
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