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26 Sep. 1809
Parl y Reform
B. I. Necessity
Ch. 18. Despotism near
§.1. Commons dependent
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So enormous is become the body of those dependents whose sinister[?] interests are
connected with and dependent on /united to/ the sinister interest of the King, that
the voice of this part of the people alone is become capable of raising itself to
such a pitch as to be scarcely distinguishable from that of the whole. So numerous is
the multitude of deceivers, that one knows not where to look for the deceived.
In Smollets Ferdinand Count Fathom[?], one of the hero’s first exploits is to pick
the pocket of a young maiden of her all, a part of which, bestowed under the mask of
sympathy, suffices for her seduction. Partly by original design, partly by a
factitious necessity which under good /prudent and able/ management would not have
been necessary /had existence/ to this pitch is arrived the
conduct of public affairs under the British Monarchy. So prodigious /vast/ is the
proportion of the peoples property drawn from them by /in the way of/ taxes, that in
the character of a corruption fund, an engine of corruption, that what with need
produced by the impoverishment on the one hand, what with ways and means accumulated
on the other, the force of corruption is almost universally irresistible. Of the
money thus taken from the whole body of the people from the people in a body, a part
serves for the corruption and enslavement /corrupting the virtue/ of a majority of
their lenders: so that /and the result/ in looking round among the people the
difficulty is to find a man of any account who is not in some way or other dependent,
who is not under the influence of a separate interest more powerful than his social
interest and under the influence of this sinister interest ready at all times and
upon all occasions to sacrifice to that interest which he possesses in severalty
whatever interest he possesses in common with the people body of the people.
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Title: [8 June 1810 Influence Ch.2]Description: 8 June 1810 Influence Ch.2. King’s influence sinister §.1. Sinister interest 2 o 1 Were there time there never could have existed any useful […?] To the […?] far from being a […?] this state of things is an excuse In the falsity of it lies the motive for giving it a home §.8. King’s separate and sinister interest - its reality I have not interest - I can not have any interest - separate from that of my people. In what a multitude of speeches from the throne has not {this} proposition /an assurance/, in effect and prospect or even in times as above been repeated. Nothing can be more oratorical /rhetorical/ - few things perhaps more conciliatory - but none more /yet scarce any indisputable not to say/ palpably false. If the King had not any such separate interest, despotism would be the only good form of government: our own would be a miserably bad one: every limitation to the regal authority would be a nuisance. An interest the King no doubt has which is common to him with that of the whole people: and the greater is the mass of the elements of falsity that are heaped /thrown/ together into his bushel, the greater is the share he possesses in that common interest. But besides this common interest he possesses in severalty a vast mass of interest which being separate from that of the people is opposite to it and being opposite to it may of any interest […?] […?] be with propriety termed a sinister interest. His separate and sinister interest is composed of every thing good that he has not - and of every thing good which, inasmuch his having it being the cause of evil to the people, he ought not to have.
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Title: [7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. 1]Description: 7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. 1. Necessity – Chapters and Sections Ch. 1. Plan of this work §.1. Objects of this work §.2. Radical grievance Dependence of the House of Commons on the King. Nov. 1816 This is not the evil itself but its cause. §.3. Pleas in belief of the Dependence stated. Ch. 2. Kings separate interest – general view of it. §.1. K. gs separate interest why held up to view §.2. K. gs separate interest – shapes in which it acts. Ch.3. King’s interest as to to Power – what power he ought to have. §.1. Power as to 1 measures – 2. – men. §.2. What power the King ought to have as to each. Ch. 4. King’s interest as to power continued – What power he ought not to have. (See Ch 13.) §.1. Powers not properly exercisable by the King §.2. Pitt y r[?] – his notions accorded with the above. Here or further on? §.3. No medium between the Kings absolute power and the above limitations. Note on continuing[?] Kings here or elsewhere? Ch.4. continued. §.4. King’s inviolability and indismissibility depend upon his impotence. Ch. 5. Kings interest as to power continued – his sinister interest. as to d o. §. 1 King’s sinister interest as to 1. Measures §. 2. King’s sinister interest as to 2. patronage Marginals have only §.6 Ch. 6. King’s interest as to power continued. his sinister interest as to sources of power. §.1. King’s sinister interest as to war. §.2. – as to Colonies and dependencies in general §.3. – as to Penal Colonies §.4. – as to ill-governed home-possessions. §.5. Limits to Kings power of patronage Ch. 7. King’s interest as to 2. Money §.1. Money how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister interest. §.2. Admiralty Droits. §.3. Greenwax. §.4. Exemption from War-Taxes. Ch. 8. King’s interest as to 3. Ease. §.1. Ease, how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister, interest. §.2. Ch. 9. King’s interest as to 4. Reputation. §.1. King’s reputation, what publicly useful, what sinister. §.2. Mischief of undue reputation in the Kings case §.3. Kings interest in the means of reputation Ch. 10. Kings interest as to 5. Vengeance. §.1 Sinister how much, i.e What fit, what unfit. §.2. Ch. 11. Kings sinister interests – their mutual subservience. Ch. 12. Sinister interest of the King’s subordinates. §.1. Shapes in which the sinister interests of the Kings subordinates act. §.2. Natural confederacy among the several subordinate possessors of sinister interest. §.3. Sinister interests as to war exemplified. {{ Topics of the Chapters Stated. I. Radical grievance dependence of Commons on King N.B. This dependence /The mischief/ depends on the existence of a separate interest on King’s part. Insert here from Plan – Explanations – Mischief of Commons dependence Ch. 1. II. Kings sep. interest, its different branches – Ch. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9 10. 11. thence unfitness as to probity III. D o of this subordinate. Ch.12. IV. King’s unfitness as to intelligence. Ch. 13. V. Necessity of an adequate check to King’s power, governed by his separate interest. Only such check, his dependence on the people, thro’ their representatives. Ch. 14. VI. Burke’s opinion assuring Kings unfitness, and thence the necessity of his constant dependence on the people. Ch. 15 VII. Unless the king be thus constantly dependent, his power will encrease to despotism and his sinister interest govern without controul. Ch. 16 VIII. Inadequacy of other checks upon the King’s absolute power. Ch. 17. } IX. Particular necessity of King’s constant dependence to the prevention of unnecessary wars. Ch. 19. { King can not be dependent on people but in so far as their representatives are Ch. Taking representatives out of dependence on King and rendering them in part[?] dependent as formerly on their property in part independent of every body the main object of Parliam. Reform. }} { X. King would naturally[?] be in a state of adequate dependence on people, of representatives, instead of being either independent or dependent on people, were not dependent on King. XI. Necessity of taking them out of the improper dependence and placing them under the proper one. XII. For this purpose intelligendum how /by what means[?]/ the dependence is established. } { XIII. Corruption and bribery by and to whomsoever applied are no otherwise productive of considerable mischief, than in as far as they are contributory to this anticonstitutional dependence. } XIV. By the means necessary to do away the greatly mischievous corruption, the other modes will be done away. XV. The arrangements necessary to place the dependence of Members on the proper footing as above may be so ordered as to be productive of divers collateral and subordinate and collateral good effects.
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Title: [[lxxxiv. 20] 1821 Decr 5 Codification]Description: [lxxxiv. 20] 1821 Decr 5 Codification Offer penult ?.5 Draughtsman single I. Monarchs interest If for want of such a support his own individual security be lessened it may be his interest to allow to a portion of his subjects a quantity /mass/ of power being in such sort dependent on his own, as not liable to be taken back again by himself. The persons to whom such partially independent power is allowed become thereby members of a particular body © of that sort of political body which is stiled an aristocratical one: /body:/ or in one word an aristocracy If there be any other sinister interest the continuance or establishment of which would be contributory /subservient/ to his own sinister interest it is his interest to give as the case may be existence or support to it. So likewise, as to interest©begotten prejudice, authority©begotten prejudice, and original relative intellectual weakness Under a Monarch In so far as sinister interest operates with effect, misrule has place bad government is the result: bad government, or in one word misrule In a certain sense of the word instrument, force, intimidation, corruption and delusion. Force and intimidation are necessary instruments of good as well as of bad government. Force applies to the physical faculties of the person on whom or thing on which it is exercised: intimidation is the force of evil apprehended to be applied in the character of punishment: corruption is the application of the matter of reward to a sinister purpose: delusion is the production of erroneous opinion /judgment/ or erroneous conception by instruments working on the imagination: by the same instrument corruption and delusion may be made to take effect on the same subject Thus by a military force /body/ /establishment/ with its decorations /trappings/ force, intimidation, corruption and delusion are produced.
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