date

1818 Dec. r 9 Parl Principles
1818 Dec. r 9

Parl

Principles

Beginning

§.1. Misrule

20

Anti Reformist. But of these same Electors suppose a majority each having a separate

personal interest of his own distinct from and opposite to the interests of the

minority to confederate together and concurr in giving to the aggregate sinister

interest thus composed an advantage such as that the interest of some one or more or

even of all together of the interests of the minority is sacrificed by it?

Reformist. If by the Electors of no more than one Representative – if by the

majority of this body of Electors and no other, the confederacy is entered into it is

a confederacy without an object: for supposing the supposed unapt and mischievously

/treacherously/ disposed Representative chosen, still towards the supposed desired

sacrifice still if this be all nothing can /will/ be done.

Suppose seats in any number thus mischievously /unaptly/ filled still if that number

be not so great as a majority nothing will be done.

Unless therefore the number of seats thus filled be a majority of the whole number

of seats no effect can in this way be produced. But if the number of seats thus

filled does amount to a majority of the whole number of seats, then is the interest

thus supported not any interest opposite to the interest of the majority of all the

members of the community, but that very interest itself.
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    Anti-Reformist: Act[?] Office-bearers[?]? Custom House officers, Excise men?

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