JB_128_318.xml

Title: [nd [wm 1816] 11 {universal]

Description: nd [wm 1816]

11

{universal interest being part and parcel of his own personal interest, will

therefore in so far as his conception of it is correct and adequate, exercise on his

conduct an influence, at any rate not inferior to that which would be exercised on it

by any such purely personal interest as would, in his eyes, be of equal value.}

Resolved

17. {15. That} /that/, by the Representatives of the people, the sense of the people

whose Representatives they are, can never be truly represented and conformed to,

otherwise than is so far as, for their continuance in such their situation, they have

been rendered, and remain dependent upon the wishes – the real and genuine wishes and

desires – of such their Constituents, as expressed by their suffrages, delivered as

above.

18. That, though to give to this dependence that utmost point of perfection, of

which, considered in itself and without regard to any other object, it would be

susceptible, it would be necessary, that at all times it should be in the power of

every such Electoral body as above, to remove its Representative, in the same manner

as it is in the power of every individual who has granted to another a power of

Attorney, to revoke the same, {*} yet forasmuch as, in such a

state of things, instead of deputing representatives to manage such their public

concerns, the people would thus be, in their own persons, continually occupied in the

management of those same concerns, whereby that proportion of time and labour would

be occupied and engrossed, without which the business of private life, in respect of

the provision of the means of subsistence, could not be carried on, - hence it

becomes necessary, that this same power of removal should not be called into

exercise, otherwise than at certain stated, and more or less distant periods.

19. That, forasmuch as the degree of dependence so established will be the more

perfect, the shorter the term is, during which each such representative remains

exempt from removal at the hands of his Constituents, - it is therefore expedient

that this term should be as short as any regularly established term, which, without

practical inconvenience in respect of its shortness, has ever, in the practice of the

constitution, been seen exemplified: which said term is, as appears by divers

Statutes, the term of one year.

{ 16. That, for the due exercise of that power, by which, as above, it is expedient,

that the people, as divided into such Electoral bodies as aforesaid, should keep such

their Representatives in dependence, - it is necessary that by every Member of each

such Electoral body, the conduct of its Representative in the exercise of such his

trust should, at all times, and on all occasions, be capable of being known and taken

into consideration, in so far as the sense of need suggests itself, and the quantity

of time applicable to this purpose permitts

17. That, forasmuch as by no power lodged in the hands of constituents, can any

dependence, on the part of their respective Representatives, be in any degree created

or maintained, except in so far as the good and evil about to be eventually produced

by the exercise of such power is, at all times, in the expectation of the

representative, greater than any that can be made to accrue to him, by any other

person or persons, whose interest or supposed interest, and consequent endeavour, it

may be to engage him in a violation of such his trust, it is accordingly necessary,

that, by all practicable means, every Representative of the people be rendered as}

{* It may be proper perhaps to apply this likewise to Instructions. J.B.}

131a-004.xml

Title: [[131a-004] 1818 March 22 +]

Description: [131a-004]

1818 March 22 +

Parl Reform Answer to Antiballot Observations

2 o

3

3

{1. You don’t get /can have no assurance of getting/ the real wishes: you get spurious ones

2. The spurious ones you get by a breach of trust

3 The breach of trust you produce[?] by compulsion, compulsion employed to produce sacrifice of personal interest as well as of the universal interest, such compulsion[?] is arranged[?]}

As to the moral acts stated by the antiballotists as attached to the secret mode, they will not afford matter of conclusive objection any otherwise than in as far as they are preponderant over the evils attached to the opposite, viz. to the open mode. This consideration renders it necessary to begin with bringing to view these last mentioned evils.

1. The grand evil is that which may be distinguished by the name of the political evil: the radical and all embracing political evil. I mean the substituting, to an extent beyond the power of calculation, to the elections produced by the wishes of the majority of the people elections produced by the wishes of a comparatively minute minority. Such an effect, in so far as it has place, I can but place in my own mind to the account of evil. Why? because, in my view of the matter as given in my book, the wishes of the majority of the people would be produced by the conceptions entertained by that same majority in relation to their own interests, and those conceptions would, to the purpose of procuring those same interests and thus accomplishing those same wishes be sufficiently correct; whereas on the other hand the wishes of the small minority in question would be produced by the conception entertained by that same small minority in relation to the interests of that same small minority; while the interests of that same small minority are in a state of constant and irremediable opposition to the interests of the majority, and their conception of this their particular and sinister interest, would to the purpose of promoting that same sinister interest and accomplishing those same sinister wishes be sufficiently correct.

JB_127_355.xml

Title: [1818 July 16 Parl. Ref. Bill]

Description: 1818 July 16

Parl. Ref. Bill

Reasons

II. Electors

Universality

4

4

In no one case either the interest or the power any where.

1. Prediction the first. Without recurring[?] to their Representatives the people would effect this division of themselves.

2. Prediction the second. In the major part /a sufficiently great majority/ of the whole number of Election Districts, the people in their character of constituents would choose such Representatives as they fore[...?] to be determined to concurr in this operation, and to persevere in carrying it into effect.

3. Prediction the third. The representative thus chosen would enter upon this operation, and persevere in it in such sort as to carry it into effect.

Prediction 1. Without recurring[?] to their Representatives the people would effect this revolution of themselves.

Answer: A supposition to this effect belongs not to the case of the proposed Reform: it therefore forms not /is not capable of affording/ any argument against it. By the /an/ original supposition they have confidence enough in a particular set of people to [...?] them their representatives: and as such to committ to them to do every thing which it is their desire to be done. By another supposition there exists not any set of them in whom they have any such confidence. But if this be the state of things /be the case/ supposed, it is not the proposed[?] it is not the state of /case of things/ that would have place under the here prop[?] Parliamentary reform. If it be in their power to do this otherwise than by representatives representatives chosen on the proposed mode of Parliamentary reform, it is in their power to do it without Parliamentary reform: it is in their power to do it under the existing system of Non reform.