JB_128_325.xml

Title: [nd [wm 1816] C + 17]

Description: nd [wm 1816]

C +

17

{as compleatly exempt as possible from every such external influence.}

27. That, forasmuch as, according to the originally and immemorially established,

and still existing, forms and practice of the Constitution of this realm, the

disposal of public offices and Commissions is, and all along has been, without any

considerable exception, lodged in the hands of the Crown, to which Offices and

Commissions, pecuniary emolument has all along, for the most part, been, - and to a

greater or less amount can not but continue to be, - attached – and not only Offices

and Commissions, but objects of general desire, in various other shapes, such as

those of power, rank, and dignity, in a variety of forms, all which advantages

constitute so many instruments of temptation, by the hope of obtaining which, for

themselves or their connections in the way of personal interest or sympathy, or in so

far as obtained by the fear of being deprived thereof, the representatives of the

people can not but continue to be exposed, as at all times they have been exposed, to

be seduced from their duty, and induced to sacrifice the universal interest, of the

people their constituents, to the particular interest or supposed interest of the

Crown, its servants and their adherents, possessors, many of them, by one means or

other, of seats in Parliament, - hence arises a necessity – not only for the giving,

to the continuance of their respective terms in such their trust, the shortest

practicable duration, as above, but moreover, in the event of any such transgression,

to the profit whereof it may happen, to be greater in value, than the utmost loss, to

which they can ever be subjected by simple removal from such their {trust, - the

further necessity, of rendering them eventually subject to adequate ?quere what? punishment, +[1] at the hands, or at the

instance, of their successors in such their trust.}

28. That, forasmuch as, in proportion as it has place, this influence of the Crown

can not be exercised and made productive of its natural effect, without counteracting

and /outweighing and/ overpowering, in the breasts of their Representatives, the influence of the

people, - and that, in such sort as to engage them to make

continual sacrifice of the interest of such their dependents, and adherents, - such

influence may, with but too incontrovertible propriety, be termed a Sinister influence.

29. That, so long ago as the year 1780, in consequence of the experience then

already had, and the strong sense accordingly entertained, not only of the existence,

but of the mischievous effects of this same sinister influence, it was, in and by a

Resolution passed on the 6 th day of April in that year by this

House, declared, of and concerning the influence of the Crown, that the same “has

encreased, is encreasing, and ought to be diminished.”

30. That, since that time, this same sinister influence hath been encreased, viz on

the one hand, by the difference between the public Debt and consequent Taxes of that

time (viz. between £ | | and £ | |) and the public Debt and Taxes of the present time

(between £ | | and £ | |); on the other hand by the amount of the standing army at

that time, between ( ) and ( ) men /(viz Army 35,003 +[2] men)/,

and the amount of the standing Army (viz between ( ) and ( ) men at this present

time: the debt, - in respect of the taxes, necessary for payment of the interest

thereof, and the profitable patronage and power, exercised in relation to the several

offices and Commissions, necessary for the collection of those same taxes: - the

army, “in respect of the patronage and power exercised in relation to the Offices and

Commissions thereunto belonging, as well as of the faculty of applying that same

power to the stifling the voice, and destroying the liberties, of the people.”

+[1] Answer – No use in saying what: it would only afford a handle for objections

against a proposition the truth of which as it stands is out of the reach of dispute.

J.B.

But I have no objection to the omission of this clause about punishment on this

occasion, indispensable as I can not but regard the measure thus proposed. J.B.

+[2] Annual Register A o 1780, p.308 Supplies granted by

Parliament for the Year 1780.

JB_128_026.xml

Title: [3 April 1818 Proposed Parliamentary]

Description: 3 April 1818

Proposed Parliamentary Reform Resolutions

Draught Marginals

2

2

II Freedom

14.

Community: interest being all members interest nothing better than that each member’s

vote should be determined by his opinion of his own interest, his share in the

universal interest included.

7. Anne 1702. Oct. 21

8. d o 1704 Oct. 29

9. d o 1713. April. 9.

10. G. 2 1732. Jan y 13

11. G. 2. 1734 April 16

12. d o 1745 Oct. 17.

13. G. 3 1772 June 10

14. d o 1791 June 10.

IV. Annuality

Members dependence

16.

By Representatives peoples sense not conformable to, but in so far as for seat they

depend on people’s wishes expressed by suffrage as above.

IV. Annuality

Members dependence

IV Annuality

17. 14.

Such dependence not | | unless at all times each Representative were removable by his

constituents: but such continual occupation precluding provision necessary for

subsistence power of removal can not be exercisable but as stated, and more or less

distant periods (Apply this to instructions)

IV Annuality

18

Dependence the more perfect the shorter the term: hence the term should be the

shortest exemplified in constitutional practice: viz one year. # 3

IV Annuality

21

For due exercise of the power correspondent to such dependence each Representatives

conduct must by each Constituent be knowable in so far as sense of need has place,

and time permitts

V. Incorruptibility

Numbers under independence

22

No such dependence but in so far as good and evil from all other quarters is in

Representatives estimation | | to d o from Constituents hence by

all practicable means Representative should be exempted from all such external

influence.

V. Incorruptibility

Members Responsibility

27

Offices and commissions which can not but be more or less lucrative being

constitutionally at the disposal of the Crown; also objects of desire in other

shapes; hence temptations, by the hope of gaining which, for self or connections or

fear of losing them, Representatives can not but be liable to be engaged to sacrifice

universal interest to King’s his adherents’ particular interests, real or supposed,

hence the necessity of not only shortening the term as above, but subjecting

Representatives to eventual punishment greater in value than the utmost loss

incurrible as above.

V. Incorruptibility

Members undue & due dependence

28

This influence of the Crown, not being efficient but in so far as it outweighs d o of Constituents, is sinister.

V. Incorruptibility

Members undue & due dependence

29

So long ago as 1782 by the experience & sense of the mischievousness of this

influence was produced the Commons Resolution that it ought to be diminished

30

Since then it has been encreased by the difference between debt and standing army of

that time and this: | |

Debt, by taxes and profitable patronage exercised by grant of the attendant offices

& commissions: army by d o & by power of stifling

the voice & destroying the liberties of the people.

V. Incorruptibility

Members undue & due dependence

31

Influence by the debt not diminishable but by acts too manifestly inconsistent with

justice and humanity to need mentioning

Members undue & due dependence

32

Nor d o by army otherwise than in proportion as distant

dependencies are given up

Members undue & due

33

Thence sole remedy against sinister influence counterforce produced by people’s

influence.

Numbers of inhabitants

say 16,000,000

Divide by N o of Districts ............. 658

Average N o in each District ......... 24,316

Surplus 72

JB_128_270.xml

Title: [1818 March 8 Parl Reform Proposed]

Description: 1818 March 8

Parl Reform Proposed H. of Commons Resolutions

9

19. That forasmuch as, in proportion as it has place, this influence of the Crown

can not be exercised and made productive of its natural effect. without counteracting

and overpowering in the breasts of their Representatives the influence of the people,

and that in such sort as to engage them to make continual sacrifice of the interest

of such their constituents to the separate interest of the servants of the Crown

their dependents and adherents such influence may with but too incontrovertible

propriety be termed a sinister influence.