JB_128_318.xml

Title: [nd [wm 1816] 11 {universal]

Description: nd [wm 1816]

11

{universal interest being part and parcel of his own personal interest, will

therefore in so far as his conception of it is correct and adequate, exercise on his

conduct an influence, at any rate not inferior to that which would be exercised on it

by any such purely personal interest as would, in his eyes, be of equal value.}

Resolved

17. {15. That} /that/, by the Representatives of the people, the sense of the people

whose Representatives they are, can never be truly represented and conformed to,

otherwise than is so far as, for their continuance in such their situation, they have

been rendered, and remain dependent upon the wishes – the real and genuine wishes and

desires – of such their Constituents, as expressed by their suffrages, delivered as

above.

18. That, though to give to this dependence that utmost point of perfection, of

which, considered in itself and without regard to any other object, it would be

susceptible, it would be necessary, that at all times it should be in the power of

every such Electoral body as above, to remove its Representative, in the same manner

as it is in the power of every individual who has granted to another a power of

Attorney, to revoke the same, {*} yet forasmuch as, in such a

state of things, instead of deputing representatives to manage such their public

concerns, the people would thus be, in their own persons, continually occupied in the

management of those same concerns, whereby that proportion of time and labour would

be occupied and engrossed, without which the business of private life, in respect of

the provision of the means of subsistence, could not be carried on, - hence it

becomes necessary, that this same power of removal should not be called into

exercise, otherwise than at certain stated, and more or less distant periods.

19. That, forasmuch as the degree of dependence so established will be the more

perfect, the shorter the term is, during which each such representative remains

exempt from removal at the hands of his Constituents, - it is therefore expedient

that this term should be as short as any regularly established term, which, without

practical inconvenience in respect of its shortness, has ever, in the practice of the

constitution, been seen exemplified: which said term is, as appears by divers

Statutes, the term of one year.

{ 16. That, for the due exercise of that power, by which, as above, it is expedient,

that the people, as divided into such Electoral bodies as aforesaid, should keep such

their Representatives in dependence, - it is necessary that by every Member of each

such Electoral body, the conduct of its Representative in the exercise of such his

trust should, at all times, and on all occasions, be capable of being known and taken

into consideration, in so far as the sense of need suggests itself, and the quantity

of time applicable to this purpose permitts

17. That, forasmuch as by no power lodged in the hands of constituents, can any

dependence, on the part of their respective Representatives, be in any degree created

or maintained, except in so far as the good and evil about to be eventually produced

by the exercise of such power is, at all times, in the expectation of the

representative, greater than any that can be made to accrue to him, by any other

person or persons, whose interest or supposed interest, and consequent endeavour, it

may be to engage him in a violation of such his trust, it is accordingly necessary,

that, by all practicable means, every Representative of the people be rendered as}

{* It may be proper perhaps to apply this likewise to Instructions. J.B.}

JB_128_267.xml

Title: [1818 March 7. + Parl. Reform Proposed]

Description: 1818 March 7. +

Parl. Reform Proposed H. of Commons Resolutions

Representatives

6

14. {That for the purpose whatsoever mode and degree of attendance it is established

and reserved}

15. That {forasmuch as the degree of dependence so established will be the more

perfect the shorter the term is during which each such representative remains exempt

from removal at the hands of his constituents} it is therefore expedient that this

term should be as short as any regularly established term which without practical

inconvenience in respect of its shortness, has in the practice of the Constitution

been seen exemplified: which said term is, as appears by divers Statutes, the term of

one year.

16. That, for the due exercise of that power, by which, as above, it is expedient

that the people, as divided into such Electoral bodies as aforesaid should keep such

their Representatives in dependence, it is necessary that, by every Member of each

such Electoral body, the conduct of its Representatives in the exercise of such his

trust should at all times and on all occasions be capable of being known and taken

into consideration, in so far as the sense of need suggests itself, and the quantity

of time applicable to this purpose permitts.

JB_128_268.xml

Title: [1818 March 7. + Parl. Reform Proposed]

Description: 1818 March 7. +

Parl. Reform Proposed H. of Commons Resolutions

Representatives

7

17. That forasmuch as by no power lodged in the hands on Constituents can any

dependence on the part of their reputed Representatives be in any degree created or

maintained except in so far as the good and evil about to be eventually produced by

the exercise of such power is at all times in the expectation of the Representative

greater than any that can be made to accrue to him by any other person or persons

whose interest or supposed interest and consequent endeavour it may be to engage him

to a violation of such his trust, it is accordingly necessary that, by all

practicable means, every Representative of the people be rendered as compleatly

exempt as possible from every such external influence.

18. That forasmuch as according to the originally and immemorially established and

still-existing forms and practice of the Constitution of this realm, the disposal of

public Offices /Offices and Commissions/ is and all along, has been without any

considerable exception in the hands of the Crown, to which Offices and Commissions

pecuniary emolument all along has for the most part been, and to a greater or less

amount can not but continue to be, attached – and not only offices and Commissions,

but objects of general desire in various other shapes such as those of power, rank

and dignity in a variety of forms, - all which advantages constitute so many

instruments of temptation by the hope of obtaining which, for themselves or their

connections in the way of personal interest, or sympathy, or in so far as obtained,

by the fear of being deprived thereof, the representatives of the people, can not but

continue to be exposed, as at all times they have been exposed, to be seduced from

their duty and indeed to sacrifice the universal interest of the people their

constituents, to the particular interest or supposed interest of the Crown its

servants and their adherents, have