nd [wm 1816]

C +

17

{as compleatly exempt as possible from every such external influence.}

27. That, forasmuch as, according to the originally and immemorially established,

and still existing, forms and practice of the Constitution of this realm, the

disposal of public offices and Commissions is, and all along has been, without any

considerable exception, lodged in the hands of the Crown, to which Offices and

Commissions, pecuniary emolument has all along, for the most part, been, - and to a

greater or less amount can not but continue to be, - attached – and not only Offices

and Commissions, but objects of general desire, in various other shapes, such as

those of power, rank, and dignity, in a variety of forms, all which advantages

constitute so many instruments of temptation, by the hope of obtaining which, for

themselves or their connections in the way of personal interest or sympathy, or in so

far as obtained by the fear of being deprived thereof, the representatives of the

people can not but continue to be exposed, as at all times they have been exposed, to

be seduced from their duty, and induced to sacrifice the universal interest, of the

people their constituents, to the particular interest or supposed interest of the

Crown, its servants and their adherents, possessors, many of them, by one means or

other, of seats in Parliament, - hence arises a necessity – not only for the giving,

to the continuance of their respective terms in such their trust, the shortest

practicable duration, as above, but moreover, in the event of any such transgression,

to the profit whereof it may happen, to be greater in value, than the utmost loss, to

which they can ever be subjected by simple removal from such their {trust, - the

further necessity, of rendering them eventually subject to adequate ?quere what? punishment, +[1] at the hands, or at the

instance, of their successors in such their trust.}

28. That, forasmuch as, in proportion as it has place, this influence of the Crown

can not be exercised and made productive of its natural effect, without counteracting

and /outweighing and/ overpowering, in the breasts of their Representatives, the influence of the

people, - and that, in such sort as to engage them to make

continual sacrifice of the interest of such their dependents, and adherents, - such

influence may, with but too incontrovertible propriety, be termed a Sinister influence.

29. That, so long ago as the year 1780, in consequence of the experience then

already had, and the strong sense accordingly entertained, not only of the existence,

but of the mischievous effects of this same sinister influence, it was, in and by a

Resolution passed on the 6 th day of April in that year by this

House, declared, of and concerning the influence of the Crown, that the same “has

encreased, is encreasing, and ought to be diminished.”

30. That, since that time, this same sinister influence hath been encreased, viz on

the one hand, by the difference between the public Debt and consequent Taxes of that

time (viz. between £ | | and £ | |) and the public Debt and Taxes of the present time

(between £ | | and £ | |); on the other hand by the amount of the standing army at

that time, between ( ) and ( ) men /(viz Army 35,003 +[2] men)/,

and the amount of the standing Army (viz between ( ) and ( ) men at this present

time: the debt, - in respect of the taxes, necessary for payment of the interest

thereof, and the profitable patronage and power, exercised in relation to the several

offices and Commissions, necessary for the collection of those same taxes: - the

army, “in respect of the patronage and power exercised in relation to the Offices and

Commissions thereunto belonging, as well as of the faculty of applying that same

power to the stifling the voice, and destroying the liberties, of the people.”

+[1] Answer – No use in saying what: it would only afford a handle for objections

against a proposition the truth of which as it stands is out of the reach of dispute.

J.B.

But I have no objection to the omission of this clause about punishment on this

occasion, indispensable as I can not but regard the measure thus proposed. J.B.

+[2] Annual Register A o 1780, p.308 Supplies granted by

Parliament for the Year 1780.