JB_128_049.xml

Title: [7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. 1]

Description: 7 Oct. 1809

Parl y. Reform. P t. 1. Necessity –

Chapters and Sections

Ch. 1. Plan of this work

§.1. Objects of this work

§.2. Radical grievance Dependence of the House of Commons on the King. Nov. 1816 This

is not the evil itself but its cause.

§.3. Pleas in belief of the Dependence stated.

Ch. 2. Kings separate interest – general view of it.

§.1. K. gs separate interest why held up

to view

§.2. K. gs separate interest – shapes in which it acts.

Ch.3. King’s interest as to to Power – what power he ought to have.

§.1. Power as to 1 measures – 2. – men.

§.2. What power the King ought to have as to each.

Ch. 4. King’s interest as to power continued – What power he ought not to have. (See Ch 13.)

§.1. Powers not properly exercisable by the King

§.2. Pitt y r[?] – his notions accorded with the above.

 Here or further on?

§.3. No medium between the Kings absolute power and the above limitations.

Note on continuing[?] Kings here or elsewhere?

Ch.4. continued.

§.4. King’s inviolability and indismissibility depend upon his impotence.

Ch. 5. Kings interest as to power continued – his sinister interest.

as to d o.

§. 1 King’s sinister interest as to 1. Measures

§. 2. King’s sinister interest as to 2. patronage

Marginals have only §.6

Ch. 6. King’s interest as to power continued.

his sinister interest as to sources of power.

§.1. King’s sinister interest as to war.

§.2. – as to Colonies and dependencies in general

§.3. – as to Penal Colonies

§.4. – as to ill-governed home-possessions.

§.5. Limits to Kings power of patronage

Ch. 7. King’s interest as to 2. Money

§.1. Money how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister interest.

§.2. Admiralty Droits.

§.3. Greenwax.

§.4. Exemption from War-Taxes.

Ch. 8. King’s interest as to 3. Ease.

§.1. Ease, how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister, interest.

§.2.

Ch. 9. King’s interest as to 4. Reputation.

§.1. King’s reputation, what publicly useful, what sinister.

§.2. Mischief of undue reputation in the Kings case

§.3. Kings interest in the means of reputation

Ch. 10.

Kings interest as to 5. Vengeance.

§.1 Sinister how much, i.e What fit, what unfit.

§.2.

Ch. 11. Kings sinister interests – their mutual subservience.

Ch. 12. Sinister interest of the King’s subordinates.

§.1. Shapes in which the sinister interests of the Kings

subordinates act.

§.2. Natural confederacy among the several subordinate possessors of sinister

interest.

§.3. Sinister interests as to war exemplified.

{{ Topics of the Chapters Stated.

I. Radical grievance dependence of Commons on King

N.B. This dependence /The mischief/ depends on the existence of a separate interest

on King’s part. Insert here from Plan – Explanations – Mischief of Commons dependence

Ch. 1.

II. Kings sep. interest, its different branches –

Ch. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9 10. 11. thence unfitness as to probity

III. D o of this subordinate. Ch.12.

IV. King’s unfitness as to intelligence. Ch. 13.

V. Necessity of an adequate check to King’s power, governed

by his separate interest. Only such check, his dependence

on the people, thro’ their representatives. Ch. 14.

VI. Burke’s opinion assuring Kings unfitness, and thence the necessity of his

constant dependence on the people. Ch. 15

VII. Unless the king be thus constantly dependent, his power will encrease to

despotism and his sinister interest govern without controul. Ch. 16

VIII. Inadequacy of other checks upon the King’s absolute power. Ch. 17. }

IX. Particular necessity of King’s constant dependence to the prevention of

unnecessary wars. Ch. 19.

{ King can not be dependent on people but in so far as their representatives are Ch.

Taking representatives out of dependence on King and rendering them in part[?] dependent as formerly on their property in part independent of every body the main object of

Parliam. Reform. }}

{ X. King would naturally[?] be in a state of adequate dependence on people, of

representatives, instead of being either independent or dependent on people, were not

dependent on King.

XI. Necessity of taking them out of the improper dependence and placing them under

the proper one.

XII. For this purpose intelligendum how /by what means[?]/

the dependence is established. }

{ XIII. Corruption and bribery by and to whomsoever applied

are no otherwise productive of considerable mischief, than in as far as they are

contributory to this anticonstitutional dependence. }

XIV. By the means necessary to do away the greatly mischievous corruption, the other

modes will be done away.

XV. The arrangements necessary to place the dependence of Members on the proper

footing as above may be so ordered as to be productive of divers collateral and

subordinate and collateral good effects.

JB_128_050.xml

Title: [7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. I]

Description: 7 Oct. 1809

Parl y. Reform. P t. I. Necessity. Chapters

and Sections

Ch. 13. King’s unfitness or Evil consequences of the Kings being his own Minister

 See Ch. 4.

§.1. Evil consequences enumerated.

§.2: Consequence 1. Misrule, viz. by the King

§.3.2. Preference given to unfit subordinates.

§.4-3. Encroachment continually encreasing.

§.5.-4. Habits of insincerity produced in Ministers.

{ §.6. King’s unfitness for power maintained by Burke.  Here, or in Ch. 4? or in Ch.

14? }

Ch. 14. King’s dependence on the people how far necessary

§ 1. Propriety of the King’s dependence in point of theory.

§ 2. Objection answered inconsistency of such dependence with the ballance of power.

(Reference to a dissertation in the Appendix.)

§.3. Actual dependence of the King antecedently to the present reign. Historical

sketch

§.4. Hanover and Hampshire The dependence broken through in the case of Hanover.

§.5. The propriety of the King’s dependence maintained by Burke  Post[?] off to Ch.

15.

§.6. Future prospects necessity of this dependence indicated by the state of the

Royal Family.

Ch. 15

poste[?] 16[?] Marginals

Ch. 16. The King will be despotic, unless the House of Commons be thus dependent on

the people.

§.1. The King’s sinister interest will prevail unless controuled

§.2. Sole adequate controul the power of the people

§.3. Peculiar excellence of the mode in which this controul is exercised according to

the English constitution.

§.4. The controul of the people is nullified, in so far as their delegates are

dependent on the King.

§.5. The dependence of the House of Commons on the King is compleat on all ordinary

occasions.

§.6. Its dependence on the people is the sole true remedy.

§.7. Inefficacy of all other remedies – spirit of the people – press - &c.

Ch. 17.* Occasional interposition on the part of the people

is inadequate.

§.1.

§.2.

§.3. Burke’s intimation of its adequacy examined.

§.4. Tumultuous petitioning Act – check applied by it to

such interposition.

Ch. 19. Necessity of parl y reform to the promotion of unnecessary

wars.

§.1. In theory Polyarchy is more favourable than monarchy to peace.

§.2. Facilities the King has for plunging the people into war.

§.3. In practice polyarchy has been more pacific than monarchy.

§.4. Wars produced or endeavoured at by sinister interest in this reign.

Ch. 18 No marginals Recapitulatory conclusion – Despotism is at

hand.

§.1. Abject dependence of the House of Commons.

§.2. Abject dependence of the Clergy and the Lawyers

§.3. All interruptions to the despotism are precarious and inadequate.

§.4. Recapitulation.

Ch. 15. Unfitness of the King for exercising power in detail – and the necessity of

his dependence on the people through the medium of their delegates, contended for by

Burke

§.1. Burke’s opinions to what purpose brought to view

§.2. His opinions as to the power of the King

§.3 – as to the powers of the people

§.4 – as to the power of the Electors over their delegates.

Ch. 20. Mischief of Idol-worship in the person of the King viz. as obstructing Parl

Reform

§.1.

29 Dec r 1809

Ch. 17 The occasional prevalence of Oppositions[?] is no efficient check to the

King’s despotism.

§.1. Dependence on a party, though in opposition, is dependence on the King.

§.2. Changes in administration prevent not despotism, only cause it to change hands.

§.3.

125_158.xml

Title: [[Copyist’s hand] [Marginal summary]

Description: [Copyist’s hand]

[Marginal summary sheet[?]]

K: 28 Aug 1809

Parl y Reform. B.II. Ch.2. Art. 2. Placemen excluded […?]

Infra[?]

§ II Exclusion of Placemen

1

§.1.

1. The evil and its causes - viz. the corrupt dependence of Parliam t already described.

p1

{2. The remedy - viz. the removal of the cause of this dependence, & to what extent capable of being carried remains to be shewn.}

{3. In this view, follow the arrangements proposed.

1. Placemen as per list to be excluded from voting.

2. None but placemen as per list to speak or make motions.}

3. Military & Naval Officers to be exempt from this incapacitation.

p2

1. A sure majority /influence/ on all occasions would render the King absolute on all occasions: a d o on most occasions would render him d o on most occasions.

§.2. Commons Judges.

1. Commons are Judges over Ministers.

On this head points y t may be useful for reminiscence though not necessary for information.

1. No man should be Judge in his own cause.

2. In the H of Commons Ministers unite in themselves the character of judges & Parties.

3. Therefore Ministers sh d be excluded from voting viz. from acting as Judges in their own cause.

4. Every man judging in his own cause acts corruptly.

p1

1 (a)

Except when the judicial power of the judicatory itself is in question: but as to this appeal should lie from every subordinate to the highest judicatory.

p1

2.

The three first propositions too clear to need any explanation.

p2

The fourth follows as a natural consequence from the others, & the conclusion that arises from it - viz: that a corrupt Judge is unfit to act as such, too obvious to be denied.

p2

4.

If any error is found in these propositions, on being pointed out it will be corrected.

p2

5.

The one that will be least readily assented to is the second - viz. that the Members of the H of Commons should be considered as Judges of the King’s Ministers.

p3

6.

True that in the vulgar sense of the word Judge - a high-seated, wigged, robed man, the Members of the H. of Commons are not Judges.

p3

7.

But if these concomitants are necessary appendages to this character neither are the Members of the H of Lords Judges.

p3

8.

Admitted that this is but an argument ad hominem but the occasion admitts of none better.

p3

§.2. Commons Judges.

9

By the H of Commons two distinct functions are exercised.

1. the legislative.

2. the inquisitorial or more properly the judicial.

p4

10.

- and this power may at any time come to be exercised on any of the King’s Ministers.

p4

11.

It is however distinguishable from other judicatories by these circumstances - that when punishment is to be applied judgment is pronounced by the H. of Lords, when dismissal is involved by the King.

12.

And between these two cases there is this difference - viz. the Lords are under no obligation to apply punishment when called upon, whereas the King, howsoever it may be in pretence, is virtually bound to dismiss his Ministers whenever their removal may be called for.

p5

13.

Thus in respect of the powers of scrutiny, inspection, superintendence their functions are incontestably judicatorial.

p6

14.

And as in the cases of ordinary judicature their divisions are founded on evidence, and are pronounced on points greater beyond comparison in point of importance, than ever fall to the province of Judges so called.

p6

{15.

If fitness be among the qualities by the possession of which they wo d entitle themselves to the appellation of Judges, their claims in this respect is greatly exceed those of ordinary judicatories their mode of collecting evidence is superior and comparatively unattended with delay vexation & expence.

16.

In these respects it is in fact the only tribunal that does merit the name of judicatory.}

{§.2. Commons Judges

17.

Society would be destroyed if the decisions of the H of Commons were not consonant to the ends of justice - society does & can exist, tho the decisions of the West r Hall Courts are continually adverse to the Ends of justice.

p7.

17 (a)

If in the case of M rs Clarke for example, supposing her, like the Duchess of Portsmouth to have been in the pay of France & y e H. of C. had proceeded by Bill, before the cause terminated Bonaparte w d have been in London, & y e House itself destroyed.

Let the people think of this & then consider the foul corruption they have been mistaking for purity.}

18.

If in an ordinary judicature the friends of the criminal formed a part of the Jury, this w d be universally regarded as a mockery of justice.

p9

19.

Compared with the Verdict of a Jury, an address of the H. of C. is of surer efficiency - the address is invariably complied with - the Verdict may be quibbled away.

p.9

20.

Being essentially corrupt Judges and known to be so, the Members of the H. of C. voting in favour of the D. of York neither received nor deserved any credit for their verdict.

p10.

{21.

If Judges are removeable by address from the House, so ought the holders of all other officers in the due execution of which the people have an interest.

p11}