date

12 Aug 1809 Parl Reform Qualification
12 Aug 1809

Parl Reform Qualification of Electors

Case in which all Electors by pursuing each his own interest (in respect of the

choice of Representative) might yet counteract the interest of the whole candidate is

a rule powerful – each Elector so poor that he is forced to give up his lasting to

his […?] interests, the Candidate bribes him with his own money.

Remedy – Check the duration of Representatives situation so short that viz[?] that it

shall not be worth his while to employ bribery

No one permanent class of men whose interests are

constantly and habitually sacrificed. No Helots[?] – No slaves &c

But the less opulent a variable description of men are habitually sacrificed to more

opulence

Remedies against Corruption from[?] the course[?] – in addition to d o against bribery at large

1. Keeping the matter of bribery in excess out of the hands of the Commons this is

now[?] become impossible

2. Keeping it from being applied to the Judges over […?] in such manner as to

influence their judicial conduct: this the only recourse.

Remedies against bribery at large

1. Electors numerous – bribery the[?] expence

2. Duration of Parliament short – bribery not worth while

3. Voting epistolary: thence occasion of expence over portion for bribery

/corruptive/ expence lessened

4. Voting by ballot: the /each man’s/ right being previously established

5. Annuality: the seat not worth bribing for.

On the supposition of universal suffrage each Elector could not do wrong if

independently of any sinister interest that might be employed to influence his vote

he pursued his own interest and that his permanent interest – his having a a compleat

and correct conception of that interest.

Wealth comes under consideration

1. as being possessed or receivable by an Elector.

2. as being possessed by a person possessing an influence either over the will or the

understanding of an Elector.

When an Elector feels himself incapable of forming any judgment on the merits of a

Candidate any the slightest neat[?] packet of personal advantage will be sufficient

to determine him: and if he sees no such advantage he will not give himself the

trouble of going to vote.

He sees no mischief that can ensue from his acceptance of a bribe: I[?]

And it does not follow that because a man will accept a bribe on ordinary occasions,

he will on every occasion ... where he feels himself capable of forming a judgment.

{ Corruption from /by/ individuals much less mischievous than d o

by the Crown.

{Bribery} /Corruption/ of Electors by the Crown is no further of mischievous than as

it determines them to choose a Representative who would be corrupted by the Crown,

but this result may be considered as certain

Corruption of Electors by individuals is no further mischievous than as it

determines them to choose a representative who would be comparatively unfit either by

want of probity or intelligence

A representative can never of himself produce in parliament any mischievous result,

to do so he must have on the question in question a majority on his side.

But by selling himself to the Crown he may not on each question /proposition/

supposed by the crown contribute to the success of that measure but he may moreover

get a measure in which he has a sinister interest carried for him by the Crown. }

{The only corruption therefore which is seriously formidable is that in which

mediately or immediately the Crown is the corrupter.}

{Duration short loses.

1. Making bribery not worth a lot (viz. occasional but the Crown is a permanent

briber)

2. Preservation of Members probity Not worth while to plan

the […?] of a Member, when the fellow[?] may be ousted from it the next year

3. Promoting intelligence on the part of Members, by making them ashamed of […?]

& silent votes.

4. In case of frequent change producing competition, emulating[?] intent[?]

5. Securing Members attendance.}

In the hands of an electors advisor, wealth considered as an index of superior

probity and intelligence may serve to guard him against wealth administered to him by

means of corruption.

In the case of Electors probity is no otherwise of use viz. to himself as to that of

fellow subjects – than in so far as it is accompanied by intelligence in so far as he

acts under the guidance of intelligence

The intelligence under the guidance of which he acts may be his own or borrowed.

In so far as he is free and pure

an Elector, if conscious of inability to judge for himself will borrow a judgment of

the person or persons whom he looks upon as best qualified to give it

Instruction is of no […?] where men are steeled against it by sinister interest

If Elenboro’ and Percival had their will there would be no

more liberty in England than in France. Their power to this

purpose is but suspended.

Voting Epistolary

Advantages

1. Electors in many districts may vote in all without trouble or expence.
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    Description: Dec 1809

    Parl y. Reform

    Ch.1. Explanations

    '.5. Matter its modifications

    2

    7

    1. Trusts[?] so important

    2. Quantity of corrupt matter so great

    { 4 As to the first point, there are two circumstance in the view /under the aspect/ of which, although there be / were?/ not a particle of the matter of good that is not in the character of matter an efficient cause of corruption - in a word of criminality /delinquency/ and vice in all their shapes, susceptible /capable/ of being applied in and by other hands than the King's, and thence to other evil[?] purposes than the King under the influence of his separate and sinister interest is liable to propose to /set before/ himself, yet when compared with the mischief to the influx of which the community is exposed from this most copious and highest source, the utmost possible quantity of mischief producible in this way by any such private hands shrinks into nothing: these are}

    { 4. That in comparison of the species of trust, the breach of which is liable in this instance to be brought to pass the mischief producible by the breach of any other trust, not to say of all other trusts put together, is inconsiderable.}

    { 2. That whereas /while/ in the case of individual corruptors the aggregate mass of sinister interest by which taken together they are excited on the one hand to be /become/ corruptors on the other hand to become corrupted is in an indefinite degree divided: and that in such sort and degrees the mischievous effect of the corruption administered by one hand is capable of being lessened or done away by the effect of corruption, administered by another.

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  • Title: [30 Aug 1809 Parl. y Reform.]
    Description: 30 Aug 1809

    Parl. y Reform.

    Table of Ends and Means: viz 1 in the order of the Ends: 2. in d o of the Means

    I Ends first - their means. & End

    1. Securing Probity in the Members

    Means to ends.

    1. Placemen’s Votes extended.

    2. Elections universal

    3. Speeches correctly compleatly, authentically and constantly taken down and

    published.

    4. Attendance (viz. of all alike secured in an encreased degree) viz. by authentic

    publication of speeches and annuality of Parliaments.

    5. On the part of Electors, fitness for judging the conduct of Members encreased:

    viz. by publication given as above to the speeches of Members.

    6. Members and other Candidates prevented from bribing; Electors from being bribed:

    viz. 1. Home-voters by their voting by ballot, i.e. in

    secret: 2. Out Voters by their voting by letter, thence without expence of journeys &c.

    7. Members rendered less corruptible by being exonerated of expence, as per N o 6.

    End II

    II Securing intelligence on the part of the Members.

    Means to End II

    1. To an additional means of Placemen viz from the Subordinate Boards &c

    right of Speech and d o of Motion given.

    2. Speeches published as above.

    3. Attendance - regularity and generality of it secured in an encreased degree, as

    above.

    4. Elections annual: thence yearly opportunity of substituting more intelligent to

    less intelligent Members.

    Addition III Securing Active talent.

    1. Speeches published, as above.

    2. Attendance secure, as above.

    3. Electors good point[?] strengthened

    End III

    III. Reducing expence and vexation in Elections.

    Means to End III

    1. Home-voters to vote by ballot: thence no Candidate can expect benefits by bribery.

    2. Out votes, by letter, free from expence, as above.

    End IV.

    Reducing expence, vexation and delay, of Election

    Judicature.

    Means to End IV

    1. Voting by ballot and letter the candidate knowing by whom the votes in favour of

    his competitor have been given, none will have any inducement for contesting votes.

    I

    II. Means first - their Uses

    (direct) i.e. in the character of Means with reference to

    one or more of the above Ends.

    I Voting - Home-votes by ballot.

    Contributing to secure probity on the part of Members: viz. by rendering it not worth

    candidates while to begin[?] corruption: votes not being to be secured by bribery.

    2. Rendering the vote free: i.e. saving it from being pro-[?] by influence of will

    over will.

    3. Reducing expence and vexation viz.[?] to Members and unsuccessful Candidates.

    II. Voting - Out votes, by letter: Uses (direct)

    1. Reducing expence and vexation: viz to Members and unsuccessful candidates

    2. Reducing expence and vexation: viz. to Electors themselves.

    3. Reducing the danger of improbity on the part of Members: viz. the number of

    out-voters not forming so considerable a part of the whole as to render bribery

    eligible: especially when the seat is but for a year.

    III. Exclusion of Placemen’s Votes

    Uses

    1. Rendering the danger of improbity, viz. in the shape of undue obsequiousness to

    the Crown on the part of Members.

    IV. Admitting Speech and Motion on

    the part not only of the existing placemen, but of others from the Boards,

    &c.

    Uses (direct)

    1. Contributing to secure encrease of intelligence on the part of the Members.

    Collateral uses.

    1. Contributing to secure encrease of probity on the part

    of the placemen thus subjected to continual examination

    /scrutiny/.

    2. Contributing to secure encrease of intelligence in d o by the encreased obligation of understanding the business.

    3. Contributing to secure Encrease of intelligence on the part of succeeding ones, by

    rendering the situation formidable to incapable ones.

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    5. Contributing to secure encrease of intelligence on the part of d o: viz. by encreasing the stock of information habitually or casually laid

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    II

    II. Means first their Uses (continued)

    V. Parliaments Annual /Elections Annual/-ly renewed.

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    1 Contributing to secure encrease of probity on the part of

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    not worth a Minister’s while to give in the shape of a place to any of their

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    purchase of bribing Electors viz. by making it not worth their while to bestow much

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  • Title: [21 Aug 1809 + Parl y Reform]
    Description: 21 Aug 1809 +

    Parl y Reform

    B.III. Influence

    Corruption

    Electors

    1

    The Lords are in for themselves: Why may not Electors be?

    '. Bribery be on the part of the Elector?  Not till after Corruption on the part of the Member.

    The parliamentary Elector in his situation does he not do mischief, by accepting of money or what is equivalent, for his vote?

    I answer, as before /above/ - that depends upon the character and disposition of the Member whom his vote contributes to place in the House: in which is included the this /these two/ proposition, viz. that, if without his vote the candidate would equally have been placed there, or is not placed there at all, no mischief is produced.

    The Member /Candidate/, who being a man of an independent mind, means to act upon independent principles gains his election by bribery, and acts upon those principles to the last. The Candidate who had he succeeded on his election would have been from first to last a tool of the Minister, gives no bribes and loses it. Now where is the mischief in this? - just none: the case /event/ in which the mischief, whatever mischief the case is susceptible of, would have taken place, is the opposite case /event/.