JB_128_049.xml

Title: [7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. 1]

Description: 7 Oct. 1809

Parl y. Reform. P t. 1. Necessity –

Chapters and Sections

Ch. 1. Plan of this work

§.1. Objects of this work

§.2. Radical grievance Dependence of the House of Commons on the King. Nov. 1816 This

is not the evil itself but its cause.

§.3. Pleas in belief of the Dependence stated.

Ch. 2. Kings separate interest – general view of it.

§.1. K. gs separate interest why held up

to view

§.2. K. gs separate interest – shapes in which it acts.

Ch.3. King’s interest as to to Power – what power he ought to have.

§.1. Power as to 1 measures – 2. – men.

§.2. What power the King ought to have as to each.

Ch. 4. King’s interest as to power continued – What power he ought not to have. (See Ch 13.)

§.1. Powers not properly exercisable by the King

§.2. Pitt y r[?] – his notions accorded with the above.

 Here or further on?

§.3. No medium between the Kings absolute power and the above limitations.

Note on continuing[?] Kings here or elsewhere?

Ch.4. continued.

§.4. King’s inviolability and indismissibility depend upon his impotence.

Ch. 5. Kings interest as to power continued – his sinister interest.

as to d o.

§. 1 King’s sinister interest as to 1. Measures

§. 2. King’s sinister interest as to 2. patronage

Marginals have only §.6

Ch. 6. King’s interest as to power continued.

his sinister interest as to sources of power.

§.1. King’s sinister interest as to war.

§.2. – as to Colonies and dependencies in general

§.3. – as to Penal Colonies

§.4. – as to ill-governed home-possessions.

§.5. Limits to Kings power of patronage

Ch. 7. King’s interest as to 2. Money

§.1. Money how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister interest.

§.2. Admiralty Droits.

§.3. Greenwax.

§.4. Exemption from War-Taxes.

Ch. 8. King’s interest as to 3. Ease.

§.1. Ease, how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister, interest.

§.2.

Ch. 9. King’s interest as to 4. Reputation.

§.1. King’s reputation, what publicly useful, what sinister.

§.2. Mischief of undue reputation in the Kings case

§.3. Kings interest in the means of reputation

Ch. 10.

Kings interest as to 5. Vengeance.

§.1 Sinister how much, i.e What fit, what unfit.

§.2.

Ch. 11. Kings sinister interests – their mutual subservience.

Ch. 12. Sinister interest of the King’s subordinates.

§.1. Shapes in which the sinister interests of the Kings

subordinates act.

§.2. Natural confederacy among the several subordinate possessors of sinister

interest.

§.3. Sinister interests as to war exemplified.

{{ Topics of the Chapters Stated.

I. Radical grievance dependence of Commons on King

N.B. This dependence /The mischief/ depends on the existence of a separate interest

on King’s part. Insert here from Plan – Explanations – Mischief of Commons dependence

Ch. 1.

II. Kings sep. interest, its different branches –

Ch. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9 10. 11. thence unfitness as to probity

III. D o of this subordinate. Ch.12.

IV. King’s unfitness as to intelligence. Ch. 13.

V. Necessity of an adequate check to King’s power, governed

by his separate interest. Only such check, his dependence

on the people, thro’ their representatives. Ch. 14.

VI. Burke’s opinion assuring Kings unfitness, and thence the necessity of his

constant dependence on the people. Ch. 15

VII. Unless the king be thus constantly dependent, his power will encrease to

despotism and his sinister interest govern without controul. Ch. 16

VIII. Inadequacy of other checks upon the King’s absolute power. Ch. 17. }

IX. Particular necessity of King’s constant dependence to the prevention of

unnecessary wars. Ch. 19.

{ King can not be dependent on people but in so far as their representatives are Ch.

Taking representatives out of dependence on King and rendering them in part[?] dependent as formerly on their property in part independent of every body the main object of

Parliam. Reform. }}

{ X. King would naturally[?] be in a state of adequate dependence on people, of

representatives, instead of being either independent or dependent on people, were not

dependent on King.

XI. Necessity of taking them out of the improper dependence and placing them under

the proper one.

XII. For this purpose intelligendum how /by what means[?]/

the dependence is established. }

{ XIII. Corruption and bribery by and to whomsoever applied

are no otherwise productive of considerable mischief, than in as far as they are

contributory to this anticonstitutional dependence. }

XIV. By the means necessary to do away the greatly mischievous corruption, the other

modes will be done away.

XV. The arrangements necessary to place the dependence of Members on the proper

footing as above may be so ordered as to be productive of divers collateral and

subordinate and collateral good effects.

JB_129_004.xml

Title: [8 Oct 1809 Parl. Reform Necessity]

Description: 8 Oct 1809

Parl. Reform Necessity

Burke on present Discontents – References to Passages in.

1

General proscription of official men by Bute. p.21.

2.

Discussion carefully fomented. p.32

3

King virtually absolute. + p32

4

Grant of D. of Portland’s Estate. + p33.

5.

Sandwich persuaded to peach Wilkes. p34

6

Repts.[?] Midx. George’s Fields. Opening of the Parl t p35.

7

Confidence exclusively given to subordinates.

8

Subordinates draw majorities from their superiors in Parl t. p.36.

9.

Subordinates maintain office in spite of their superiors – Superiors sacrificed to

them. p37

{10 K.1

King’s men or friends – Double Cabinet. p.37}

11

Written A o 1768 p38

{12 K2

Blame laid not on Brute but on the system – i.e. the King. p39}

13 K3

Favoritism the Grand Mischief. p40

Mischiefs 14. K.4

Choice of Ministers in the King: a grievance. p41

{ Mischiefs 15. K.5.

King sh d have no choice of men or measures. p41}

16

Mischief of all sorts & degrees may be done by ministers without exposing

them to punishment. p.42

{ Popular[?] waste[?] 17 K.6

King’s personal power sho d be = 0. p.43}

{18 P.

People should have a virtual negative to nomination to offices as King has to laws.

p.44}

{19 K7

Insulated[?] men should not be suffered in office because dependent on the King.

p46.}

{ Mischief 20 K8

Mischievous that the King sh d appoint the Ministers p.47.}

{ Dependence 21 P2

Interposition of substantial Yeomanry called for. p.50}

22

Anxious incapacity of King’s friends make them afraid of just war. p52.

{ 23 P3

Good men hope better things from temporary confusion than from established servitude.

p.57}

24 G.3.

All the circumstances of the reign melancholy proofs of bad governm t. p.62

25. G.3.2

King takes an interest in giving uneasiness to his people. p.63

26 G.3.3

Subordinates dear to King as they are odious to the people. p.64

{ Dependence 27 P.4

Per Burke. H. of Commons letter democratical than dependent. p67 }

{ 28 P.5.

H. of Commons sh d h a controul, not upon but for, the people.

p.68}

{ Dependence 29 P.6 | 2

Worst corruption in the H. of Commons independence as ag t the

people. p69}

30 P Ro 1.

Per Burke: principle of Parl t totally corrupted, Lets end

defeated. p69

31 R Ro 2

Septennial Parliaments necessitated by Election disorders. p.70

See 40. p.95

32 Lords

Impeachm t in danger of being lost. p.71.

33

Executive functions being participated in by H. of C. its use as a check is lost. p71

Dependence 34. P.7 | 1

H. of Commons no controul, useless in so far as controuled by their Representatives.

p80.

35.

Subject of incapacities in an arbitrary state. p81

36

Judge-made law reprobated. p81

{ Dependence 37 R C H

H. of Commons must quite[?] be always dependent either on Court or people. p.85}

38

King’s debt – civil list debt – no debt of the Nation paid by Parliament as[?] p91.

39

Civil list expenditure arbitrary standard substituted to legal. p.92

40 C. P.R.

Parl t declared to be the best support of arbitrary power that

ever was invented – if things happened – than which more important have now actually

happened. p.94

41 P.R.

Short Parliaments reprobated – See 31. p.70 p95

42 P.R.

Removal of placemen d o. p.95

43 P.R. Influence

Influence by place defended. p.39.

{ Cas. Interp 44 P.8

Casual interposition of y e people recommended. p100}

45 C

Distempers of Monarchy, the mischief in the last century – in this the distemper of

Parl. t p.100

46 P 9

Schemes for everything the controul of Electors upon Representatives. p.100

Mischief dependence 47

Impotent administration […?] to Kings interest – not fit for y e

governm t. p.101

48 C

Dependence of Commons abject. p.101

49 C P.9

Dependence on the people, tho’ awful honourable. p.102

{ Mischief 50 K.10

King pretending to have any power incompatible with public peace & good

gov t. p.103}

{ 51 P.10

Exhortation to Electors to contribute by their Votes to the extirpation of King’s

men. p.104}

52

Open declaration of Bute ag t political connection. p.105

In 55. p.112

53

Fallacy – never may barbarism plus sages guiles[?] sages. p108

54

Party eulogistic definition of. p110

55

Not measures but men supported – The contrary reprobated. See 52. p.105. p112.

Mischief dependence 56 P.11

Exhortation to resist the will of the King p117

Dependence 57 P.R.

Exhortation to restore the constitution to original principles, & to the

people to keep the House dependent on themselves. p117

Dependence 58 K.11

Choice of the people ought to determine King’s choice of Ministers. 118.

59 K 12 P.12

No alternative between Kings dependence on the people and despotism. p118.

JB_128_050.xml

Title: [7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. I]

Description: 7 Oct. 1809

Parl y. Reform. P t. I. Necessity. Chapters

and Sections

Ch. 13. King’s unfitness or Evil consequences of the Kings being his own Minister

 See Ch. 4.

§.1. Evil consequences enumerated.

§.2: Consequence 1. Misrule, viz. by the King

§.3.2. Preference given to unfit subordinates.

§.4-3. Encroachment continually encreasing.

§.5.-4. Habits of insincerity produced in Ministers.

{ §.6. King’s unfitness for power maintained by Burke.  Here, or in Ch. 4? or in Ch.

14? }

Ch. 14. King’s dependence on the people how far necessary

§ 1. Propriety of the King’s dependence in point of theory.

§ 2. Objection answered inconsistency of such dependence with the ballance of power.

(Reference to a dissertation in the Appendix.)

§.3. Actual dependence of the King antecedently to the present reign. Historical

sketch

§.4. Hanover and Hampshire The dependence broken through in the case of Hanover.

§.5. The propriety of the King’s dependence maintained by Burke  Post[?] off to Ch.

15.

§.6. Future prospects necessity of this dependence indicated by the state of the

Royal Family.

Ch. 15

poste[?] 16[?] Marginals

Ch. 16. The King will be despotic, unless the House of Commons be thus dependent on

the people.

§.1. The King’s sinister interest will prevail unless controuled

§.2. Sole adequate controul the power of the people

§.3. Peculiar excellence of the mode in which this controul is exercised according to

the English constitution.

§.4. The controul of the people is nullified, in so far as their delegates are

dependent on the King.

§.5. The dependence of the House of Commons on the King is compleat on all ordinary

occasions.

§.6. Its dependence on the people is the sole true remedy.

§.7. Inefficacy of all other remedies – spirit of the people – press - &c.

Ch. 17.* Occasional interposition on the part of the people

is inadequate.

§.1.

§.2.

§.3. Burke’s intimation of its adequacy examined.

§.4. Tumultuous petitioning Act – check applied by it to

such interposition.

Ch. 19. Necessity of parl y reform to the promotion of unnecessary

wars.

§.1. In theory Polyarchy is more favourable than monarchy to peace.

§.2. Facilities the King has for plunging the people into war.

§.3. In practice polyarchy has been more pacific than monarchy.

§.4. Wars produced or endeavoured at by sinister interest in this reign.

Ch. 18 No marginals Recapitulatory conclusion – Despotism is at

hand.

§.1. Abject dependence of the House of Commons.

§.2. Abject dependence of the Clergy and the Lawyers

§.3. All interruptions to the despotism are precarious and inadequate.

§.4. Recapitulation.

Ch. 15. Unfitness of the King for exercising power in detail – and the necessity of

his dependence on the people through the medium of their delegates, contended for by

Burke

§.1. Burke’s opinions to what purpose brought to view

§.2. His opinions as to the power of the King

§.3 – as to the powers of the people

§.4 – as to the power of the Electors over their delegates.

Ch. 20. Mischief of Idol-worship in the person of the King viz. as obstructing Parl

Reform

§.1.

29 Dec r 1809

Ch. 17 The occasional prevalence of Oppositions[?] is no efficient check to the

King’s despotism.

§.1. Dependence on a party, though in opposition, is dependence on the King.

§.2. Changes in administration prevent not despotism, only cause it to change hands.

§.3.