date

14 Oct r 1809 P.I. Parl. y Ref. m
14 Oct r 1809 P.I.

Parl. y Ref. m Part II. Influence. {Ch. 1.

Explanations}

2 o

1

Sophisms derived from the idea of ballance.

Necessity of the Kings the Peers &c having a weight in the constitution, the government – the house

No need of any such weight. Needful and important that the King should have the

patronage viz that it may be in a single responsible hand: seen that it should be so disposed of as to bribe his Judges.
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  • Title: [14 Oct r 1809 P.I Parl y Ref. m B]
    Description: 14 Oct r 1809 P.I

    Parl y Ref. m B. II. Influence. Ch. {1.}/3/

    {Explanations} /Modes of Corruption/

    Ordinary modes

    2

    {1. Of the different shapes &c[?] viz. money &c it depends on

    idiosyncrasy which creates most dependence

    2. / 2/ Fear of ablation makes more dependence than hope of

    collation.

    3. / 1/ Benefit in expectancy no matter the shape: values, what

    he would pay for it

    4. By a benefit already conferred on a friend no dependence except by gratitude: it

    not being generally ablatible.

    I Value to dependents

    5. Drawbacks from value on

    1. Labour – ex. gr. of others

    2. Punishment or infamy[?] as in case of bribe

    6. Corroboration of dependence of obsequiousness – on

    1. Gratitude (the sympathy)

    2. Obligation to gratitude by force of popular sanction

    7. By expectation a single benefit may keep any numbers of Members or Electors in

    dependence and obsequiousness }

    II. Value to patron

    1.

    8. 1 greater, the more valuable to dependent

    2. the less merit it requires on the part of dependent: because

    1. The more merit requisite the fewer he is able to demand[?] in de dependence.

    2. the less likely it is that his personal favourites, who the more obsequious they

    are the more meritless they are likely to be can be provided for.

    9 Of the whole of the mass of patronage the value is the greater the greater the

    number of benefits conformable and the greater the value of each.

    10. Useful to have a cloak to corruption. Unaware[?] is that cloak […?] the as[?]

    steward.
  • Title: [31 Aug 1809 Parl y Ref m Ch. Necessity]
    Description: 31 Aug 1809

    Parl y Ref m Ch. Necessity Original

    Beginning.

    1

    §.5. K gs sep. interest. 1. Money

    23. 24. 25.

    §.8. King’s separate interest

    3. ease.

    §.9. King’s separate interest

    4. vengeance

    §.10. Kings separate interest. 5. reputation.

    {Part 1

    Ch. 1 Objects of this work

    […?] and Means of Reform

    Necessity & mode of reform[?] replacing the House of Commons in a state of

    dependence on the people

    Ch.2. The King’s separate interest – shapes in which it acts

    Ch.3. The Necessary prevalence[?] of which the conduct of the K.[?] is dependent on

    his will

    Ch.4. Sole remedy replacing the House in its dependence on the people }

    B.I. Necessity. Sect. s continued

    { 6

    §.19. Elogiums on the Kings mischievous.}

    B.III. Influence

    1 2

    §.20. Tests, an instrument of corrupt dependence.

    III. Influence

    2 1

    §.21. Ireland – its abuses of use to despotism.

    Ch. 5

    { B.I. Necessity Sections 12 Sept 1809

    § 1 Objects of this work

    1 (2. 3. 4. notes:) 5.

    6

    §.2. General grievance. Dependence of the H. of Commons.

    7. 8. 9: 10. 11. 12.

    §.3 Pleasure[?] forms[?] of the dependence. 13. 14. 15.

    Duplicative[?] 15. Influence ambiguous, Reference inwards.

    II

    §.4. Kings sinister /separate/ interest – its 5 shapes 16. 17 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. {23

    24. 25.} (dup. 8. 9.)

    §.6. Kings sinister /separate/ interest

    2. Power. as to 1. Measure

    §.7.* King’s separate interest

    2. power. as to 2. patronage

    III

    §.7./10/ Mutual subservience of King’s separate interests.

    §.8./11 Ministers’ separate interests.

    IV

    1

    §.9./12/ King’s and Ministers separate interests prevalent – unless controuled.

    2

    §.10. People’s controul Britannice[?] – its peculiar

    excellence.

    3

    §.11. Sole effectual controul, People’s power thro’ Representatives.

    4

    §.12. People’s controul mollified by House’s dependence.

    5

    §.13. House, in dependence compleat.

    6

    §.14. Sole remedy. House’s dependence

    15 V

    § 15. King’s dependence necessary

    17

    §.16. Future prospects.

    18

    §.17. Despotism chained & loosed – Historical Sketch

    19

    §.18. King’s dependence necessary – Objection – Ballance destroyed.
  • Title: [24 Dec r 1809 Parl y Ref m]
    Description: 24 Dec r 1809

    Parl y Ref m

    Ch.15. Electors Contin

    '.1. Mischief to the State

    5

    7

    7

    Now, instead of being so many pocket votes - votes already purchased - suppose all these to be so many free votes - free to choose, yes and add disposed to choose a purchaser - each of them, at all times - a purchaser. Yes, and disposed to take for that purchaser the best bidder.

    As it is /On the former supposition/ so many sets of them, so many secret dependents in those who ought to be constitutionally and openly dependent upon them - so many corrupt judges, stationed /seated/ in the most important seats of judicature.

    On the present supposition, being at /to take/ the very worst /case/, disposed all of them to sell themselves to the best bidder, on each election, that best bidder is in the instance of each seat just as likely to be, in relation to the corrupter[?]-general, in a free and independent as in a dependent state.

    In the case where every thing was as it should be where there was no bribery no corruption - nothing for any man to find fault with, it was all sure loss in the article of independence. In the present case it is all corruption all bribery - corruption in the grossest of all its forms - "dry and sordid" bribery /gain/. + Yet, compared with that pure and unexceptionable case, here is gain - no less than 50 per Cent gain to independence.

    + Speaker's Speech

    Cobbet's Register

    10 June 1809