JB_129_176c.xml

Title: [16 Sep 1809 K[?] 5 Sep. 1809]

Description: 16 Sep 1809

K[?] 5 Sep. 1809

Parl y Ref m Necessity. Ch. Kings dependence

necessary

3

20

§ 3 Kings dependence […?] Hanover & Hampshire

1.

To gratify the King, Hanover and Hampshire under two successive Reigns put upon a

par. p5.

2.

Had the interests of the people formed an ingredient in their calculations, no such

rapprochement would have been made. p.5.

3.

The declaration thus made by Fox and Grenville furnishes them by Ord[…?], as little

capable of being effected, as the conquering Spanish America for the Junta p.6.

4.

Had the King turned over Hanover to one of his sons, the King w d

have been none the Poorer, and his son would have been placed in the same condition

as the king of Wirtemberg. p.6

3 (a)

Note from Dodington. p.6

4 (a)

Blessed condition of the people! Under a party the two heads of which have not

scrupled to avow that they cared no more for their country than for Hanover! – and

that even the party should be a resource!

JB_128_050.xml

Title: [7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. I]

Description: 7 Oct. 1809

Parl y. Reform. P t. I. Necessity. Chapters

and Sections

Ch. 13. King’s unfitness or Evil consequences of the Kings being his own Minister

 See Ch. 4.

§.1. Evil consequences enumerated.

§.2: Consequence 1. Misrule, viz. by the King

§.3.2. Preference given to unfit subordinates.

§.4-3. Encroachment continually encreasing.

§.5.-4. Habits of insincerity produced in Ministers.

{ §.6. King’s unfitness for power maintained by Burke.  Here, or in Ch. 4? or in Ch.

14? }

Ch. 14. King’s dependence on the people how far necessary

§ 1. Propriety of the King’s dependence in point of theory.

§ 2. Objection answered inconsistency of such dependence with the ballance of power.

(Reference to a dissertation in the Appendix.)

§.3. Actual dependence of the King antecedently to the present reign. Historical

sketch

§.4. Hanover and Hampshire The dependence broken through in the case of Hanover.

§.5. The propriety of the King’s dependence maintained by Burke  Post[?] off to Ch.

15.

§.6. Future prospects necessity of this dependence indicated by the state of the

Royal Family.

Ch. 15

poste[?] 16[?] Marginals

Ch. 16. The King will be despotic, unless the House of Commons be thus dependent on

the people.

§.1. The King’s sinister interest will prevail unless controuled

§.2. Sole adequate controul the power of the people

§.3. Peculiar excellence of the mode in which this controul is exercised according to

the English constitution.

§.4. The controul of the people is nullified, in so far as their delegates are

dependent on the King.

§.5. The dependence of the House of Commons on the King is compleat on all ordinary

occasions.

§.6. Its dependence on the people is the sole true remedy.

§.7. Inefficacy of all other remedies – spirit of the people – press - &c.

Ch. 17.* Occasional interposition on the part of the people

is inadequate.

§.1.

§.2.

§.3. Burke’s intimation of its adequacy examined.

§.4. Tumultuous petitioning Act – check applied by it to

such interposition.

Ch. 19. Necessity of parl y reform to the promotion of unnecessary

wars.

§.1. In theory Polyarchy is more favourable than monarchy to peace.

§.2. Facilities the King has for plunging the people into war.

§.3. In practice polyarchy has been more pacific than monarchy.

§.4. Wars produced or endeavoured at by sinister interest in this reign.

Ch. 18 No marginals Recapitulatory conclusion – Despotism is at

hand.

§.1. Abject dependence of the House of Commons.

§.2. Abject dependence of the Clergy and the Lawyers

§.3. All interruptions to the despotism are precarious and inadequate.

§.4. Recapitulation.

Ch. 15. Unfitness of the King for exercising power in detail – and the necessity of

his dependence on the people through the medium of their delegates, contended for by

Burke

§.1. Burke’s opinions to what purpose brought to view

§.2. His opinions as to the power of the King

§.3 – as to the powers of the people

§.4 – as to the power of the Electors over their delegates.

Ch. 20. Mischief of Idol-worship in the person of the King viz. as obstructing Parl

Reform

§.1.

29 Dec r 1809

Ch. 17 The occasional prevalence of Oppositions[?] is no efficient check to the

King’s despotism.

§.1. Dependence on a party, though in opposition, is dependence on the King.

§.2. Changes in administration prevent not despotism, only cause it to change hands.

§.3.

JB_129_089.xml

Title: [31 Aug 1809 Parl y Ref m Ch. Necessity]

Description: 31 Aug 1809

Parl y Ref m Ch. Necessity Original

Beginning.

1

§.5. K gs sep. interest. 1. Money

23. 24. 25.

§.8. King’s separate interest

3. ease.

§.9. King’s separate interest

4. vengeance

§.10. Kings separate interest. 5. reputation.

{Part 1

Ch. 1 Objects of this work

[…?] and Means of Reform

Necessity & mode of reform[?] replacing the House of Commons in a state of

dependence on the people

Ch.2. The King’s separate interest – shapes in which it acts

Ch.3. The Necessary prevalence[?] of which the conduct of the K.[?] is dependent on

his will

Ch.4. Sole remedy replacing the House in its dependence on the people }

B.I. Necessity. Sect. s continued

{ 6

§.19. Elogiums on the Kings mischievous.}

B.III. Influence

1 2

§.20. Tests, an instrument of corrupt dependence.

III. Influence

2 1

§.21. Ireland – its abuses of use to despotism.

Ch. 5

{ B.I. Necessity Sections 12 Sept 1809

§ 1 Objects of this work

1 (2. 3. 4. notes:) 5.

6

§.2. General grievance. Dependence of the H. of Commons.

7. 8. 9: 10. 11. 12.

§.3 Pleasure[?] forms[?] of the dependence. 13. 14. 15.

Duplicative[?] 15. Influence ambiguous, Reference inwards.

II

§.4. Kings sinister /separate/ interest – its 5 shapes 16. 17 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. {23

24. 25.} (dup. 8. 9.)

§.6. Kings sinister /separate/ interest

2. Power. as to 1. Measure

§.7.* King’s separate interest

2. power. as to 2. patronage

III

§.7./10/ Mutual subservience of King’s separate interests.

§.8./11 Ministers’ separate interests.

IV

1

§.9./12/ King’s and Ministers separate interests prevalent – unless controuled.

2

§.10. People’s controul Britannice[?] – its peculiar

excellence.

3

§.11. Sole effectual controul, People’s power thro’ Representatives.

4

§.12. People’s controul mollified by House’s dependence.

5

§.13. House, in dependence compleat.

6

§.14. Sole remedy. House’s dependence

15 V

§ 15. King’s dependence necessary

17

§.16. Future prospects.

18

§.17. Despotism chained & loosed – Historical Sketch

19

§.18. King’s dependence necessary – Objection – Ballance destroyed.