[129b-538]

2 April 1817

Plan Cat

Introd

§. Impermanence

2 Usage

4

5

Democratic ascendancy – the very system above ventured to be brought to view and advocated – democratic ascendancy in other words dependence of the Monarch on the body of the people – democratic ascendancy – the result of its {two} efficient causes – on the part of the Monarch perpetually recurring need of money – inability of obtaining it in sufficient quantity but by the free consent of the body of the people – on the part of the representatives of the people dependence where due, viz as towards the people, followed by independence where due viz. as towards the Monarch – such was the state of things during that long /long-lasting/ and auspicious period: no disuse of Parliaments for the purpose of tyrannizing without controul /by terrorism/ as under {the most mendacious {as well as} faithless though among the ablest of tyrants} Elizabeth: no perpetuation of the same Parliament by the means of corruption and for the hope and comfort of misrule, as under the last but one of the Stuarts. Prorogations altogether unknown: /On occasions more than one/ Parliaments more than one or even two in the same year: Years few without a Parliament comparatively few: of the continuance of one and the same Parliament for any such space as two years not a single example.
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    Observations. Here we the course taken by the argument, in pursuance of the design and plan already indicated, namely the design of planting and cultivating in the minds of the lovers of peace and gentleness an antipathy to the cause of reform and to that democratic ascendancy to which the mouth-honour prescribed by policy has just been seen bestowed, by causing them to suppose that tumult universal and habitual tumult is not only /merely/ subservient but necessary to it.

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