JB_160_208.xml

Title: [[clx. 208] 1821. April 30.]

Description: [clx. 208]

1821. April 30.

First Lines

Constitutional

Under a Representative Democracy, the matter of the substantive branch of law will, throughout the whole frame of it, have, for its object or all-comprehensive end - the greatest happiness of the greatest number: in proportion /proportioned/ to the wisdom and felicity of the arrangements by which that end has been pursued and been endeavoured to be attained, the end will accordingly be attained /have been fulfilled/.

Under this same form of government /Under an absolute Monarchy/ the adjective branch of the law will of course /naturally/ have that same object for its all-comprehensive end. Accordingly so it will in fact in so far as it is the work of the same legislator of which the substantive branch of law is the work.

In the only example as yet known of a Representative Democracy, viz. the Anglo american United States, the only branch /portion/ even of the substantive branch law which is the work not only is enforced by the authority, but has actually been the work of the supreme operative power in that state or cluster of states is the Constitutional branch. The mass of law with which every other part of the field of legislation is there covered, remains in a state of chaos. Of this chaos, the ground is throughout composed of the corrupt mass imported from the territory of the limited Monarchy from the yoke of which this democracy has, for above these 40 years, been so compleatly liberated: a ground wor composed partly of statute law i.e. real law, partly of imaginary and fictitious law, called common law. Upon this chaos are still suffered to dribble in streams of fictitious law from the same impure source: and upon this medley /into this hodgepodge/ are, from time to time, cast batches of real law - the home-made work of the several particular legislatures.

JB_160_212.xml

Title: [[clx. 212] 1821. April 30.]

Description: [clx. 212]

1821. April 30.

First Lines

Constitutional

legislation with a thick and dark forest of dark science planted for their own purposes with their own hands and of which they guard the entrance, behold, in their own, the only eyes that are able to find their way in it, for the purpose of doing any work that is required to be done in it.

To these men, in return for their services, the Monarch, as in most absolute Monarchies, found or deemed it expedient to abandon a portion of the substance of the people. But this substance /remuneration/ they have found themselves unable to extract otherwise than by rendering their instrument the adjective branch of the law more or less ill adapted to the purpose of giving execution and effect to the substantive: pregnant with evils opposite to the collateral /proper/ end of judicial procedure: viz. the evils of expence, vexation and delay for the sake and purpose of the profit extractible from the offence: and thus for the sake and by means of this sinister profit partly selling /keeping on foot the sale,/ the denial of justice.

JB_160_342.xml

Title: [[clx. 342] 1822 July 13 Constitut]

Description: [clx. 342]

1822 July 13

Constitut Code

Securities Counterforce

4. Legal responsibility

5. Moral responsibility

Thus much /far/ as to an absolute Monarchy. In the case of a Limited Monarchy the case /matter/ /result/ is not /the state of things is not in this respect/ materially different. In this case likewise the power of giving impunity to any one and every one is commonly given even by law: such is the general rule: and if in words and shew there be any exceptions, the extent given to them is extremely narrow, and even to /in/ that extent they are without substance and effect. As to this point, /the main difference/ between an absolute and a limited Monarchy the main difference consists in this: the impunity which in a direct and open way might by law be alike effected /conferred/ in both Monarchies is in an absolute Monarchy accordingly conferred in a direct and open way, in a limited Monarchy in some indirect and concealed way in preference. In a limited Monarchy the acts of the Monarch and his instruments are necessarily in one way or other more exposed to observation than in an absolute Monarchy. Suppose then a case in which the grant of impunity would in the eyes of the public be in a flagrant degree repugnant to the received notions of justice, there may be a convenience in employing some indirect and covert method in preference to /rather than/ a direct and open one for the production of the effect. A party of Soldiers for example are thus set on and employed to slaughter peaceable a company of men /malcontents/ whose abstinence from all violation of the law has rendered it impracticable to apply to the same purpose the hand of a Judge. The Monarch if he pleased might first give the order to the slaughterers and then pardon them. Under the Constitution, such is its excellence he might kill his subjects the whole multitude of them and the law /no law/ still remain unviolated. But were this the course, sooner or later, resistance might here and there be made and disturbance be thus given to his ease the gard for ease requires that a course more or less direct and conspicuous should be given to vengeance The slaughterers might be sent out of the way, or rendered undistinguishable. Should the resources of this physical kind fail, the state of the law Judicatories and Judicial Procedure affords them in such multitude, and such intricacy that the list of them if rendered intelligible would influx to fill /compose/ a volume.