date

[clx. 214] 1821. May 1. First
[clx. 214]

1821. May 1.

First Lines

Procedure.

/Constitutional Procedure/

Under an absolute Monarchy, so far as regards offences against Government, more particularly seditious speaking and seditious libelling, the laws being but so many instruments of hostility against the subject many, what little security they can have against the ruling one consists in, and is in proportion to the weakness of the laws: it is, therefore, for their interest - for their security - that the hand which cals itself the hand of justice should, in all such cases, be lame: as near immoveable as possible.

So likewise in /under/ a limited monarchy, and for the same reasons.

For the same reasons? yes: and for some additional ones.

Under a limited Monarchy, rather than that the whole frame of government, subjective law adjective law, administration should not be weak in that part, it is for the interest - it is for the security - of the subject many, that it be weak throughout and in the whole. For as, on the one hand, if the whole frame of government possessed any such strength either as that which it has under a Representative Democracy, or even as that which it has under an absolute government, much less can /than/ compleat execution and effect given to these laws would suffice for converting the limitd monarchy into an absolute one, so, on the other hand, under a limited monarchy, the quantity of appropriate aptitude in all its shapes kept up on the part of the subject many by those discussions which, so ong as any limitation remains, can not but continue, afford, to whatsoever is salutary and wel applied in the power of the laws, a substitute such as can have no place in company with that prostration of will and understanding and will on which an absolute Monarchy depends for its continuance
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