date

[clx. 323] 1823 Sept. 15 J
[clx. 323]

1823 Sept. 15

J.B for Greece Constitut Code

Ch.5 Short Rationale

?.3. In People the supreme and universal dislocative

/Constitutives Dislocative Reasons./

With the exception of the signing and sending in the necessary petitions a process altogether quiet and silent and quiet The process is no other than that which takes /has/ place of course on the occasion of every Election: by no tumult or disturbance in any shape is profit in any shape capable of being made by any body: therefore with no evil in any shape is the institution pregnant.

IV. By no other mean at any expence could this same remedial effect be produced: much less at any less expence. On him who thinks otherwise it will rest to produce some such more eligible means.

An ordinary expedient has been - the giving to some single functionary invested with the supreme Executive authority a negative in the acts of the so stiled legislative: that is to say a share in the legislative in addition to the whole of the Executive. What has been the consequence? As by the legislative so called nothing could be done without his concurrence, his concurrence must be bought at any price: so likewise by him, their concurrence. But by such mutual concurrence every thing can be done how prejudicial so ever to the people and without possibility of redress for the people The Executive Chief in virtue of his almost universal locative, gives valuable situations to an unlimited amount to the members of the legislative or what comes to the same thing to their connections: and that he may have the more of these desirable situations to give /good gifts/, they join with him in augmenting the number and value of them without end. To neither authority does that of the other act as a bridle to each of them the power of the other serves as a cloak

The division of power is an effective conjunction of sinister interests. It creates a slight contest which is sure to end in agreement - an agreement never likely to be broken, and the perpetually encreasing expence of which is borne by the people for whose benefit is the pretended motive for the establishment of it.
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  • Title: [[clx. 322] 1823 Sept. 15 J]
    Description: [clx. 322]

    1823 Sept. 15

    J.B. for Greece Constitut. Code

    III. Rationale - brief

    Ch.5 Short Rationale

    ?.3. In People the supreme and universal dislocative

    /Constitutive's dislocative Reasons/

    3. If /Suppose/ the functionary or functionaries on which the power is exercised be the members of the legislative, the exercise of it on a particular occasion would be nothing more than an accelerated anticipation of that exercise which at the end of the year would take place of course

    4. If the functionary or functionaries were any other than the members of the legislative, the exercise could not take place but on the supposition of a neglect or concurrence on the part of the legislative: it would betoken a want of confidence in the legislative as a body: and the legislative would naturally be on the watch and take measures for saving themselves from the expression of such want of confidence

    Of all the grades which this Constitution exhibits The lower in grade the functionary is whom it should be in their contemplation to dislocate, the more grades there are above him in every one of which the functionaries belonging to it would be on the alert to save /preserve/ themselves against the reproach that would be cast upon them by such a want of confidence by a token of dissatisfaction thus manifested

    5. By /At/ the very commencement of the dislocative process, an apprehension such as could not but be more or less efficient would be raised /produced/ in the mind of the functionary thus marked out for censure

    The power thus exercised would be nothing more than a negative upon the exercise of locative power in the case in question: and this a negative not exercisible but after experience In this particular the negative here exercised will differ very much and greatly to its advantage from what a negative is in the ordinary course /sense/ - a negative /power/ exercised antecedently to, and without the benefit of, experience.
  • Title: [1823. May 26 Constitut. Code]
    Description: 1823. May 26

    Constitut. Code

    Ch. Judges

    S. Location

    1. Question- Location of Judges- why not in con stitutive, nor Legislative, nor Executive, but in Justice Minister?

    2. Answer. Reasons. I Why not in Constitutive. 1. Want of time: as in case of Executive Chief

    3. 2. Want of moral aptitude. For locating members of Legislative, aptitude sufficient: for by location of one member, no Constitutive's sinister interest could be served without concurrence of a majority: which, as above, is not probable. Not so for locating singly acting Judges. By league with a candidate for the Judgeship, a single leader might in the event of his success, acquire means of gratification for sinister interest to an indefinite extent.

    4. Connected thus with and dependent on, the head of a party, the undue favor of the Judge might thus be all along shown to every member of that party, his unjust disfavor to the opposite party.

    Ch. Judges

    S. Location

    5. That in these hands the dislocative with regard to the situations in question should is proposed. But, with the two exceptions here noticed (namely Legislative and Ministerial) it is essential that the locative and dislocative function be not in the same hands: at any rate, not exclusive dislocative in the same hands with the locative. For if yes, what ever particular and sinister interest, places tho functionary in the situation will, how bad so ever his conduct, be disposed to keep him there

    6. True, under a Government arranged in other respects, sooner or later, mischief from this, as from every source would find remedy: viz from Public opin. Tribunal. But to the application of the remedy in this case, a constant party struggle would be necessary The locating party successful, redress none: d o successful, then one party Judge would succeed to another d o, oppression and depredation might be in part extinguished, but also in part they would only change sides.

    Ch. Judges

    S. Location

    7. Against such evil, insufficient would be the remedy by Appeal: for

    1. By the inseparable expence vexation & delay, the application of the remedy would be limited

    8. 2. The from party influence, applies also to the Appellate Judicatories.

    9. 3. Want of intellectual aptitude. On this point, constitutive in altogether debarred from corrugating with Justice Minister. See the list of his functions.

    10. art. II Why not in Legislative? Reasons same in kind as those applying to Constitutive: only not so strong: yet sufficient [vs Quere if not stronger?]

    11. art. III. Why not in Executive Chief? Answer. Reason see d o applying to situation of Justice Minister. For the functions Executive Chief would have to look to the exercise of, in addition to his own and those of his subordinates the Minister, see Justice Minister's functions.

    12. or 2. Amongst functionaries of the administrative department, as to what regards official duty, contestation is neither desired nor expected: for im

    impartiality there is therefore no demand. Not so in the situation of Judge: this contestation is certain: and only for the termination of it, is the office instituted. Here there is the demand for impartiality: and for independence as towards
  • Title: [1823. Oct n 6. Constitutional Code]
    Description: 1823. Oct n 6.

    Constitutional Code

    1. Enactive Part

    Ch. XII. Judiciary Collectively ยง. 29. Located here.

    1. Located by Justice Minister are 1. Judges Immediate and

    Appellate.

    2. 2. So government Advocate.

    3. 3. So eleemosynary Advocate.

    4. 4. So Registrars

    1. Question-Location of Judges, why not in Constitutive, nor

    Legis lative, nor Executive, but in Justice Minister.

    2. Answer. Reasons 1. Why not in Constitutive 1. Want of time,

    as in case of Executive chief.

    3. 2 Want of moral aptitude. For locating members of Legislative,

    aptitude sufficient: for by location of one member, no

    Constitutive's sinister interest c d be served, without concurrence of a majority:

    which, as above, is not probable Not so for locating singly

    acting Judges By league with a Candidate for a Judgeship, a

    single might, in the event of his success, acquire means of

    gratifications for sinister interest to an indefinite extent.

    4. Connected thus with and dependent on the head of a party,

    the undue favour of the Judge might thus be all along shown to

    every Member of that party, his unjust disfavor to the opposite

    party.

    5. That in these hands the dislocative with regard to the

    situation in question, sh o be as here

    proposed. But with the two exceptions here noticed, (viz.

    Legislative and Ministerial), it is essential that the locative

    and dislocative functions be

    not in the same hands: at any rate, not the

    exclusive dislocation in the same hands with the locative. For, if

    yes, whatever particular and sinister

    interest places the functionary in the situation will, have had

    soever his conduct, be disposed to keep him there.