date

[clx. 383] 1822 Oct. 17 Constitut
[clx. 383]

1822 Oct. 17

Constitut. Code

Securities

Public Opin Trib

Sections Aristoc and Democrat

1. Interests

Sanctioning power.

In speaking of the Public Opinion Tribunal or say the Tribunal of the social sanction that is to say /composed in its power and influence of/ the power and the influence of the members of it in the character of a Security against Mis-rule, one observation /considerable/ presents an irresistible claim to attention in the first instance. This is that in the bosom of it are individuals in no small multitude, against whom rather than for whom the need of whatever security it is in the power of such a tribunal to afford, has place that is to say the Members /individuals/ of whom the Aristocracy of the country whatsoever be that country, the Aristocracy, in all its shapes and divisions /sub-sections/. Of those sections, or at least the principal of them it is necessary that a clear conception be obtained and kept constantly in view. In most countries, and for example in England in particular They may be thus enumerated. \ZA\ Here insert them
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  • Title: [[clx. 384] 1822 Oct. 17 Constitut]
    Description: [clx. 384]

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    Such being the nature and composition of the Aristocratical Section if such it must be called of the tribunal in question, the propriety of admitting it /its force/ in the character of a security against misrule lies open to /calls forth/ an obvious objection The sort of security which it is capable of affording against the evil here in question in what does it differ from the sort of security that in the case of a foreign war would be afforded by an army of the enemy /hostile power/ in the heart of the kingdom, and in possession of the chief fortresses? The persons for whom /whose happiness/ by the social principle the security is in demand, are by the supposition the greatest number. By the same supposition the persons composing this same Aristocratical Section of the tribunal of public opinion - the aristocratical section of this same tribunal if, of the tribunal /body/ in question they can with any propriety be considered as constituting a part are by the same supposition the /a/ minority, a minority of the whole number of the members of whom the community in question is composed. But according to that same principle if received good government requires that as against the majority, the power the influence of the minority should not on any occasion be ever productive of any effect.
  • Title: [[clx. 389] 1823. Feb. 9 Constitut]
    Description: [clx. 389]

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    Constitut. Code

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  • Title: [[clx. 392] 1822 Oct. 23 Constitut]
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    Constitut. Code

    III. Rationale or II. Exposition

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    Whatsoever moral considerations - notions of moral obligation - should lead /urge/ /engage/ /induce/ a man to abstain from acts injurious to individuals, or to the community in the aggregate, and to oppose himself to acts of the like nature /tendency/ on the part of other individuals, or of foreigners, considered in the character of enemies, should urge him to the like conduct as against the correspondent acts of misrule on the part of the government, and as against the form and system of government which gives birth to them: So much with regard to direction:- [...?] as to force and energy. In the case of the public wrong it ought to be to what it is in the case of the private wrong as the mischief done by the public wrong is to do by the private wrong. Apply this to honesty, generosity, courage etc