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[clx. 384]
1822 Oct. 17
Constitut. Code
Securities
Public Opin Trib
Sections
1 Interests
Such being the nature and composition of the Aristocratical Section if such it must be called of the tribunal in question, the propriety of admitting it /its force/ in the character of a security against misrule lies open to /calls forth/ an obvious objection The sort of security which it is capable of affording against the evil here in question in what does it differ from the sort of security that in the case of a foreign war would be afforded by an army of the enemy /hostile power/ in the heart of the kingdom, and in possession of the chief fortresses? The persons for whom /whose happiness/ by the social principle the security is in demand, are by the supposition the greatest number. By the same supposition the persons composing this same Aristocratical Section of the tribunal of public opinion - the aristocratical section of this same tribunal if, of the tribunal /body/ in question they can with any propriety be considered as constituting a part are by the same supposition the /a/ minority, a minority of the whole number of the members of whom the community in question is composed. But according to that same principle if received good government requires that as against the majority, the power the influence of the minority should not on any occasion be ever productive of any effect.
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Title: [[clx. 383] 1822 Oct. 17 Constitut]Description: [clx. 383] 1822 Oct. 17 Constitut. Code Securities Public Opin Trib Sections Aristoc and Democrat 1. Interests Sanctioning power. In speaking of the Public Opinion Tribunal or say the Tribunal of the social sanction that is to say /composed in its power and influence of/ the power and the influence of the members of it in the character of a Security against Mis-rule, one observation /considerable/ presents an irresistible claim to attention in the first instance. This is that in the bosom of it are individuals in no small multitude, against whom rather than for whom the need of whatever security it is in the power of such a tribunal to afford, has place that is to say the Members /individuals/ of whom the Aristocracy of the country whatsoever be that country, the Aristocracy, in all its shapes and divisions /sub-sections/. Of those sections, or at least the principal of them it is necessary that a clear conception be obtained and kept constantly in view. In most countries, and for example in England in particular They may be thus enumerated. \ZA\ Here insert them
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Title: [[clx. 385] 1822 Oct 17 Constitut]Description: [clx. 385] 1822 Oct 17 Constitut Code Securities Public Opin Trib Sections Aristocrat 1 Interests Hereupon comes an objection /a question/ on the other side. If then as against the /this/ insecurity good government i.e. what you call good government requires that the interests of the minority shall on every occasion have the preference, in so much that the interests of those few shall uniformly be sacrificed to the interests of the /those/ many, here then of this same community area portion and that no inconsiderable an one, that on this principle stand devoted to utter destruction The answer is - By no means. True it is that the interests of the few are in many points hostile to the interests of the many: But, true it is not, that on any points the interests of the many is hostile /are opposite/ to the interests of the few, excepting always in so far forth as consists in /far as regards/ the interest they have in being secured against the sacrifice of their means of existence and enjoyment to cupidity of such their adversaries. /protected against depredation and oppression by the few./ Only in /by/ self preservation, not in /by/ aggression have they any interest: By aggression by every endeavour to inflict either depredation or oppression in any other shape on the ruling few, so far from being benefited they can not be in an extreme[?] degree injured, and in case of perseverance destroyed. As to depredation, the case /reason/ is a very simple /perfectly plain/ one By depredation committed on the majority /subject many/ the ruling and influential few are capable of being every one of them /be their multitude ever so great/ enriched: and that in a high degree and for a length of time to which there is no assignable end. But by depredation committed on the ruling and influential few, it is not in the nature of things that the subject many should be capable of being enriched in any such proportion as a majority of them to any [...?] amount, and at the same time with any degree of permanence
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Title: [[clx. 406] 1822 July 12 Constitut]Description: [clx. 406] 1822 July 12 Constitut. Code Rationale or Exposition? Securities Counterforces 4. Legal responsibility 5. Moral do Public Opinion Tribunal Members who Sections Democratical and Aristocratical ?. Public Opinion Tribunal - Members who - Sections, Democratical and Aristocratical - their affections and opinions. The Members of the Public Opinion Tribunal in a community are the members of that same community the whole number of them considered in respect of their capacity of taking cognizance of each others conduct, and sitting in judgment on it and causing their judgments in the several cases to be made known In the English House of Commons, in the formation of a Committee of the Members for this or that particular purpose an Order that now and then is seen to have place is that all who come to the Committee shall have voices. The Members of the Public Opinion Tribunal are to the members of the community at large what the Members of the House of Commons Committee thus formed are to the Members of the House. This being the case, the Members of the Aristocratical Section of the Tribunal being as much Members of the community as those of the Democratical Section, can not but be Members of the Democratical Section likewise. They have every one of them a vote in it: and this vote not only has a force and effect not less than that of a Member of the Democratical section but a force and effect much greater, rising above it in a scale composed of numerous degrees of magnitude. Still however in proportion as the number of the Members of the Community in the habit of acting in this character encreased, the ratio of the number of /in/ this more extended section to the members in the more contracted Section would encrease - and thus the members of the Aristocratical Section being constantly in a minority the whole Section would be without influence. To preserve their influence they make common cause, secede from the democratical members, and act in a Section apart, forming as it were a House of Lords having an interest of its own different from distinct from and opposite to the interest of the remainder and acting constantly in pursuance of that particular and sinister interest.
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