date

[clx. 403] 1823 Jany. 22 Constitut
[clx. 403]

1823 Jany. 22

Constitut. Code

II. Constitutive

Ch.5. Constitutive

Universal dislocative -why

Corruption analysed

15. Pub. Opin. Trib. insufficient

Of the Public Opinion Tribunal the two great and between them all-comprehensive Sections - the democratical and the aristocratical - have already been brought to view: members of the democratical the subject many; members of the aristocratical, the ruling and otherwise /by other means/ most influential few. To the aggregate interest of the subject many, misrule, with the depredation oppression and dissipation involved in it is prejudicial: corruption therefore as being the immediate efficient cause, and prime and universally applying /operating/ instrument of misrule. But to the aggregate interest /the particular and sinister interest/ of the ruling few, misrule, and therefore corruption is beneficial, at any rate in their sure and constant view of the matter by which every thing they say or do is determined: so far then from opposing the progress of corruption in its progress /operations/, they will of course do every thing to promote it. It is in a word their instrument, kept in operation by them for their own purposes.

True it is that of this aristocratical Section a Sub section there commonly /always/ is by whom in appearance opposition to the work of corruption will naturally be maintained. These are This section is composed of such of those corruptionists as /who/ being such in desire and expectation only, and not being in connection with those in possession, will in this way as in all others be /keep at all times/ making war with them, which they can no otherwise do than by accusing them at the bar of the Public Opinion Tribunal, and using their endeavours to draw down upon them the discontent and resentment of the people. But in no such apparent endeavour ever have they or in the nature of the case ever can they be sincere: were the desires on this occasion crowned with success the object and foundation of their own hopes would, the greatest part of it be destroyed. From any exertions they can make, no such catastrophe however have they to fear. For as hath above been demonstrated, for the extirpation /exclusion/ and even for the diminution of the evil, prohibition and punishment are compleatly and necessarily unavailing: so that they may in this way /by this [...?], make sham attacks without [...?] and always /[...?]/ without any the least ground for apprehension of success
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