date

[clx. 408] 1822 July 12 Constitut
[clx. 408]

1822 July 12

Constitut Code Rationale

Securities Counterforce

4 Legal responsibility

5 Moral responsibility

It being manifest that as members of the same community an identity of interests as between the members of the one Section and those of the other can not but to a considerable extent have place the consequence is - that to the list of the points in which the interests and thence the affections and opinions and actions of the aristocratical section are opposite to each other, an Appendix naturally expected is a list of the points in which the identification or coincidence between the two interests has place. But of a work /an operation/ of this sort the use would not in practice be very considerable. Why? Because in so far as the coincidence has place the force and efficiency of the aristocratical section is included and merged in that of the democratical: and no conclusion applicable to practice is derived /results/ from the coincidence. Not so where the opposition has place: for in so far as it has place, an interest opposite to the interest of the majority is in operation - an interest by which in so far as it predominates the happiness of the majority is made a sacrifice the minority body is over the majority of the whole: the real /unquestionable/ happiness of the many is /unquestionably/ sacrificed to the questionably greater happiness of the few
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