date

[clx. 425] 1822 July 28 Constitut
[clx. 425]

1822 July 28

Constitut. Code

So much for power taken by itself: for power and the minimzation of it considered as a means of prevention applicable to the abuse of it. Now as to the other faculty - the will. By the force of that particular interest to the action of which every human breast is /stands/ exposed, every functionary is at every moment prompted as above to make by himself or to concurr in making the sinister sacrifice. If this sinister force can by any means be prevented from being /becoming/ in that way effective it must be by the operation of some counterforce added to that opposed by his share in the universal interest: sinister force the temptation, counterforce the sanction, antagonizing with one another. Under /As to/ the head of sanctions three of them there has been frequent occasion to hold up to view: the political including the legal, the popular or say the moral, and the superhuman, or say the religious

For a counterforce to the natural to the native indigenous sinister interest

1. First as to the political included the legal. The force of the sanction is the whole of it at the disposal of the rulers: therefore in the very nature of the case it can not be /is incapable it may be said/ opposed to theirs : if for a moment it were so, the next moment they would rid themselves of it. True. But though two rulers taken singly can not be made punishable legally punishable at the same time and for the same cause each of them by the will of the other, yet arrangements in considerable variety are by no means wanting in which opposition may even under an absolute Monarchy be opposed for a time at least to the will of the rulers even of the supreme ruler or rulers. Wherever for example in a Monarchy, were it only to satisfy those whom it may concern, that such as is expressed in a certain document is the will of the Monarch, the countersign, the name for example of some official servant of his is regarded as necessary, this servant so long as he continues in such his office has a negative upon that branch of his Masters power, and possesses in conjunction with a share in it
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