date

[clxii. 175] 1820 May 23 Emancipation
[clxii. 175]

1820 May 23

Emancipation Spanish

'. 7. Rulers gainers

'. 4 Rulers gainers

10. Factitious dignity

Scarcely under any government but in a Monarchy is this instrument in use: and according as the Monarchy is of the pure or the mixt sort the case is /effects of it are/ considerably different.

Under a pure monarchy it can hardly be said to produce any mischievous effect. Under a pure Monarchy there is so much mischief done by more potent injuries - that there is no room for any more Under /For fulfilling the purpose of/ a pure Monarchy punishment /the matter of force/ is of itself nearly /comparatively/ sufficient: as there is nothing good there is nothing to corrupt: as the people have none that so much as pretend to care for them, to advocate /support/ their cause /interest/ there are none on whom it is necessary to operate for the purpose of inducing /to induce/ them to betray that /the/ universal interest.

In a mixt Monarchy is the great and almost the sole demand for it: the /a/ demand for it for the purpose of engaging /practising //operating// upon/ those who are [...?] to be and are stiled as guardians of the peoples interest and so causing them to betray their trust.

But as in a mixt Monarchy as in a pure monarchy the interests of the chief ruler are repugnant to and absolutely irreconcilable with those of the people whom he rules. In addition therefore to these other instruments, without which neither that nor any other form of government can support itself, it is smaller and ineffectual instrument in his hands applicable to the same pernicious purposes.
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