JB_164_125.xml

Title: [[clxiv. 125] 1820 May 23 Emancipation]

Description: [clxiv. 125]

1820 May 23

Emancipation Spanish

?.8. Corruptive influence

?4. Rulers gainers

10 * Mutual convertibility

Like money and moneys worth /goods/ How different so ever in their respective natures these instruments of felicity operate /are applicable/ most of them as means for the procurement of each other: or to sacrifice strict propriety to conciseness they may be said to be convertible into each other In so far as this is the case the more a man gets of any one, the more he gets or may get of all /both/ the others.

JB_164_222.xml

Title: [[clxiv. 222] 1820 June 27 Emancipation]

Description: [clxiv. 222]

1820 June 27

Emancipation Spanish

?.8. Corruptive influence

Corruption without Corrupter

The essence of the mischief /evil/ consists in the existence, in the hands of one or of the few, of a power adequate to the purpose of sacrificing to their own narrow interest the broader interest of the many: corruptive influence is productive /a source/ of evil no otherwise than so far as it is productive of this effect. In /Under/ a pure despotism no corruptive influence it has been already remarked is exercised on the under despots by the despot in chief on the under despots: why because he has no need of going to work in a way so less sure and at the same time so expensive: by force military force, when once it is collected and established, no additional expence is necessitated for the making application of it to this or any other purpose: it costs no more to fire a ball into the bowels of a petitioner for reform than into a target

Accordingly where by the situation a man occupies in the government and by the power attached to that situation he finds himself enabled to put himself into the possession of a mass of the external instruments of felicity in any shape or shapes, to put into his purse /pocket/ for example the matter of depredation in any shape it matters not whether a special corrupter can or can not be found for him in the persons of any other functionary.

If merely by occupying the situation of Chancellor it is in the power of a man at the expence of insolvent debtors and their impoverished creditors to fill with fees his own pockets in that character, and those of his sons or other dependents /worshippers/ whom he would or would not otherwise have had to feed /provide for/ at his own expence in the situation of Commissioner, it makes no difference with regard to the temptation he is under of adding to the public misery for the sake of adding to those emoluments whether he receives this part of his emolument from the hands /at the hands/ of a Corrupter General by a separate deed, or whether without need of application to that primary author of all evil he puts /sweeps/ the money into his purse by means of a power attached already to his office.

JB_164_123.xml

Title: [[clxiv. 123] 1820. May 16 Emancipation]

Description: [clxiv. 123]

1820. May 16

Emancipation Spanish.

ult o

?.8. Corruptive effect

?.4. Rulers gainers

?.8 Of the dominion in question, the operation of corruptive influence to the destruction of whatsoever there is that is good in the Constitution, would sooner or later an inevitable result.

11 Profit in the shape of power of corruption: of giving by the influence of corruption of direction given to the matter of corruption, direction - sinister direction to the conduct of the representatives of the people

Of power in this shape the use to the possessor is the securing to him and his connections in point of interest in possession and expectancy, profit in all those other shapes that have been mentioned.

Power in this shape is an article peculiar to a mixt constitution in which in conjunction /connection/ with a function or functionaries not chosen by the people at large, but succeeding one to another in the way of natural succession functionaries chosen by the people at large have a share.

It is the interest of the people at large, that the quantity of money taken from the people and placed at the disposal of their rulers and from the purpose of affording subsistence and gratification and exemption from evil in every shape, to the people at large to any other purpose than that of security for that subsistence and that gratification and exemption and thence that the profit derived from it in all three shapes be as small as possible. But it is the interest of these same rulers that the quantity so placed at their proposal[?] and of that same profit in all its shapes be as great as possible.

In a pure Monarchy, the external instruments of felicity in all those several shapes have respectively but one value and so in a pure Commonwealth. In a mixt government in addition to that universal value they have a special value: a value in the character of instruments of corruption: instruments of corruption not only applicable but, without need of human operation /exertion/, actually and constantly applying themselves to the breasts of the representatives of the people, self-stiled guardians of the interest of the people: applying themselves in such sort as to engage these self-acknowledged trustees in a /the/ constant habit of betraying their trust