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[clxiv. 151]
1820 July 4.
Emancipation Spanish
ult o
?.8. Corruptive influence
Beginning
Rulers [...?] course
Spaniards In your case, whatsoever is done towards keeping the interest of the leading functionaries from a coincidence with that of the subject many with the universal interest and thereby toward keeping it from a coincidence with their acknowledged duty - whatsoever is done towards enabling them to make sacrifice of to their own private /narrower/ interests the universal interest - it is not by coercive power that, in the first instance it will be done, not by unbridled coercive power to be avowedly exercised over the people, for whatever they propose to themselves to do, neither against the will of the people nor so much as without the cordial[?] support of the people can they hope to do it: for the people have already felt enough of unbridled coercive power, and it is in the hope of keeping themselves secure against it /exempt from it/, in this hope and no other, that they are prepared to continue and with encrease[?] whatsoever support they have given to those who have stood foremost /forward/ for their deliverance from under it.
Remains as the only sort of instrument applicable to the purpose, corruptive influence. And most admirably adapted to the purpose it must be confessed to be. What renders it so admirably adapted to this and every other politically nefarious purpose is the cloud of obscurity in which its nature is involved. This cloud - a cloud which /scarcely/ has never /ever/ yet been compleatly dissipated I will do my best /proceed my friends in my humble/ endeavours to dissipate that you may behold in his true lineaments the subtle fiend - the most formidable, and hitherto in every place but one the too effectual /effective/ enemy of all good government.
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Title: [[clxiv. 217] 1820 July 4 Emancipation]Description: [clxiv. 217] 1820 July 4 Emancipation Spanish As to the representatives of the people, /what their power does/ instead of applying to the power of the Monarch a limit beneficial to the people, and thence serving or helping to promote the coincidence of his single interest with the universal interest and thence with his duty what they do, and as yet but too effectually is to serve as a cloak to the power of the Monarch, and thus rendering it by so much the more easy to sacrifice to that same single interest together with other narrow and thence sinister interests the universal interest. A body of men, by whatsoever name stiled, whether representatives or any thing else, are no /can not be any/ otherwise of use to the people than in so far as at the least in a number sufficient at all times to determine the direction taken by the acts of the whole body they are as above, in fact as well as in name trustees for the people, agents of the people, as such appointed by the people, at short intervals removable by the people, and by such removal at least punishable by the people. The consequence is that, except in an indirect way and by accident, as will be shewn presently, and only for a time to which it is always in their power to put a period at a minutes warning, the people derive no benefit whatsoever from the power which these pretended representatives have in their hands. On the contrary, as will be shewn in the next place, they are all the worse for it. For as the King /Monarch/ with all his military power could not without the aid of these pretended or treacherous Trustees extract out of the people so much money as he can and does with their assistance, he is by this means /in this way/ forced to allow to them a share in the powers of government. But this share they will not add /lend/ to his without being let into a share of the money which he extracts by their means. And thus it is that while the people are kept subject to them by coercive force, their self-stiled representatives are kept subject to them by corruptive influence. So much money as is necessary to the keeping them subject to this corruptive influence, and thereby securing on their part a constant breach of their trust, so much money therefore he must extract from the people, over and above that which for the support of his power it would be necessary for him to extract, if no such treacherous or sham trustees were in existence.
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Title: [[clxiv. 99] 1820 June 20 Emancipation]Description: [clxiv. 99] 1820 June 20 Emancipation Spanish ?. Corruptive influence ?.1. Persons operated on 3 Persons operating? 1 or 3 In a mixt Monarchy, as above, the function and use of those of the public functionaries that are trustees of and for the people is - to operate as a check and controul upon the power of the Monarch. In this case it is to the prejudice of the people, and of the people only that any breach of trust on the part of this class of functionaries as such, a breach of trust by whatsoever means - corruptive influence or any other can operate. In a pure Monarchy, the people having no trustees no breach of trust operating to the prejudice, or at any rate operating in an immediate way to the prejudice of the people can have place. By persons other than the Monarch, the functionaries under him - his public Servants the functionaries under him may be, and /and every where will naturally be/ continually corrupted. But it is not by him that they can be corrupted. Not by him on them can any influence which can with propriety be called corruptive be exercised. To engage them to support his interest to the prejudice of all other interests, no need can he ever have to apply to their breasts the matter of corruption - the instrument of corruptive influence. Whatsoever it is in their power to do in support of such his interest he has it in his power to engage them to do by means of an instrument much more efficient, namely coercive force. The matter of corruption /the instrument of corruptive influence/ leaves acceptance at the option of the party /individual/ to whom it is offered: and by that option its efficiency is narrowed and rendered precarious: coercive force leaves no option leaves nothing wanting to its efficacy. The matter of corruption is a costly matter: the utmost extent to which it can be applied is limited: and the cost of it is a burthen upon the hand /him/ at whose immediate expence it is applied. Of The /Once composed, the/ instrument of coercive force, when once it is composed the application costs nothing: the extent to which it can be applied is unlimited. Manchester Yeomen's sabres. Parson Hays 2,500 a year Living.
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Title: [[clxiv. 219] 1820 July 4 Emancipation]Description: [clxiv. 219] 1820 July 4 Emancipation Spanish ult o ?.8. Corruptive influence Corruption without Corrupter Continue Either a King or [...? ...?] much more both will suffice to bring you under power coercive power Q. To corruption, action needless: situation sufficient. Examples. Of this instrument of mischief the most striking /curious/ /mysterious/ as well as mischievous /efficient/ property is - that it operates and works without need of a hand to move it. Situation, mere situation a still and silent relation between cause and effect between human /moral/ means and human /moral/ motives - suffices for the production of the effect. Before me lies an external instrument of felicity - a lucrative office a mass of power - an ensign of factitious dignity:- from /in/ the very nature of the case without need of any body to inform me of it, I see that if I pursue a certain line of conduct I shall thereby give to myself a more or less considerable probability of obtaining it: if I pursue the opposite line, then am I sure I shall not have. As yet what there is /is stated as being/ in the case is but /simply/ influence. The line of conduct by which alone I can hope to obtain this object of desire is of such a sort by the pursuing of which mischief will be done to the universal interest: no matter: it will be beneficial to my own private interest: I therefore pursue it notwithstanding
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