date

[clxiv. 217] 1820 July 4 Emancipation
[clxiv. 217]

1820 July 4

Emancipation Spanish

As to the representatives of the people, /what their power does/ instead of applying to the power of the Monarch a limit beneficial to the people, and thence serving or helping to promote the coincidence of his single interest with the universal interest and thence with his duty what they do, and as yet but too effectually is to serve as a cloak to the power of the Monarch, and thus rendering it by so much the more easy to sacrifice to that same single interest together with other narrow and thence sinister interests the universal interest.

A body of men, by whatsoever name stiled, whether representatives or any thing else, are no /can not be any/ otherwise of use to the people than in so far as at the least in a number sufficient at all times to determine the direction taken by the acts of the whole body they are as above, in fact as well as in name trustees for the people, agents of the people, as such appointed by the people, at short intervals removable by the people, and by such removal at least punishable by the people.

The consequence is that, except in an indirect way and by accident, as will be shewn presently, and only for a time to which it is always in their power to put a period at a minutes warning, the people derive no benefit whatsoever from the power which these pretended representatives have in their hands.

On the contrary, as will be shewn in the next place, they are all the worse for it. For as the King /Monarch/ with all his military power could not without the aid of these pretended or treacherous Trustees extract out of the people so much money as he can and does with their assistance, he is by this means /in this way/ forced to allow to them a share in the powers of government. But this share they will not add /lend/ to his without being let into a share of the money which he extracts by their means. And thus it is that while the people are kept subject to them by coercive force, their self-stiled representatives are kept subject to them by corruptive influence. So much money as is necessary to the keeping them subject to this corruptive influence, and thereby securing on their part a constant breach of their trust, so much money therefore he must extract from the people, over and above that which for the support of his power it would be necessary for him to extract, if no such treacherous or sham trustees were in existence.
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    ?.8. Corruptive effect

    ?.4. Rulers gainers

    ?.8 Of the dominion in question, the operation of corruptive influence to the destruction of whatsoever there is that is good in the Constitution, would sooner or later an inevitable result.

    11 Profit in the shape of power of corruption: of giving by the influence of corruption of direction given to the matter of corruption, direction - sinister direction to the conduct of the representatives of the people

    Of power in this shape the use to the possessor is the securing to him and his connections in point of interest in possession and expectancy, profit in all those other shapes that have been mentioned.

    Power in this shape is an article peculiar to a mixt constitution in which in conjunction /connection/ with a function or functionaries not chosen by the people at large, but succeeding one to another in the way of natural succession functionaries chosen by the people at large have a share.

    It is the interest of the people at large, that the quantity of money taken from the people and placed at the disposal of their rulers and from the purpose of affording subsistence and gratification and exemption from evil in every shape, to the people at large to any other purpose than that of security for that subsistence and that gratification and exemption and thence that the profit derived from it in all three shapes be as small as possible. But it is the interest of these same rulers that the quantity so placed at their proposal[?] and of that same profit in all its shapes be as great as possible.

    In a pure Monarchy, the external instruments of felicity in all those several shapes have respectively but one value and so in a pure Commonwealth. In a mixt government in addition to that universal value they have a special value: a value in the character of instruments of corruption: instruments of corruption not only applicable but, without need of human operation /exertion/, actually and constantly applying themselves to the breasts of the representatives of the people, self-stiled guardians of the interest of the people: applying themselves in such sort as to engage these self-acknowledged trustees in a /the/ constant habit of betraying their trust
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    Question 6 Is not that admiration well-grounded?

    A. It is well grounded in so far as the share which the people at large possess in appearance is in reality possessed by them: it is ill grounded in so far as the share which in appearance is possessed by them is in reality not possessed by them.

    Question 7 In what consists the appearance of the share which they have in appearance?

    A. In this: viz. that the supreme power of government can not be exercised but with the concurrence in each instance of the majority of the Assembly: the House of Commons, the Members of which are all of them spoken of as /by the common name appellation/ the Representatives of the people, and who are some of them in fact chosen each of them by considerable numbers of the people.

    Question 8 How is it that any share which in appearance {not name} is possessed by the people is not possessed by them in reality.

    {A. It is possessed in reality no further than in as far as the persons stiled their representatives have the same interest with the universal interest, not predominated over by but predominant over every interest adverse to that universal interest, and in particular over every adverse interest capable of being created by the influence of the separate and sinister interest of the Monarch.}

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    3. Persons operating?

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    In the English House of Commons, in profession all the trustees are not only appointed but removable by those for whom they are in trust. In fact some of them are But those who are compose no more than a small minority: /a number never large enough to produce any effect:/ the great majority are like the King /just as is the Monarch/ irremovable.

    Besides the irremovable part of the House of Commons we have a whole legislative Assembly - a whole House as it is called, of which all the Members are irremoveable.